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Abstract 
 
The thesis examines the role of the ‘last Yugoslav generation’ in rethinking Yugoslav 
socialism and the very nature of Yugoslavism. It focuses on the way in which the elite 
representatives of this generation - the publicly prominent and active youth actors in 
Yugoslav late socialism from the spheres of media, art, culture and politics sought to 
rearticulate and redefine Yugoslav socialism and the youth’s link to the state. This 
thesis argues that the Yugoslav youth elite of the 1980s essentially strove to decouple 
Yugoslavism and dogmatic socialism as the country faced a multi-level crisis where old 
and established practices and doctrines began to lose credibility. They progressively 
took over the youth infrastructure (the youth media, the cultural venues and the 
League(s) of Socialist Youth) and sought to hollow out their dogmatically understood 
socialist content, by framing their artistic, media or political activism as targeting 
specific malfunctions of socialist self-management. Hailed as ‘a new political 
generation’, they sought to re-invent institutional youth activism, to reform and 
democratise the youth organisation and hence open up new spaces for cultural and 
political expression, some of which revolved around anti-militarism, environmental 
activism, and issues around sexuality.  
A progressive wing of this generation essentially argued that Yugoslavia could be 
reformed and further democratised. Two dominant strands become obvious: a line of 
argumentation which targeted the ruling elite, exposed its responsibility for the poor 
implementation of socialist self-management and the necessity to thoroughly revise the 
socialist model without abandoning its basic principles; and a later trend in which 
experimentation with liberal concepts and values became dominant. The first type of 
critique - reform socialism - was almost completely abandoned during the very last 
years of the decade, as more and more dominant players in the youth sphere started to 
turn away from socialism and came to appropriate the discourse of human rights, 
pluralism, free market and European integration.  
In this rejection of the socialism of the older generation and search for new values – 
some liberal, some leftist – they were also trying to re-imagine what being a young 
Yugoslav was about. The thesis maintains that this generation embodied a particular 
sense of citizenship and framed its generational identity and activism within the 
confines of what I call ‘layered Yugoslavism’, where one’s ethno-national and Yugoslav 
sense of belonging were perceived as complementary, rather than mutually exclusive. 
Whilst many analyses have focused on the powerful tensions that would lead to 
Yugoslavia’s dismemberment, this work reminds us of the existence of countervailing 
forces: that until the moment of collapse, a series of alternatives continued to exist, 
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embodied most powerfully in the political and cultural work of a young Yugoslav 
generation.  
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Introduction 
 
Why study youth and the 1980s? 
 
‘Post-Yugoslav culture’ has been fascinated by the generational story of 
those who left their mark on the last Yugoslav decade. As an illustration, in what 
was hailed as the ultimate Balkan road (documentary) movie The Long Road 
through Balkan History,1 two writers, a Croat and a Serb, born in 1966 and in 
1975, drove a YUGO car along the former ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ highway. In 
Zagreb, they met former Croatian president and member of the last Yugoslav 
federal presidency Stjepan Mesić and one of them posed the following question: 
‘Mr. President, since I come from Belgrade and I belong to the last generation of 
the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia, I will ask you an unpleasant 
question: what did you mean when you said that your task was finished 
because Yugoslavia had ceased to exist?’2 A number of documentary films, 
books, exhibitions, and theatre plays have been produced over the past ten 
years which in one way or the other deal with the popular youth culture of the 
last Yugoslav decade and with the generation which experienced the violent 
dissolution of the state in their late twenties and early to mid-thirties.3 The need 
for self-reflexivity could be interpreted as an urge to reflect back on the last 
Yugoslav decade and make sense of the social rupture/historical trauma of the 
break-up of socialist Yugoslavia.4  
                                                 
1
 Dugo putovanje kroz istoriju, historiju i povijest (Željko Mirković, 2010). 
All translations hereafter are mine, unless stated otherwise.  
2
 Referring to Stjepan Mesić’s statement from December 1991 upon his return from Belgrade to 
Zagreb: ‘I think I did my task - Yugoslavia doesn’t exist anymore. Thank you very much.’ 
3
 Documentary films such as Srijetno dijete [Happy child] (Igor Mirković, 2003), Orkestar 
[Orchestra] (Pjer Žalica, 2011), The Last Yugoslavian Football Team (Vuk Janic, 2000), Once 
Brothers (Michael Tolajian, 2010); series dedicated to various aspects of post-WW2 Yugoslav 
popular culture and everyday life, such as SFRJ za početnike [SFRY for beginners] (Radovan 
Kupres, 2012) or Robna kuča [Department Store] (Igor Stoimenov, 2009); the ‘NEXT YU’ 
season at Belgrade theatre Atelje 212 and plays such as Rodjeni u YU [Born in YU] (Dino 
Mustafić, 2010) and Zbogom SFRJ [Goodbye SFRY] (Kokan Mladenović, 2011); and scholarly 
and non-scholarly books which have dealt with particular cultural phenomena of the 1980s, 
such as Pavle Levi’s Disintegration in Frames: Aesthetics and Ideology in the Yugoslav and 
Post-Yugoslav Cinema (Stanford University Press, 2007); Dalibor Mišina’s, Shake, Rattle and 
Roll: Yugoslav Rock Music and the Poetics of Social Critique (Ashgate, 2013); Ante Perković’s 
Sedma republika: pop kultura u YU raspadu [Seventh republic: pop culture in the Yugoslav 
dissolution] (Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2011) or Mitja Velikonja’s and Vjekoslav Perica’s 
Nebeska Jugoslavija: interakcije politickih mitologija i pop-kulture [Heavenly Yugoslavia: the 
interaction of political mythologies and pop-culture] (Beograd: XX vek, 2012).  
4
 Alexei Yurchak in his seminal study on the ‘last Soviet generation’ identifies one crucial 
‘inaugural event’ around which the identity of this generation was formed – the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Alan Spitzer similarly underlines this point of disjuncture, which determines a 
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This thesis addresses the experiences and work of the activists and the 
more prominent representatives of the last Yugoslav generation within the 
broad framework of the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia [Savez 
socijalističke omladine Jugoslavije/Сојуз на социјалистичката младина на 
Југославија/Zveza socialistične mladine Jugoslavije/Lidhja e rinisë socialiste të 
Jugosllavisë]. By combining oral history interviews and archival and other 
primary material the thesis seeks to map both the institutional youth sphere and 
the lived histories of the last Yugoslav generation. The generational lens is used 
to provide new insights into the decline of socialism and the collapse of socialist 
Yugoslavia. It shows that the youth’s challenge to the socialism of the older 
generation was an important feature of 1980s’ Yugoslavia and that there was a 
deep commitment to the reforming (and not the dismantling) of the federation, 
based both on leftist and liberal principles. 
Scholarly literature on Yugoslavia views the 1980s primarily as the 
prelude to the violent dissolution of the country and has generally dealt with the 
end of Yugoslavia as a fait accompli. The political trajectories of the major 
actors in the break-up, as well as the major political events, are well mapped 
and have been subject of a range of studies and approaches,5 as scholars were 
initially interested in uncovering the roots of the demise of the country. 
However, few academic works have shifted the focus away from the 
institutional/political sphere and attempted to explore the inner dynamics of 
parts of 1980s’ Yugoslav society on its own terms without necessarily framing it 
within the dissolution narrative.6 As Jasna Dragović - Soso rightly noted, ‘there 
                                                                                                                                               
generation by referring to it as a ‘social trauma’, ‘historical trauma’ or a ‘Great Divide’ (a World 
War or a Depression generation). See: Alan B. Spitzer, ‘The Historical Problem of Generations’, 
The American Historical Review 78/5 (1973), 1353-1385. 
5
 Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy - Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington: 
The Brookings Institution, 1995); Sabrina Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 
1962-1991(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); Andrew Wachtel, Making a Nation, 
Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia (Stanford University Press, 
1998); Dejan Jovic, Yugoslavia: A State That Withered Away (Purdue University Press, 2009); 
Paul B. Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia (London: C. Hurst, 2000); Valerie Bunce, Subversive 
Institutions: the design and the destruction of socialism and the state (Cambridge University 
Press, 1999); Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: the disintegration of Yugoslavia (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1993); V. P. Gagnon, The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s 
(Cornell University Press, 2004). 
6
 For one of the rare analyses that dwells on the intellectual realm in the 1980s, see: Jasna 
Dragović-Soso, ‘Saviours of the Nation’ – Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of 
Nationalism (London: Hurst & Company, 2002). On grassroot mobilisation in the late 1980s, 
see: Nebojša Vladisavljević, Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milošević, the Fall of 
Communism and Nationalist Mobilization (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
Where scholars have dealt with alternatives, they have mostly focused on the 1990s. See, for 
example: Eric Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of 
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has been a tendency to “read history backwards”, ignoring alternatives that did 
exist to the dominant nationalist discourses and policies throughout 
Yugoslavia’s history’.7 Indeed, the existence of alternatives and other attempts 
at rethinking of the Yugoslav framework have been overshadowed by an 
imperative to explain the violent break-up and establish the major reasons 
behind it. However, more recently the field has begun to expand beyond the 
dissolution/ethno-nationalism paradigm, although the majority of authors choose 
to analyse only one of the former Yugoslav republics or regions.8  
This will be one of the first attempts to explore this alternative world of 
the Yugoslav 1980s through a generational lens, taking the variety of political 
and cultural projects that sought to redefine – but not destroy – the Yugoslav 
project. Focusing on the politically and culturally prominent amongst this 
younger generation, the thesis addresses how the Yugoslav youth in the 1980s 
attempted to rearticulate, question and rethink Yugoslav socialism and the very 
notion of Yugoslavism.9 Contestation and negotiation were intricately mixed,10 
                                                                                                                                               
Alternatives (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999) or Bojan Bilić, We Were Gasping for 
Air: [Post-]Yugoslav Anti-War Activism and Its Legacy (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012). 
7
 Jasna Dragović-Soso, ‘Why Did Yugoslavia Disintegrate?: an Overview of Contending 
Explanations’ in Lenard J. Cohen and Jasna Dragovic-Soso (eds.), State Collapse in South-
Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia’s Disintegration (Purdue University Press, 
2008), p.28.  
8
 See: Bojan Bilić and Vesna Janković (eds.) Resisting the Evil: [Post] Yugoslav Anti-War 
Contention (Baden Baden: NOMOS, 2012); Jelena Obradović Wochnik, Ethnic Conflict and War 
Crimes in the Balkans: The Narratives of Denial in Post-conflict Serbia (London: I.B. Tauris, 
2013); Igor Duda, Pronađeno blagostanje. Svakodnevni život i potrošačka kultura u Hrvatskoj 
1970-ih i 1980-ih (Zagreb: Srednja Evropa. 2010).  
Studies on everyday life and social and cultural history have become more prominent in recent 
years. See, e.g. Patrick Hyder Patterson, Bought and Sold: Living and Losing the Good Life in 
Socialist Yugoslavia (Cornell University Press, 2011); Hannes Grandits and Karin Taylor (eds.), 
Yugoslavia’s Sunny Side: A History of Tourism in Socialism (1950s-1980s) (Central European 
University Press, 2010) and Breda Luthar and Maruša Pušnik (eds.), Remembering Utopia: The 
Culture of Everyday Life in Socialist Yugoslavia (Washington: New Academia, 2010). 
9
 The thesis takes into account the ‘recognition that the experience of age is shaped by social 
conditions, including the operation of the state (among other facets such as civil society and 
globalizing processes), and that both individuals and the state actively contribute to its 
meaning.’ See: Johanna Wyn and Dan Woodman, ‘Generation, Youth and Social Change in 
Australia’, Journal of Youth Studies 9/5 (2006), 495-514, p.497.    
10
 In her study of ‘Stalin’s last generation’, Juliane Fürst touches upon the fine line between 
youth oppositional attitudes/cultures and conformism. By arguing that ‘the more an individual 
was exposed to Soviet ideology and integrated in the framework of Soviet education, the better 
he or she was equipped to voice criticism’, Fürst developes an argument similar to some of the 
conclusions from a 1983 study on the Yugoslav youth and the societal crisis which stated that 
‘the youth is particularly sensitive to the growing incompatibility between the theory and the 
practice […] If, during the classes in ‘Marxism and socialist self-management’ and in the media 
they listen to what our society should really look like, in practice they encounter just the opposite 
[...]’ See: Mihailo V. Popović, ‘Sadašnja društvena kriza, omladinski konformizam i bunt’ in 
Dobrica Vulović (ed.), Omladina i društvene krize (Beograd: Centar za marksizam Univerziteta u 
Beogradu, 1983), p.19.  
13 
 
as the Yugoslav youth elite of the 1980s essentially strove to decouple 
Yugoslavism and dogmatic socialism. They framed their artistic, media or 
political activism as targeting certain prescribed norms, particular malfunctions 
of the system, or the older elite - rather than as strictly anti-institutional or anti-
Yugoslav. The thesis refers to several theories/notions which are closely related 
to the phenomena it engages with: space, identity and citizenship. The 
citizenship lens might be useful for accounting for social and political activism 
and its relation to space in late socialism, as it elucidates one significant 
dimension of the youth’s engagement with the state in the 1980s – negotiation, 
pragmatism and challenge from within.11  
This thesis also seeks to provide a pan-Yugoslav perspective. Most work 
which has dealt with late socialist culture has done so through case studies of 
particular republics – an approach which has often been the product of a post-
socialist and post-Yugoslav ‘methodological nationalism’.12 Studies which have 
dealt with youth politics and culture in late socialist Yugoslavia have tended to 
focus on Slovenia13, generally internalising the narrative of the developed, 
                                                                                                                                               
Lines of comparison are also to be found in the disillusionment with the reality which appeared 
incompatible with the promoted socialist ideals, the critique which targeted the new ‘red 
bourgeoisie’, but did not necessarily question the basic premises of socialism and the fact that 
the main critique which went beyond the Soviet frame was coming from the artistic milieus. In 
the Yugoslav context the student movement ‘in the late sixties and early seventies, for example, 
criticized the ruling party for inefficiency in carrying out the socialist revolution – that there was 
not enough egalitarianism, self-management, or solidarity with other revolutionary movements’. 
Gregor Tomc, ‘The Politics of Punk’ in Jill Benderly (ed.), Independent Slovenia: Origins, 
Movements, Prospects (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp.113-135.  
On the 1968 student protests in Yugoslavia, see: Hrvoje Klasić, Jugoslavija i svijet 1968 
(Zagreb: Ljevak, 2012). 
11
 In this context, the concept of Eigen-Sinn as employed by Adolf Lüdtke and Thomas 
Lindenberger appears as particularly relevant, as it ‘consists of the plethora of interpretations 
and patterns of behaviour by the individual confronted with political, social and cultural 
structures […] explores the rich space created by the citizens’ own personal negotiations 
between public and private demands and opportunities’. See: Jan Palmowski, ‘Between 
Conformity and Eigen-Sinn: New Approaches to GDR History’ (Workshop Report), German 
History 20/4 (2002), 494-502; T. Lindenberger (ed.), Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur. 
Studien zur Gesellschaftsgeschichte der DDR (Cologne, 1999); A. Lüdtke, Eigen-Sinn. 
Industriealltag, Arbeitserfahrungen und Politik vom Kaiserreich bis zum Faschismus (Hamburg, 
1993). 
In the context of East Germany, Anna Saunders has similarly underlined ‘the importance of 
interaction between the ruling elite and the masses, in the form of negotiation, bargaining and 
the pursuit of one’s own interests’. See: Anna Saunders, Honecker’s Children, p.10. 
12
 Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, ‘Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation-
state building, migration and the social sciences’, Global Networks 2/4 (2002), 301-334.  
The authors’ observation that ‘The social sciences have become obsessed with describing 
processes within nation-state boundaries as contrasted with those outside, and have 
correspondingly lost sight of the connections between such nationally defined territories’ might 
not ring true for all area studies, but it is a valid observation in the context of Yugoslav studies.  
13
 See: Blaž Vurnik, Med Marksom in punkom (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2005); Milan Balažic, 
Slovenska demokratična revolucija 1986-1988 (Ljubljana: Liberalna akademija, 2004). 
14 
 
democratic North and the undeveloped, conservative South and the peculiarity 
of the Slovenian case in comparison to the other parts of Yugoslavia.14 By 
taking a broader frame, this thesis seeks to engage with important questions 
about the evolution of Yugoslav youth culture and politics as a whole in the 
1980s. It addresses, for instance, the extent to which there was a fragmentation 
of the institutional youth realm at the end of the decade along 
national/republican lines. Did political and cultural divides within republics, or 
links across republican borders, remain equally important? Did the de facto 
confederal institutional set-up of socialist Yugoslavia, which meant that most of 
the youth did not for the most part engage with the federal level, imply that 
republican centres remained heavily bounded spaces for activism, and that 
attempts at rethinking Yugoslav politics, culture and identity were always limited 
by the reality of the particular republic? Or were trans-republican reformist or 
liberal networks, which cut across those ethno-national divisions remain 
important? Certainly these questions are worth considering: acts of ‘trans-
national cross-fertilisation’15 have generally been overlooked or over-shadowed 
by an emphasis on growing friction and inability to reach any type of consensus 
in the 1980s. The same is valid for the various articulations of Yugoslavism (see 
below) in a context where the Yugoslav identification was politically and 
practically discouraged. Hence, the thesis explores the idea that comparisons 
across republican lines and a pan-Yugoslav approach enables us to trace the 
mutual influences, interactions and debates in the youth sphere seen through its 
wide institutional network of the League of Socialist Youth, especially in the light 
of the various attempts at youth reform across the different federal units.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
Studies which have taken a Yugoslav approach to late socialist Yugoslav popular/music culture 
focus on the social critique embedded in the lyrics of some of the prominent musicians and 
bands. See: Dalibor Mišina, Shake, Rattle and Roll: Yugoslav Rock Music and the Poetics of 
Social Critique (Ashgate, 2013).  
One of the rare earlier works which took a cultural perspective focused on Serbia in the 1990s: 
Eric Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia. 
14
 As it has been argued, ‘Not only a gap was widening in Yugoslavia between the north, which 
was slowly entering the post-industrial age, and the south, which was remaining or drifting back 
into premodern times, but a similar gap was emerging between the urbanites and the peasants, 
workers, and petty bureaucrats.’ See: Aleš Erjavec, ‘Neue Slowenische Kunst-New Slovenian 
Art: Slovenia, Yugoslavia, Self-Management, and the 1980s’ in Aleš Erjavec (ed.), 
Postmodernism and the Postsocialist Condition: Politicized Art under Late Socialism 
(Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 2003), p.154. 
15
 Anna von der Goltz, ‘Introduction: Generational belonging and the ‘68ers’ in Europe’ in Anna 
von der Goltz (ed.), ‘Talkin’ ‘bout my generation’: Conflicts of generation building and Europe’s 
‘1968 (Wallstein Verlag, 2011), p.12.   
15 
 
The challenges of writing a generational history: the generational 
lens 
 
Why use a generational lens to study the alternative ways of rethinking 
the Yugoslav socialist project? As I will explore in the thesis itself, the idea that 
this challenge to established notions of the Yugoslav project was generational 
was noted at the time both by youth and external observers. For instance, the 
idea of a new generation that would bring forward significant changes was 
current in contemporary international and domestic political/scholarly discourse. 
As the 1980 UNESCO report on youth noted,  
‘Finally, it should be recalled that the youth of the 1980s are the children 
of the youth of the 1960s… The new generation faces a considerable 
challenge in carrying their parents’ hopes and dreams into an 
economically inhospitable future. Many argue that the new generation is 
more realistic and less utopian than the generation that came before it. It 
may be suggested, however, that the sobering tasks and even the defeats 
that confronted their parents never eclipsed a belief in real progress 
towards justice, equality and peace.’16   
 
New ideas about the socialist project, about the extent of media 
freedoms, and notions of Yugoslavism were for the most part concentrated in 
critiques advanced by a younger age cohort who had been socialised in the 
1960s and 1970s, and within an institutional space devoted to socialisation of 
the young – the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia (LSYY). The thesis 
maintains that a generational approach provides new insights into the 
processes of remaking/rethinking and decline in late socialism. The younger 
generation was not central to negotiating the dissolution, yet some of its 
representatives were at the forefront of trying to rethink Yugoslav socialist 
federalism. The stretching of the boundaries of media freedom – a phenomenon 
led by the youth press - is one among many examples of the inner dynamics of 
transformation of late socialist Yugoslav society led by a younger cohort. 
Furthermore, a generational lens would provide insight into new forms of 
political expression in the 1980s, some of which found shelter within the 
different parts of the Youth League and (re)shaped youth journalism and the 
youth press as a space for debate and contention.  
In this sense, this thesis draws upon the work by Karl Mannheim, who 
advanced new understandings of how generational cohorts form. All reflections 
                                                 
16
 Youth prospects in the 1980s: Synthesis report presented to the General Conference of 
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on generation depart from the seminal essay by Mannheim which posits 
generation as ‘nothing more than a particular kind of identity of location, 
embracing related “age groups” embedded in a historical-social process’.17 
Later studies proposed that the problem of generations could be summarised as 
one of the ‘linkage of personal time (the life cycle) and social time (history)’,18 
i.e. that one sociological (or what one may call historical) generation may in fact 
encompass many biological generations, since age groups19 are not to be 
identified with generations. Given that ‘generation’ is a subject of study in 
history, sociology, anthropology, and politics, it is often an elusive, slippery 
concept that requires more precise definition depending on the context of 
analysis. 
Few scholars have drawn on Mannheim’s insights – whether explicitly or 
implicitly – in framing Yugoslav history in generational terms (see below). From 
this outlook, socialist Yugoslavia becomes a generational project of a combined 
revolutionary and partisan generation20 – the older cohort (born at the end of the 
19th and the first decade of the 20th century) which led the underground 
communist movement in the interwar period and the revolutionary liberation 
struggle during the Second World War and drafted the socio-political contours 
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of the new federation; and the younger cohort of revolutionaries who joined the 
partisan guerillas led by Tito as youths (see Annex 2). Although few of them 
were still active in the late Yugoslav political scene in the 1980s (such as 
Minister of Defense and first general of the Army Veljko Kadijević, born 1925), 
the positions of power were in general held by the ‘post-war generation’, that is 
the first Yugoslav generation of individuals who did not have any conscious 
personal experience of the Second World War.21 Indeed, what has been 
referred to as ‘a generational shift within the regional party leaderships’22 took 
place gradually in the second half of the 1980s in different federal units and at 
the level of federal leadership. Beside Slovenian Milan Kučan (born 1941), 
Azem Vllasi (born 1948) also came at the helm of the League of Communists of 
Kosovo in 1986, and Slobodan Milošević (born 1941) took over the Serbian 
Party branch in 1987. A number of scholars have attempted to build these 
generational frames into their understanding of politics in the 1980s. As Lenard 
Cohen observed, for example:  
‘The ascendancy of the post-partisan elite generation to the highest level 
of the political hierarchy received striking recognition at the 13th Congress 
of the Yugoslav League of Communists in June 1986. Thus, while 58 
percent of the former Central Committee elected in 1982 had participated 
in the National Liberation War, this was true of only 24 percent of the 1986 
Committee […] Forty years after founding the communist regime, Tito’s 
“younger” comrades-in-arms were relinquishing the country’s highest 
positions to a new political generation.’23    
   
In addition, Cohen underlined ‘the juxtaposition of different generational 
cohorts, with different formative experiences and different levels and types of 
skills’.24 Nebojša Vladisavljević also used these generational frames to make 
sense of political change in the 1980s:  
‘members of the younger generation had very different formative 
experiences, values and skills from the old guard, which inevitably 
affected the general direction of policy, relations within the political class 
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and state-society relations. Unlike members of the old guard, most were 
well educated, with a background in administration, business or local 
politics […] priorities gradually shifted toward economic reform, more open 
intra-party debates, the relaxation of repression and more autonomy for 
low- and middle-ranking party and state officials.’25  
 
Nevertheless, in the Yugoslav political and public/media scene in the 
second half of the 1980s, three different political generations were present, 
more often than not with different and conflicting visions. Although there was a 
shared consensus that the Yugoslav socialist framework needed reform, 
consensus on the way it should be achieved, the scope of reform and the 
particulars of it could not be reached. This research seeks to offer insight into 
the most junior of the three generations, which was at the forefront of trying to 
rethink the Yugoslav project, attemped to reform certain aspects of the system 
and believed in its reformability much longer than members of a young cohort in 
other parts of Eastern Europe. By ushering in new grievances, envisaging new 
solutions and a new understanding of the polity the previous two generations 
had built, it searched for both liberal and leftist models to do so. Thus, the thesis 
seeks to reinforce the idea that alternatives did exist in the 1980s.  
This thesis does not overlook the diversity of outlooks within a particular 
generation. Mannheim also developed the notion of a ‘generational unit’, as a 
sub-category of a generation: ‘Youth experiencing the same concrete historical 
problems may be said to be part of the same actual generation; while those 
groups within the same actual generation which work up the material of their 
common experiences in different specific ways, constitute separate generational 
units’.26 In the context of the last Yugoslav generation, the ‘professional’ youth 
functionaries within the League of Socialist Youth, the punk youth, the young 
sportsmen, the military youth, the university youth, may be said to have formed 
separate generational units. The ensuing chapters look both at the divisive and 
the cohesive points among some of them. In this sense, the idea of generation 
does not simply describe an age cohort shaped by similar life experiences, but 
also the emergence of a consciousness of belonging to an age-determined 
group, even amongst groups with seemingly different political or social views. 
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Here the thesis draws on more recent constructivist work in generation studies, 
which explores the construction of the feeling of belonging to a generation 
within groups over time to a far greater degree than Mannheim attempted.27   
While acknowledging the essential fact that there were prominent 
differences in social status, education, ethnic/religious belonging, gender and/or 
profession, the thesis departs from the idea that this generation was marked in 
different ways by the ‘historical trauma’ of the Yugoslav collapse and the 
subsequent wars, while in their earlier or later formative years they were all 
exposed to the omnipresent discourse and reality of a multi-level crisis. Broadly, 
the thesis explores the last Yugoslav generation during the last Yugoslav 
decade 1981-1991 within the broad framework of the institutional youth realm – 
the extended network of the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia. It focuses 
on individuals born between 1954 and 1969, who belonged in the category of 
youth (16-28) at some point during the 1980s, born to parents who belonged to 
the ‘first Yugoslav generation’, themselves raised and socialised in post-WW2 
Yugoslavia. Although the last Yugoslav generation is approached as a socio-
political generation that spans several biological generations,28 the members of 
which experienced the 1991-1992 historical juncture as young adults, it is 
evident that there are two distinct cohorts within it: the older born in the mid to 
late 1950s and the younger born after 1960.  
Secondly, a generational lens is important because generational 
discourse was a central feature of public and political understandings of youth, 
as well as of the Yugoslav research on youth in general. In the 1980s, this was 
constructed by academic and public discourse as a ‘crisis generation’, or, 
indeed, as a generation that will bring changes.29 It is important to note that the 
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generation lens was appropriated by many, if not all scholarly studies on the 
youth in socialist Yugoslavia (the terms used were (mlada) generacija or 
pokoljenje). It has been observed that the generation concept was one of the 
preferred analytical lenses among Yugoslav scholars because it was 
understood as oppositional to the Marxist class paradigm.30 Even the 1986 all-
Yugoslav JUPIO research clearly referred to Mannheim’s terminology and 
stated as one of its goals the description of the ‘characteristics of the different 
generation units which might exist within this generation’.31 Nevertheless, few 
have taken up this conceptual apparatus to analyse the story of post-WW2 
Yugoslavia. Many studies which have dealt with youth and generation originate 
from the socialist period. Yugoslav sociologist Djordjije Uskoković32, for 
instance, argued that one can observe the existence of three dominant 
generations in socialist Yugoslavia: the war generation – which took part in the 
antifascist revolution and began the rebuilding of the state; the post-war 
generation, which mainly came of age in the 1950s and was modeling self-
management according to its own interests - which is also the generation that, 
because of the general lack of educated professional cadres after the Second 
World War managed to establish itself in all of the key positions in the spheres 
of politics, economy and culture. Finally, according to Uskoković, there is the 
‘young’ generation – coming of age in the 1970s and at the beginning of the 
1980s, facing the contradictions between the proclaimed values and norms and 
the day-to-day reality they faced.  
Thirdly, this generational discourse has also continued in popular 
memory, and continues to shape the way in which people from this generation 
understand the 1980s and the (post)socialist decline.33 This is largely due to the 
impressive cultural production and creative output (alongside the significant 
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achievements in sport) from young Yugoslavs in their late teens or in their 
twenties throughout the 1980s. This generational self-identification has 
persisted mainly because the majority of those cultural products have preserved 
their prominence in the post-socialist context (in particular in popular culture, 
sport and cinematography) and the actors continued their careers within the 
same spheres after the Yugoslav dissolution.34 Hence, a generational lens is 
chosen to deconstruct a generation which has featured prominently in post-
Yugoslav music and culture, as well as in order to demonstrate the effect of the 
systemic crisis of the 1980s on a particular group which contributed to many of 
the debates, but did not have a real stake in the resolution of the Yugoslav 
crisis. Moreover, the concept has remained important as it has been capable of 
taking on new meanings, particularly amongst the liberal-left who came to 
understand themselves as a generation defined by a failure to stop the older 
cohort destroying the country. Post-Yugoslav works have sought to find ‘our 
generation’ within late Yugoslav literature, music, media, sport, politics or 
theatre.35 This was a generational consciousness solidified for some by the 
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experience of war, the breakup of Yugoslavia and the loss of geo-political and 
international status. The violent break-up of Yugoslavia also had a lot to do with 
the veneration and even the mythologisation of the Yugoslav ‘new wave’ music 
scene, for example. It should be noted that some are reluctant to use or 
appropriate the generational mould, or are prone to refuse it outright. The 
skepticism towards identifying as a part of a generation is generally a result of a 
deep sense of disappointment and bitterness towards the eruption of violence 
and the subsequent destruction of the state, often related to the political or even 
intimate splits between former colleagues and friends. The concept of 
‘generation’ has been also rejected by many of those who became successful 
nationalist or anti-Communist figures, and who did not wish to define 
themselves according to their cultural or political projects of the 1980s.  
Moreover, embarking on a generational study makes a pan-Yugoslav 
approach both inevitable and viable. Work conducted in the post-Yugoslav 
period has tended to focus on the experience of particular republics or groups: 
using the generational frame enables us to tell a pan-Yugoslav story. This does 
not necessarily mean a homogenisation of a diverse set of experiences – 
rather, we can use the concept of ‘generation’ to address how far activists 
worked across national boundaries as young people, or how they interacted 
within the institutional youth sphere, noting both the divides and connections 
that emerged. The youth, of course, was a vast heterogeneous category that 
the system identified as a potential guarantee for its future preservation and, 
consequently, invested a lot in shaping it into a progressive force and a unique 
front that carried the labels of ‘socialist’ and ‘Yugoslav’. Hence, a generational 
lens would also provide insight into the very making (and unmaking) of 
Yugoslav supranationalism (referred to throughout as ‘Yugoslavism’). Although 
the sense of supra-ethnic/Yugoslav belonging36 was conceived of, acted out, 
internalised, passed on, propagated in different ways by different groups and 
individuals, it essentially embodied an additional layer of identification, as well 
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as an additional sphere of interaction and convergence, which this research 
aims to dissect and illuminate, in particular with regard to those who 
experienced the ‘crisis decade’ as youngsters or young adults. Supra-
nationalism is often used by political scientists and historians to describe 
institutional arrangements typical for multi-national or multi-cultural federations, 
confederations or federation-like entities and unions (from the USSR to the 
European Union). This research does not use the notion in its strictly 
institutional dimension, but rather employs it to refer to a new ‘sense of 
citizenship’ and (political and cultural) membership in late Yugoslav socialism. 
Finally, adopting a generational lens gives fresh perspectives on the 
decline of state socialism, as in the realm of post-socialist studies there has 
been an increased interest in examining the rise and fall of socialism in Eastern 
Europe in generational terms.37 By analysing a particular social group, it is 
possible to view the exit from socialism in other ways and challenge the 
teleological accounts of Yugoslavia’s collapse. More specifically, it enables us 
to examine the experience of crisis. This thesis embeds the ‘last Yugoslav 
generation’ within the discourse of crisis that marked Yugoslav late socialism. It 
designates three most prominent generational markers of the ‘crisis generation’ 
(generacija krize) - the multi-level economic and political crisis, 
internationalism/Europeanism, and a new understanding of Yugoslavism as 
citizenship in its dimensions of rights and identity.38 The 1986 all-Yugoslav 
research on the youth noted that Yugoslav society is witnessing the proliferation 
of a ‘non-classical political generation’ [neklasična politička generacija], ‘a 
generation which desires and brings along changes’39, while a 1988 study 
referred to it as a ‘new political generation’.40 This underpins the notion that a 
generation which rose to prominence as the new decade and the post-Tito era 
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were dawning had been socialised differently and was bound to bring change in 
advance of that actually materialising. I map the first level - the generation of the 
crisis - as something that occurred as a process of external labeling, the second 
level - Europeanism/internationalism - as a generational consciousness, a 
dominant way of self-narration and self-perception within European/international 
frameworks, and finally the third level - layered Yugoslavism - intricately related 
to the second as a form of self-definition, i.e. what I observe as this generation’s 
new ‘sense of citizenship’41 and differently conceptualised activism which 
sought to rearticulate socialism and Yugoslavism. Hence, the first generational 
pillar as identified here which revolves around the notion of ‘crisis’ reflects the 
dominant scholarly/sociological observations with regard to the Yugoslav youth 
dating from the period under scrutiny, i.e. the 1980s; the second generational 
pillar relates to this generation’s own sense of 
Europeanism/cosmopolitanism/internationalism as conveyed at the time by its 
representatives and as construed by its members a posteriori in the post-
socialist period; the third generational pillar complements the previous two with 
my own reading of this generation’s new forms of youth activism and 
engagement with/perception of the state. 
As was mentioned above, the thesis addresses a generational challenge 
that focused above all on rethinking Yugoslavism and socialism. The thesis 
seeks to provide a different perspective on these debates in the 1980s. The way 
in which the young generation in the 1980s was, for the most part, positively 
rethinking Yugoslavism was a question which had its roots in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. A 1971 study on the political integration and attitudinal consensus 
in Yugoslavia42 provided valuable insight into what was that same year a new 
addition to the Yugoslav census: the category of the ‘Yugoslavs’. The author 
convincingly argued that ‘these individuals may represent a new element within 
Yugoslav society’ and that ‘the individual claiming a Yugoslavian nationality 
represents a unique citizen in that society’.43 The study concluded that 81% of 
this population had completed at least a gymnasium or middle school 
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education, 85% were under 45 years of age, 88% were Atheists, and 70% were 
Communists. Thus, it outlined patterns which would be addressed by 
subsequent studies: namely, that those choosing to declare a supra-ethnic 
belonging were mainly individuals of mixed parentage (‘defensive 
Yugoslavism’), the urban, educated, young, mobile strata (‘demographic 
Yugoslavism’). In addition, Yugoslav sociology also took into consideration the 
category of ‘Yugoslav’ as preferred national identification, or the so-called ‘latent 
Yugoslavism’.44 However, the 1971 study also underlined the cleavages and 
divides in terms of values and perceptions between ‘the multination orientation 
of the Yugoslav population’ and other segments of the population.45 
The ‘sharp rise in supranationalist sentiment’46 that became particularly 
prominent after the 1981 census47 was in line with ‘the personal recollections of 
many foreigners, who found that young people from Belgrade or Zagreb were 
as likely to identify themselves as Yugoslavs as anything else in this period’.48 
This is intrinsically related to what Ana Dević designates as the ‘Yugo-
cosmopolitan cultural habitus’49 when talking about the younger generation of 
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the last Yugoslav decade and the fact that due to the rising unemployment, the 
youth profited from an unlimited leisure time and hence an expanding trans-
Yugoslav cultural space. The studies focusing on the notion of Yugoslavism, on 
the common identity and on the ethnic composition of Yugoslavia point to the 
fact that the categories which were most likely to identify as Yugoslav were the 
urban residents, the young, those from nationally mixed parentage, the 
Communist Party members and the minorities.50  
The debates concerning the reform and future of Yugoslav socialism 
which unfolded in the political realm in the 1980s have been mapped by the 
numerous authors (some of whom were quoted above) who chose to engage 
with the political history of late socialist Yugoslavia. This thesis seeks to 
elucidate both the similarities and the differences between the debates on the 
future of Yugoslavia and Yugoslav socialism in the youth and the political 
realms. Essentially, it addresses the specificities of what was seen as a 
generational challenge to an ‘aging’ socialist system embodied by an older elite.  
 
Other conceptual frames: rethinking dissidence, civil society and 
space 
 
This thesis provides contribution to the literature on late Cold War 
challenges to state socialism, in that it examines a case in which nearly all of 
the dissenting political and cultural projects were contained within institutional 
structures. Amidst a rich body of literature dealing with late socialist Yugoslavia 
and its eventual demise, few depart from the realm of high politics and even 
fewer scrutinise the ways the multi-level crisis affected a particular group – in 
this case the youth and young adults, and how it shaped its understanding of 
the state and of its role in it. The thesis attempts to blur the line between what is 
considered ‘alternative’, ‘oppositional’ and ‘institutional’ or ‘official’, by shedding 
light on the intricacies in the youth’s interaction with the state and on the inner 
dynamics of the wide youth infrastructure, which was a product of the particular 
Yugoslav institutional arrangements and the doctrine of self-management. 
Hence, it maintains that the League of Socialist Youth still represented a 
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location for real meaningful politics. Consequently, research focusing less on 
dissidence and resistance and more on adaptation within existing institutional 
structures would provide new insights and open up new venues within the field 
of socialist studies. Furthermore, the thesis seeks to deconstruct labels such as 
‘anti-Yugoslav’ and contextualise particular acts, demands and initiatives.  
The thesis critically engages with the actors themselves to establish how 
they saw their relationship with the state and the envisioned reform. While many 
authors situate such actors within the framework of dissidence51 and civil 
society, this study, by contrast, questions the utility of the uncritical application 
of both notions, by arguing that the opposition to the political elite and the 
malfunctions of Yugoslav socialism within the youth realm did not transform into 
an outright opposition to the system as such, i.e. into demands for ‘an exit from 
socialism’, until very late in the decade. Rather, it will explore why there was a 
genuine belief amongst many of the critical actors that they could still work 
within the system to reform it in such a way that it would preserve its 
progressive and Yugoslav dimensions. They neither withdrew nor opted out of 
the institutional/public space and culture; rather, they met the state in its own 
‘official’ territory and challenged it there. In this sense, this particular case study 
of youth politics and culture, and reinvention of space in late socialist 
Yugoslavia, could offer an excellent platform from which to approach the 
complexity of the period and transcend some of the established approaches in 
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the field of state-society relations in both socialist Yugoslavia and the socialist 
world.  
Which concepts can we use to make sense of this relationship between 
state and society? Some scholars have used the term ‘socialist civil society’.52 
This term does capture aspects of the progressive liberalisation of the public 
sphere after 1980 that allowed the young to utilise the youth infrastructure for 
channelling novel demands and to act as one of the ‘main promoters of the 
spontaneous modernisation’,53 i.e. of the process of progressive 
democratisation from within. Arguably, ‘the society looked at itself on a big, 
pluralist screen, covered with different images, icons and discourses’.54 Yet, for 
others, this term is problematic because, in the literature, the very notion of civil 
society is conceived as a force that inevitably undermines socialism.55 ‘Civil 
society’ was indeed being used at the time both in the Yugoslav and in other 
Eastern European contexts. The Polish dissident movement in the late 1970s, 
for example, was hailed as ‘the rebirth of civil society’.56 Yet, ‘the elevation of 
civil society meant not so much a new relationship between state and society as 
their virtual uncoupling’.57 In the Yugoslav context, this relationship was much 
more dynamic and the public/private or state/society dichotomies were not as 
apparent and straightforward. Considering propositions that different concepts 
could meaningfully address the same phenomena as civil society does (namely 
curtailing state power, promoting and upholding pluralism, and securing the 
right for contesting the status quo and political action), a consensus had been 
reached that ‘the concept therefore needs to be broadened, relativized and 
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adapted to local conditions’.58 
In order to address the issue of activism/activist citizenship, I borrow the 
notion of ‘acts of citizenship’.59 Particularly useful for addressing the subtle and 
pragmatic ways of dialoguing, interacting with and navigating the youth 
institutions and the institutions of the state, i.e. for addressing the fact that the 
activist core of this generation was essentially working to reshape the idea of 
participation in the system, acts are those that ‘rupture or break the given 
orders, practices and habitus. Creative ruptures and breaks take different forms 
that are irreducible. They can, for example, take forms of resistance or 
subservience’.60 Beside political - ‘in so far as these acts constitute constituents 
(beings with claims)’ - acts could also be ethical, cultural (‘carnivalesque’), 
sexual or social. They are ‘those acts that transform forms (orientations, 
strategies, technologies) and modes (citizens, strangers, outsiders, aliens) of 
being political by bringing into being new actors as activist citizens (claimants of 
rights and responsibilities) through creating new sites and scales of struggle’.61 
The thesis also brings together the concepts of generation and space. It 
focuses for the most part on the institutional youth sphere – i.e. the one 
contained within the spaces of the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia, 
both at federal and republican level. Unlike studies on other Eastern European 
countries, this work will focus on how a new generational challenge came from 
within the institutions of the system. Accounting for youth activism and its 
relation to space in late socialism would not only help transcend the prism of 
‘binary socialism’,62 but it would also provide us with a valuable secondary 
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framework through which to study the inner dynamics of socio-political change 
in late socialist Yugoslavia. In this context, Francesca Polletta’s argument that 
‘Counterhegemonic ideas and identities come neither from outside the system, 
nor from some free-floating oppositional consciousness, but from long-standing 
community institutions’63 seems particularly relevant. The thesis addresses 
space through the notion of a youth sphere/youth realm. In particular, it will 
focus on the range of spaces – from the ones associated with the ‘liminoid’64 
settings relevant for youth politics and culture in the 1980s – the youth media, 
the student cultural centres, etc., to the political arenas of the LSYY and its role 
as a ‘socio-political organisation’. The wide network of the League of Socialist 
Youth as a form of public space which accommodated both mainstream and 
‘alternative’ politics and cultures is analysed in Chapter 1.     
The thesis does not aspire to tell an exhaustive story of the last Yugoslav 
generation. It engages with its ‘public face’, i.e. with a progressive, 
predominantly urban elite which was socially, politically or culturally engaged 
and publicly present in the youth realm. The majority of these individuals came 
from the big urban Yugoslav centers and appropriated urbanity as a prominent 
trait of their image and self-perception. The 1986 JUPIO research revealed 
some striking differences along the lines of urban/rural residency and social 
origin. It showed, for instance, that those whose parents were functionaries, 
highly educated and well positioned within society displayed a higher extent of 
discontent with the socio-political reality when compared to the rural or less 
educated youth.65  
One cannot help but consider the question of how legitimate it is to treat 
these particular individuals as representatives of a generation and what the 
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possibilities and limits are of such an approach. It should be emphasised that 
venturing outside of the realm of political history of late Yugoslav socialism is a 
step into largely uncharted territory. There has not been a study of the youth in 
Yugoslavia comparable to those quoted above dealing with generations and 
youth in the Soviet Union or East Germany. Not all archives are accessible 
because of the 30-year rule and events have to be reconstructed through other 
types of material (interviews, media accounts, etc.) Departing from the 
institutional youth framework and tracing the ‘official’ youth representatives and 
those who claimed to speak on behalf of a new generation of youth, is, simply 
put, easier and a more viable goal for a research project of limited duration and 
for a research topic which has not been studied in any depth. However, taking 
the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia as a framework – because of its 
decentralised and flexible network which accommodated many non-political and 
non-mainstream initiatives, individuals and groups – allows us to incorporate 
wider segments of the youth population. What it does not offer is an insight into 
other more marginal groups which began to gain prominence at the very end of 
the decade, such as various groups of religious youth, football fans and those 
who converged around the newly formed political parties after 1990. Also, the 
thesis does not specifically reflect on what could be considered separate 
generation units: the last Yugoslav sports generation, or the last Yugoslav 
literary generation, for instance. Last but not least, it is almost impossible to 
acknowledge and take into account the entire set-up of the institutional youth 
network, as almost every factory, army barrack, secondary school, municipality, 
town and every faculty and university had their LSY branch and some sort of a 
youth bulletin or newspaper. Rather, this thesis has carefully selected a range 
of youth ‘case studies’ through which we gain access to a range of generational 
experiences and challenges in the youth sphere.  
The individuals who in the 1980s were involved at different levels in the 
Youth League constitute an undeniably heterogeneous group. Yet, two more or 
less clearly delineated groups emerge: one constituted by the youth 
functionaries which at that time were openly criticised for the numerous 
privileges they enjoyed, and the other camp of more non-conformist, 
intellectually oriented youngsters who were part of the wide range of related 
youth organisations and bodies (magazines, newspapers, cultural clubs and 
centres, publishing and research centres, etc.). Many of those who held 
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important positions within the Youth League would pursue their political careers 
after 1991. Although, as it has been noted above, the principal carrier of the 
dissolution and the post-socialist transition was the ‘post-war generation’ of 
older socialist elites, there were some of the younger youth functionaries who 
joined the reformed communists (in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro) or 
entered politics through newly-established parties (like in Slovenia, Macedonia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina). The ‘progressive’ stream, which both within the youth 
organisation and in culture embraced different liberal, civic ideas or articulated 
a-political voices of rebelliousness and anti-war activism generally remained 
marginal and side-lined during and after the dissolution. Nevertheless, they 
were visible in the political youth sphere at the end of the 1980s and especially 
prominent in the realm of 1980s’ youth media and culture.  
             
The voices of the shadow elite: methodological considerations  
 
How can we capture the multiple debates that occurred in these official 
and semi-official spaces across the different republics that demonstrate the 
experiences of this last Yugoslav generation? It has been done partly through 
the official records of the LSYY, the transrepublican nature of which allows for a 
comparative approach. Yet, institutional histories can elucidate only a certain 
aspect of the political and cultural activism of the youth in the 1980s. Rather, 
drawing both on published material and on oral history testimonies would 
provide a sense of a range of responses in different parts of the youth sphere 
and acknowledge the voices of multiple actors. This is supplemented with the 
many studies of youth attitudes by state supported institutions - surveys that 
reveal how youth and generational challenge were conceptualised at the time 
and provide important material to contextualise that challenge. Oral history 
testimonies, on the other hand, provide insight into patterns of meaning making 
– into how these actors have made sense of their experience and how they 
construct and reflect on ‘generation’, generational responsibility/failure 
retrospectively.  
Embedded in qualitative research, the thesis combines oral history and 
archival research, supplementing it with survey data from larger quantitative 
research projects conducted in the 1980s on a pan-Yugoslav sample. The oral 
history interviews in this research are used in combination with archival and 
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other primary material (such as newspaper/magazine articles, visual material) in 
order to fuse what I have referred to elsewhere as ‘the Yugoslav project’, i.e. the 
political and institutional framework which has so far dominated scholarly works, 
with ‘the Yugoslav experience’.66 The latter relates to the socio-cultural fabric, 
but more importantly to the lived experiences, perceptions and narratives within 
the framework of the Yugoslav project, i.e. the flash, the ‘thickened’ time that 
Bakhtin refers to in his definition of the chronotope.67 A turn towards the life 
stories/lived histories of the defunct country provides the field with a venue not 
only for the normalisation of Yugoslav history, but also for a departure from the 
‘dissolution’ paradigm, towards more substantial engagement with different 
social groups, periods, events or places in Yugoslav history, without the 
inclination to retrospectively detect anomalies and reasons which led to the 
violence and the break-up. While official sources offer only a limited perspective 
concerning the functioning of socialist institutions, oral history provides insight 
into the ways in which people negotiated with power from below and into the 
complexities of that interaction. The oral history approach to research 
essentially tries to provide space for the voices of ‘non-hegemonic classes’68 
and ‘give back to the people who made and experienced history, through their 
own words, a central place’.69 This thesis seeks to emphasise the diversity of 
voices and include those that have been left out of historical accounts – such 
as, for example, those of young army officers. Above all, this approach that 
departs from a conventional choice of either archival research or oral history, 
allows the researcher access to the subtleties of interaction between the 
individual activists and the state, or, to the different interactions taking place 
within the framework of the League of Socialist Youth.  
One of the challenges of putting together oral history testimonies and 
archival sources lies in the fact that they represent two very different genres of 
material fulfilling different functions. Indeed, this is a challenge faced by all 
scholars. Yet, these different source genres provide important different 
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perspectives on the problem, as they are often embedded within a range of 
discourses and agendas. Therefore, the scholar needs to display an awareness 
of these clashing discourses and embed them within the analysis. Furthermore, 
matching archival/primary sources with corresponding oral history material was 
not always possible as some archives were not accessible, but it was possible 
to supplement it with media reports from the time, for instance. Also, the fact 
that many of the interviewees were publishing their own texts in the media or 
were interviewed as holding positions within the Youth League, made it easier 
to compare their past and present views and locate any distortions in the 
narrative or ‘selective’ remembering. Indeed, ‘rather than replacing previous 
truths with alternative ones, however, oral history has made us uncomfortably 
aware of the elusive quality of historical truth itself’.70 Undoubtedly, self and self-
experience are not given, monolithic or invariant, but dynamic, changing and 
plural.71 Furthermore, the thesis implicitly draws upon the concept of ‘registers 
of self and self-experience’72 which implies that there are ‘many stories of self to 
tell, and more than one self to tell them.’ The thesis, for instance, juxtaposes 
views and experiences which were significantly shaped by the dissolution wars 
when it analyses the image of the Yugoslav People’s Army and the initiatives for 
conscientious objection, as it takes into account testimonies both by young 
officers and young activists.73            
It is not surprising that the testimonies often bridged the Yugoslav 
dissolution and reflect on the present or through the present upon the past. 
Considering the profound changes which occurred after the Yugoslav 
dissolution, the oral history interviews reveal a very prominent ‘relationship 
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between self-concept and cultural norms’.74 However, if we take into 
consideration that oral history is ‘a living record of the complex interaction 
between past and present within each individual and in society’,75 the thesis 
does not take the oral history testimony at face value. When using interviewees’ 
words as ‘history’ it is essential to have in mind the dialectical relationship of 
past and present. In that sense, it is important for the oral historian to strive to 
understand why individuals are inclined to talk about particular issues and what 
motivates their narratives. Relatively comprehensive knowledge of the context 
and of the contemporary socio-political situation and the debates that surround 
the interviewee might help in understanding the insistence on certain 
comparisons or aspects of the past and the present. Where possible, the thesis 
relies on primary material to provide the framework for the testimonies and 
maintains that both bodies of source material are mutually illuminating. 
However, this is not done in order to shed light on the patterns of remembrance, 
but rather because the study seeks to account for a greater range of voices as a 
way of being sensitive to individual perspectives and lived experiences. 
Undeniably, ‘Oral history is a dialogic process; it is a conversation in real time 
between the interviewer and the narrator, and then between the narrator and 
what we might call external discourses or culture’.76 Although this work is 
predominantly concerned with reconstructing a historical era, rather than 
exploring the dynamics of memory, remembering is addressed where it appears 
to shape testimony profoundly – albeit mainly with the view of reflecting on how 
an account of the period can be best obtained.  
The first corpus of primary material consists of archival documents. I 
consulted parts of the collections of the respective ‘League of Socialist Youth’ in 
the state archives in Skopje (Macedonia), Sarajevo (Bosnia-Herzegovina), 
Ljubljana (Slovenia), as well as at the Archive of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, which 
holds the collection of the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia (subject to 
the 30-year rule).77 In Macedonia, Bosnia and Slovenia I had access to the 
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entire decade, although this particular collection in Sarajevo was not catalogued 
after the 1992-1995 war and I had to resort to an arbitrary selection of material. 
The archive in Skopje had a restrictive policy on copying the material, in 
contrast to the one in Ljubljana where photographing was free and unlimited. 
Considering the fact that only the collection of the LSY of Slovenia is accessible 
in its entirety, it does not come as surprise that the Slovenian youth sphere is 
the one most thoroughly studied so far. In order to ensure a broader range of 
sources, in Slovenia I was helped by the thematic catalogue of the collection of 
the LSYS and I chose to consult the sub-collections on the 1986 and the 1990 
congresses, on the peace movement, the Youth Day celebrations, the voluntary 
work, some of the Radio Student archive, etc. In Bosnia-Herzegovina I picked 
boxes from 1982 until 1990, while in Macedonia I chose to focus on 1989 as the 
year when the debates on reform and change gained momentum. 
The collections contained a range of materials produced at the various 
levels of the LSYY – from meeting minutes, internal reports on various issues 
(voluntary work, Youth Day, participation in the delegate system, finances, 
reports on the work of the different commissions – such as, for example, the 
commissions for political system), programmatic documents, congress 
materials, speech transcriptions, to domestic and foreign correspondence. The 
advantage of having access to these particular institutional archival sources is 
that they help the researcher gain a sense of the different debates at republican 
and at federal level. They proved crucial in analysing the language and the 
different ways in which contention and negotiation with the state were framed. 
However, being sensitive to the limitations of any archival material remains of 
paramount importance. After all, documents were drafted by individual authors, 
or by smaller groups of individuals within the various commissions of the LSYY; 
hence, in no way they could be taken as absolutely reflective of the multitude of 
attitudes and voices within the LSYY, or of the respective LSY as a whole. 
Therefore, supplementing this material with a range of contemporary 
sociological data (see below) and with the oral history testimonies could bridge 
certain gaps and illuminate the subject of the thesis from different angles.        
 The thesis draws upon a wealth of sociological and statistical material 
produced throughout the 1980s. The questions posed in the surveys and the 
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themes and subjects around which they were conceptualised clearly convey a 
sense of the major social and political concerns of the time: ‘anti-system’ 
activism and attitudes, decline in membership in the Party and in the self-
management bodies, sentiments of Yugoslav/European/national/regional 
belonging, attitudes towards religion, support for the constitutional changes and 
the programs of political/economic reform, etc. The research studies also shed 
light on the scholarly elite in this field in late socialist Yugoslavia, which was 
apparently sympathetic with the youth. More often than not it was the LSYY, its 
branches and/or the respective publishing/research centers, which initiated or 
published the various youth studies. While all-Yugoslav comprehensive youth 
research projects were rare, if not nonexistent until the 1980s, studies whose 
primary focus was the youth in the separate federal units or even cities (such as 
Belgrade) were more abundant.78 The spectrum of scholarly studies dealing 
with the Yugoslav youth in late socialism convey a belief on the part of the 
authorities and intellectuals that this generation was or had the potential to be 
unique because it had come of age and lived its youthful years at a time of 
profound crisis. At the same time, their importance could be also located in that 
this scholarly (as well as media and political) discourse dealing with the youth 
produced the very idea of a generational experience.   
The studies, although lacking sound theoretical framing, detect the 
diversification and the social differentiation of the young generation. It is from 
the beginning of the 1980s that empirical sociological studies really began to 
engage with the reality of the crisis. Indeed, the very expansion of sociology in 
the 1980s in Yugoslavia reflected this broader sense of crisis in the socialisation 
of youth. As Nebojša Popov, a leading Yugoslav sociologist and activist noted in 
1988: ‘The new upswing of sociology happens in the 1980s, above all with the 
awareness of the scope and the depth of the roots of the crisis; which led to an 
immediate conflict with the dogmatic ideologues and politicians, who at the time 
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even refused to admit that it was possible to talk about a crisis, but very soon 
accepted it…’79  
In 1983 the first Yugoslav-wide youth research was launched under the 
name JUPIO – Jugoslovenski program za istraživanje omladine [Yugoslav 
program for research of the youth]. It was initiated by the Presidency of the 
League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia in 1983 as a ‘long-term continuous 
program for scholarly research on the contemporary questions and problems 
experienced by Yugoslavia’s young generation’, offering a framework for 
‘interdisciplinary empirical and theoretical research on Yugoslav youth’.80 The 
JUPIO study, beside certain flaws (it was meant to be a long-term project which 
was in its early stages in 1986), provided a valuable overview of the Yugoslav 
youth in the mid-eighties, recalling the findings of other empirical studies dealing 
with the youth which showed that ‘it is a profile of youngsters who by no means 
consent to formal participation, to being disciplined participants in the 
conventional forms of political life…’81  
This becomes even more visible in the last all-Yugoslav youth research 
conducted in 1989 and published in 1990. Curiously, the publication bears an 
introductory note that the research was commissioned by the League of 
Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia (as in the case of JUPIO), but, ‘preoccupied with 
its own disappearence’,82 the LSYY eventually renounced the project and 
declined to publish the findings. The editors underlined that the research is 
illustrative only of ‘one slice of time’ and that if it was to be repeated again, it is 
likely that different results would be obtained – considering the incongruous 
developments on political level and in everyday life. Illustratively entitled Deca 
krize: omladina Jugoslavije krajem osamdesetih [The children of crisis: the 
Yugoslav youth at the end of the eighties], the study reflects the change in 
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socio-political discourse which occurred between 1985 and 1990 (most notably 
the hopes for accession to the European Communities) and in addition 
examines additional aspects of the young generation.83  
While it is important to have in mind that official sources on youth reflect a 
particular understanding of the role and position of youth within a given society 
and that they operate with categories which might be no longer relevant, they, 
nevertheless, do detect certain important trends among the young, as well as 
important perceptions on the part of the state and the intellectual elite which 
produced them. Studies that originate from international organisations such as 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 
also might be said to reflect the particular views of the number of states whose 
representatives were involved in the creation of the report. The idea that the 
youth was going through a crisis and that this would reshape the expectations of 
a new generation was a worldwide phenomenon of the early 1980s. UNESCO 
published a synthesis report entitled Youth prospects in the 1980s, prepared ‘on 
the basis of a survey carried out in every region of the world’.84 Beside indicating 
some core issues which have persisted well beyond the decade of the 1980s, 
such as youth unemployment (‘the most serious issue for the coming years’85) 
and the fact that ‘young people are taking on growing importance as a social 
group’,86 the report among other things helps situate socialist Yugoslavia in a 
wider, global context and offers a solid basis for transcending Yugoslav 
particularity. True to its nature as a policy paper, the report also makes certain 
predictions for the upcoming decade which indeed proved to be true:  
‘The key words in the experience of young people in the coming decade 
are going to be: ‘scarcity’, ‘unemployment’, ‘under-employment’, ‘ill-
employment’, ‘anxiety’, ‘defensiveness’, ‘pragmatism’; and even 
subsistence and survival itself. If the 1960s challenged certain categories 
of youth in certain parts of the world with a crisis of culture, ideas and 
institutions, the 1980s will confront a new generation with a concrete, 
structural crisis of chronic economic uncertainty and even deprivation’.87  
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As has been argued, ‘a concept of generation that locates young people 
within specific set of economic, social, cultural and political conditions offers a 
way beyond seeing generations as a series of birth cohorts because age alone 
is no longer the defining feature’.88 Hence, here, this group of sources is used to 
outline a broader setting for the study of the last Yugoslav generation.        
The third corpus of primary material consists of the oral history 
testimonies. I conducted forty semi-structured oral history interviews, which 
lasted from forty minutes to four hours. Most of them were one-hour long. The 
interviews were conducted in Skopje (Macedonia), Prishtina (Kosovo), Belgrade 
(Serbia), Sarajevo (Bosnia-Herzegovina), Zagreb (Croatia) and Ljubljana 
(Slovenia)89, initially through referral-sampling and later through direct contacts. 
The sample was selected from a range of groups who were active in the youth 
realm and/or contested the system from a variety of positions and from across 
the different republics. Few interviews were conducted with individuals who did 
not belong to this generation, but were closely following the events or worked in 
the youth realm at more senior positions. It also seemed important that the 
interviewees demonstrate a range of post-socialist trajectories and that they 
belong to groups that have been left out of mainstream accounts (e.g. army 
officers). I decided to focus on five groups: young musicians/artists, young 
journalists, young peace/feminist/gay activists, young army officers and young 
political functionaries (see Annex 1). 
I approached individuals whose names I had encountered in the youth 
press or in the archives and many were happy to respond. Two interviews were 
conducted via Skype. The interviewees were young journalists, musicians, 
artists or professionally involved with the League of Socialist Youth in the 
1980s. My goal was to achieve a relatively balanced representation of the 
different federal units and the different sub-groups, although the research was 
principally structured according to a preliminary list of historiographical data in 
terms of better known events and places from the 1980s. For instance, in 
Belgrade I found it important to talk to people who were involved with the youth 
media, the Belgrade alternative rock scene and the youth venues such as the 
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infamous Student Cultural Centre. In Skopje I chose to speak to more 
individuals gathered around the Youth League and the youth press because 
there has not been any scholarly studies that analytically engage with what was 
referred to in media and in personal accounts as ‘the Macedonian spring’ in the 
late 1980s. I was led by the goal of dissecting and adding complexity and 
nuance to this narrative. In Bosnia-Herzegovina I wanted to follow-up on the 
story of the League of Socialist Youth that later became the Liberal-Democratic 
Party. I also chose to speak to people who were involved in the well-known 
Bosnian youth media scene and especially reflect on the effects of the tragic 
violent conflict on this generation. To compensate for the fewer number of 
interviewees I managed to speak to in Croatia, I collected a large sample of the 
Croatian youth magazines Polet, Studentski List and Val which reported on 
many of the debates within the institutional youth realm of the time. Although 
the Slovenian is by far the best studied case, I interviewed some of the well-
known actors in ‘the Slovenian spring’ in order to obtain their reflection on the 
events in a broader Yugoslav framework. As mentioned earlier, I also decided 
to include a few testimonies of young Yugoslav Army officers, whose life stories 
and views have generally been left out of academic accounts.       
The oral history interviews revolved around a pre-drafted set of 
questions, although the format adopted was in general ‘semi-structured’. The 
interviews usually commenced with a general, open-ended question, such as 
‘What was it like to be a young person in the 1980s?’ I did not interrupt the 
interviewes if they seemed particularly keen to speak about a certain issue. The 
questions differed among different activists in order to address the specificities 
of their particular public engagement. Some of the questions I most often posed 
related to some of the major themes of the research, such as, for instance, 
becoming an activist; the relation to the institutional youth space(s); the 
understanding/self-perception or critique of Yugoslavism; the perception of and 
participation in official youth rituals, such as the Baton of Youth or the voluntary 
work camps; perceptions and experiences of the Yugoslav People’s Army and 
military service; the break-up of Yugoslavia. 
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Chapter outlines 
 
 
The last Yugoslav decade saw a challenge to established norms and 
practices in late Yugoslav politics, media and culture unfolding within the 
institutional youth sphere. The first chapter maps the wide, decentralised youth 
infrastructure of the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia, outlining some of 
the major debates which occurred within its strictly speaking political/institutional 
core, as well as in its peripheral sites, i.e. its media and cultural realms. It 
argues that a process of negotiating new forms of youth activism (in the youth 
press), of questioning the inherited traditions and creating venues for 
democratisation of the youth organisation were made possible by the 
advancement of a new young political, media and cultural elite which generally 
sought to target the malfunctions of the system and undermine dogmatic 
socialism. The first half of the decade, i.e. the period immediately after Tito’s 
death saw different oppositional ideas and new youth cultural streams and 
styles were progressively invading the youth realm. Expressed reluctantly in 
official contexts, novel ideas and contestations were being voiced - still within 
the institutionalised vocabulary of Yugoslav self-managing socialism. 
The second chapter focuses on the way in which parts of the youth 
articulated a specifically anti-regime critique and through it questioned some of 
the values embodied in contemporary politics and culture. In particular, it 
examines how older forms of political discourse and ritual - embodied by Tito’s 
personality cult and the Baton of Youth relay race - were critiqued in both 
political and new cultural forms. It argues that, for the most part, this critique 
was not reduced to a demand for outright abolishment of Yugoslav socialism, 
but that it was rather about challenging the norms of an older generation and re-
inventing socialism through the state’s youth institutions.  
The third chapter reflects on new youth activism within the wider context 
of what has been termed ‘the new social movements’ [nova družbena 
gibanja/novi društveni pokreti]. It addresses the broader transnational influence 
of movements abroad, and shows how new areas for political expression 
opened up around peace, anti-militarism, environmentalism/nuclear 
disarmament and sexuality. The chapter argues that late socialist Yugoslav 
society witnessed the proliferation of a youth arena of civil initiatives and activist 
citizenship, albeit fragmented and often discordant, which found shelter and 
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support within parts of the existing youth institutional framework. Although the 
federal Youth League did not explicitly endorse all of the initiatives stemming 
from the new social movements, it did provide spaces for some of them and 
increased the visibility of their demands in the public space.  
The last chapter looks at the ways the Youth League initially sought to 
reform and re-invent its role and mission and was later subsumed in and divided 
by the wider Yugoslav political debates and developments in the country.  The 
proposed statute changes which came out of the public debate organised by the 
LSYY in 1989 reflected both the gap between the Slovenian, on the one hand, 
and the Serbian, the Montenegrin and the YPA youth leagues, on the other, but 
also shed light on a spectrum of shared visions and values which existed 
among the other branches. The chapter reflects upon the (lack of) consensus 
about the dilemma of how to modernise Yugoslav society and the sphere of 
institutional youth politics and culture and argues that by the end of the decade 
the consensus on change and reform and the discourse of ‘pluralism of self-
managing interests’ was almost entirely replaced by a new discourse of human 
rights and liberal values which foreshadowed the ‘exit from socialism’.         
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Historical framework 
 
The crisis decade 
 
Historically, Yugoslavism was closely related to what was considered to 
be ‘progressive’ ideas: 18th century Enlightenment (reason, secularism, 
tolerance, anti-traditionalism), democracy and revolutionary/socialist radicalism: 
‘Whereas both Croatian and Serbian nationalisms were turned too much 
towards the past, the Enlightenment and Yugoslavism were excessively turned 
toward the future’.90 Tracing the historical development of Yugoslavism, the 
author underlines that it was originally conceived as a form of supra-tribalism, 
i.e. a supra-tribal (nadplemenska) national consciousness, mainly restricted to 
the intelligentsia during its beginnings in the late 19th and the early 20th 
centuries, and was intrinsically linked with the roots of social democracy (the 
Yugoslav Social Democratic Party) before ‘in a Communist version, it appeared 
to many as the only way out of extreme denationalizing pressure and 
intranational massacres.’91     
The Second World War in Yugoslavia, beside the presence of the Axis 
forces saw fierce clashes between mainly Croat and Serb ultra-nationalism and 
nationally-conscious, pro-Yugoslav anti-fascism. The complexity of the war 
context in Yugoslavia was enhanced by the high number of actors and warring 
parties and the relationships they had among each other. The beginning of the 
war in April 1941 saw the formation of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) 
by the Nazis, with the involvement of returned exiled Croatian fascists in Italy; 
the breaking of the royal army into guerilla units; and the establishment of the 
partisan liberation anti-fascist movement. The partisan resistance movement 
provided the only supranational, all-Yugoslav platform which aimed to unite 
representatives and anti-fascists from all of the Yugoslav ‘tribes’. As Dennison 
Rusinow observes,  
‘That this rebirth of the Yugoslav idea was not merely widely accepted but 
a powerful recruiting slogan for the Partisan armies is explained by the 
course of the war itself […] the lesson seemed to be that if the Yugoslav 
peoples did not hang together they would end by hanging each other in a 
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paroxysm of mutual genocide. The force of this lesson generated a 
widespread propensity to try again a new formula.’92 
 
Although anti-fascism was indeed one of the ideological building blocks 
of socialist Yugoslavia, the place and meaning of the antifascist ideology was 
significantly different from the one it occupied in the GDR or the Soviet Union.93 
If in the GDR antifascism was perceived through the lens of ‘a twofold victory 
over both fascism and Germany’,94 in the Yugoslav context it was understood 
as a twofold victory over both external (German) and internal or domestic 
fascism, embodied primarily in the Ustasha and the Chetnik movements. 
Moreover, with the missing dimension of a Soviet ‘occupation’, but with the 
pronounced civil war aspect, Yugoslav antifascism was what one could call an 
indigenous antifascism, which might partly explain its strong presence and 
relatively preserved relevance in the post-socialist context. However, it is of an 
utmost importance to underline the fact that Yugoslavia’s raison d’être revolved 
around plural state identities and multiple self-perceptions, all of which assumed 
some sort of institutional endorsement/protection: ethno-national, supranational, 
socialist, antifascist, federal, non-aligned, anti-Stalinist, pro-Western… Once in 
1991 ‘the axis mundi has shifted’95 and even more radically so than in Central 
and Eastern Europe, all of those layers of identity (save the ethno-national) 
generally lost their relevance. 
After the end of WW2, organised on the principles of an ‘ethnoterritorial 
federation’,96 socialist Yugoslavia included ‘the newly enfranchised groups’ such 
as the Macedonians, the Bosnian Muslims and even the Albanians, who ‘found 
their opportunities for access to the system’s rewards enhanced’.97 Indeed, the 
wartime liberation struggle, the bold break-up with the Cominform and the 
unique socialist model ‘had all provided the Yugoslav elite with a level of 
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political legitimacy and cohesion rarely found in communist regimes.’98 When in 
the spring of 1967 the Center for Public Opinion Research in a survey asked 
respondents: ‘In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, mainly 
satisfied, or unsatisfied with your family’s prospects for the future?’, 77% or 
more in every republic and province except Slovenia (where the percentage 
was 61%) answered that they were ‘satisfied’.99 Hence, upward progress until 
the late 1970s and an improved quality of life worked to strengthen the loyalty to 
the state.  
One should always have in sight the crucial fact that Yugoslavia was a 
fluid federation, undergoing several constitutional changes. As it has been 
argued, ‘As an idea, federalism points us to issues such as shared and divided 
sovereignty, multiple loyalties and identities, and governance through multi-
layered institutions’.100 During its existence, Yugoslavia believed to be building 
and developing an original Yugoslav model of federalism whose primary aim 
was to resolve the nationality problem101, reconcile or level down disparate 
ethnic narratives from the past, and thus promote a system of ethnic and social 
justice.102 In a similar vein, Sabrina Ramet asserts that ‘socialist Yugoslavia 
evolved a particular system of conflict regulation and social integration through 
devolution, seeking to assure communal loyalty through the abandonment of 
nation building and the provision of far-reaching autonomy to the federal 
units.’103  
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The constitutional changes of 1974104 which further decentralised the 
Yugoslav federation engendered a proper supranational sphere which was 
simultaneously clearly delineated and separated from the local republic-based 
socio-political contexts, but it was also connected through subtle threads of 
exchange and communication to the narrower federal units and allowed for co-
existence and cross-fertilisation in many spheres. The post-1974 political 
landscape of a weakened federal center, empowered regional and communal 
elites vested with considerable decision-making powers, was described as 
‘consociational authoritarianism’105 or ‘’feudal socialism’106. However, the 
amended Yugoslav constitution from 1974 had a clear statement in its 
introductory part outlining the ‘Main principles’ on the political dimension 
concerning education and socialisation: 
‘Education and schooling stand on the basis of achievements of modern 
science, and particularly on the basis of Marxism, as the foundation of 
scientific socialism, which serves to train workers for working process, 
self-government and their education in the light of the victories of socialist 
revolution, socialist ethics, self-management democratisation, socialist 
patriotism, brotherhood and unity and equality of nations and nationalities 
and socialist internationalism.’107 
 
Five years later, Josip Broz Tito was admitted to hospital shortly after the 
Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 and he passed away in 
May 1980. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan sparked a wave of reactions in 
the Yugoslav press and among the political elite and caused a sharp divide 
within the non-aligned movement, leaving Yugoslavia rather isolated and 
opposed to the pro-Soviet camp led by Cuba. Moreover, the fact that the Soviet 
military engagement in Afghanistan somewhat overlapped with the passing 
away of Tito in 1980 and the Polish events of 1980-1981 around the Solidarity 
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movement and the introduction of the martial law, helped resurrect the old 
Yugoslav fears of a Soviet intervention or interference in Yugoslav internal 
affairs. The Yugoslav press vigorously followed the Polish events and generally 
upheld the Polish anti-Sovietism and the struggle led by Solidarity, while the 
Student Cultural Centre in Belgrade hosted a week-long event ‘Young Polish 
culture’ in November 1981 and the renowned rock band Azra at its 1981 album 
Sunčana strana ulice [The Sunny side of the street] sang one of their greatest 
hits entitled ‘Poljska u mom srcu’ [Poland in my heart].  
The beginning of the decade was also marked by the Kosovo riots. They 
began as a student protest against food quality and student accommodation 
standard108 at Prishtina University, allegedly by a student of Bulgarian 
nationality.109 From 1981 until 1984, 585 individuals (143 students) were 
imprisoned.110 In a series of trials, young Albanians from Kosovo were tried for 
belonging to ‘hostile’ groups – ‘Marxist-Leninist Youth of Kosovo’ or ‘Group of 
Marxist-Leninists of Kosovo’ – which aimed to achieve republican status for 
Kosovo and hoped to see it eventually united with Albania.111 The focus of the 
debate was the involvement and responsibility of neighboring Albania for the 
Kosovan ‘counter-revolution’. The students launched protest slogans such as 
‘Revisionists’ or ‘Down with the red bourgeoisie’, reflecting ideological 
influences from Marxist-Leninist circles close to the Albanian regime of Enver 
Hoxha and hence raising legitimate concerns about the involvement of 
Albania’s intelligence service.112 These slogans were followed by more 
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exclusively and nationalistically formulated demands such as ‘Kosova-
Republic!’, ‘Unification with Albania!’ and ‘We are Albanians, not Yugoslavs!’113 
The crucial issue, however, seemed to have been the rapid expansion of 
education in Kosovo which had created ‘an academic proletariat with rising 
expectations’.114 Domestic scholars have also pointed to an ‘autarchic economic 
politics and a tendency of political-cultural closure towards Serbia and 
Yugoslavia’.115 The prominent Kosovan communist leader Fadil Hoxha 
assumed a rather ambiguous stance towards the students when at the 12th 
provincial session of the League of Communists he stated that ‘we must act and 
demand greater responsibility from the professors, educators and students. We 
must seek this from the students, since the majority of them, comrades, are with 
us. We must go to them, talk with them, and explain things to them. At the 
moment they are offended, because some of their comrades have been 
injured…’116  
Despite its relative linguistic isolation and lack of visibility with regard to 
the rest of the Yugoslav political, media and cultural space, this generation of 
young Yugoslav Albanians was by no means cut off from the Yugoslav youth 
realm. On the contrary – the period after the establishment of the University of 
Prishtina in 1970 saw the emergence of many young actors, musicians, artists 
and youth functionaries. In the political youth realm, the League of Socialist 
Youth of Yugoslavia was presided over by a Kosovan twice in the period 1974-
1990: Azem Vllasi was its President for two mandates and Hashim Rexhepi for 
one. Because of the ‘ethnic key’ and the strict rules on proportional 
representation, young Albanians were present at all levels in the youth leagues 
in the federal units where they lived in significant numbers. Although the cultural 
and the media realm were indeed part of a separate ‘Albanophone’ sphere, 
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writing about the Albanian rock scene in Yugoslavia in the 1970s and the 
1980s, Gëzim Krasniqi observed that quite a few rock musicians of Albanian 
origin were part of some of the most popular Yugoslav bands (Nexhat Macula 
from YU grupa, Shefqet Hoxha from Vatreni poljubac [Fiery kiss], Seat Jakupi 
from Konkord, etc.), many Kosovan bands had Serb, Bosniak or Turkish 
instrumentalists and they regularly played in front of mixed audiences.117 
Furthermore, he argues, ‘by being integrated into the (sub) cultural scene of 
Yugoslavia, this generation of artists from Kosovo reaffirmed both their 
Yugoslavness and Albanianness, as Yugoslavism iin Tito’s Yugoslavia meant 
above all Yugoslav citizenship, something which was not in contradiction with 
the particular ethnonational identities’.118    
While the beginning of the decade saw the violent riots in Kosovo along 
with an intervention by the Army, its end saw the violent disintegration of the 
country. As it has been astutely observed: ‘Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 
1980s featured two characteristics apparent to virtually everyone: the economy 
was in shambles, and the centre was reduced to little more than a battleground 
among the warring republican elites’.119 During the first half of the decade the 
country seemed to have lost not only a symbolic, but also a very crucial centre 
of gravity, a ‘generally respected arbiter’;120 indeed, this ‘syndrome’ of the 
absent leader was echoed in many of the public debates where intellectuals, 
politicians and ordinary people reflected upon the contemporary crisis through 
the lens of the question ‘What would have Tito done today?’, as a 1987 issue of 
the daily Borba asked. A sense of looming uncertainty and impending change 
was present from the moment he was admitted to hospital, when ‘the 
panegyrics have expressed in lofty and often poetic language not only the 
sincere love Yugoslav Communists cherished for their great leader but also 
their unconcealed fear about changes after his death.’121 A widely spread 
sentiment of uncertainty was illustratively conveyed in a post-socialist 
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documentary: ‘There was a collective feeling of being lost in a supermarket, or 
of having lost our parents while walking around a toy store.’122  
Yet, the decade of the 1980s was arguably also one marked by a 
‘politically and culturally permissive climate’123 and it was certainly a time when 
already established codes of public debate and political communication began 
to change. The 1980s were also marked by shifts in already established 
patterns of political socialisation. While in 1984 from the total of 2,041,270 
members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) 649,428 (32%) 
were younger than 28,124 three years later the daily Borba published an article 
revealing that the membership of the LCY is rapidly aging and that only over the 
past two and a half years 4,100 students left the Belgrade branch of the LCY.125 
The same article underlined that over the past ten years the participation of 
young people below the age of 27 had decreased by 18,851. Arguably, ‘The 
early 1980s appeared to be marked by a lack of confidence not just in the party 
itself, but generally in the future’.126  
The thesis explores the above-mentioned themes within the time-span of 
two crucial 5-year periods: 1981-1986 and 1986-1991.127 The discourse of crisis 
permeated every pore of the social and the political life and one could indeed 
term the last Yugoslav generation – a crisis generation (see below). It took two 
years - from 1979 until 1981 for the political elite to ‘finally acknowledge the 
state of crisis and to form a federal commission of around 300 politicians and 
scholars (the so-called Craigher commission, according to the name of the then 
President of the collective federal Presidency) which worked on the lenghty 
Long-term Program for Economic Stabilisation’.128 Yugoslav society displayed a 
rather surprisingly large dose of self-criticism, genuine interest for the different 
manifestations and potential solutions for the all-encompassing crisis, allowing 
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for the appearance of many open platforms for debate and exchange. As has 
been noted in a 1980 Radio Free Europe report: ‘Three main features are 
characteristic of post-Tito Yugoslavia: first, the country’s economic difficulties 
have been piling up on a daily basis; secondly, unlike other communist 
countries – with the exception of Poland – the Yugoslav information media in 
general, and Tito’s successors in particular are openly discussing the existing 
problems with almost no attempt made to embellish or hide anything…’129 This 
preparedness to openly engage with the pending questions of reforming the 
system was essentially an attempt to make Yugoslav self-managing socialism 
viable and functional, all the while ‘genuinely aspiring to create political 
democracy within communism’.130 
The main structural and discoursive pillars of Yugoslav society - non-
alignment, self-management, the revolutionary legacy and brotherhood and 
unity began to show the first signs of erosion and public questioning 
immediately after Tito’s death and the public political and media discourse was 
marked by political phraseologies or indeed genuine debate and reflection upon 
‘reform’ and ‘economic stabilisation’. Arguably, the ‘simultaneity’ of all of these 
processes, coupled with Tito’s death, ‘has resulted in an accumulating systemic 
crisis, affecting a variety of areas at a variety of levels made worse by the way 
in which they interlocked causally, so that a remedy for one problem 
immediately raised the solution of others’.131 Other authors have similarly 
observed that ‘multiple crises which faced Yugoslavia in the eighties [that] took 
their toll on public confidence in the system and led to an erosion of belief in the 
founding myths of the state and the inherent superiority of self-management 
socialism’.132 The decade was indeed marked by a deep sense of uncertainty 
and instability, as everything could and oftentimes was publicly questioned – 
from the constitutional order to the war crimes of the Second World War. What 
has been intelligently pointed out as the ‘disappearance of confidence on the 
part of the general population that current problems can be resolved using 
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existing political formulas and social practices’133 was clearly identifiable in the 
Yugoslav late socialist context.  
What external analysts have observed as a system undergoing a 
‘process of decay’134 was indeed recognised within the Yugoslav public 
discourse as well. Closely related, the notion of ‘apocalypse culture’135 appears 
as relevant in the realm of late socialist youth culture. ‘Apocalypse culture’ is 
associated with social crisis and essentially refers to a  
‘culture which is inward-looking, absorbed in a quest for meanings, and 
prepared to question the fundamental political and social values of the 
society. Associated with normlessness and anomie, it is therefore 
symptomatic of deep social insecurity, and is peculiar to developed 
societies in decay […] Contributors to ‘apocalypse culture’ view 
themselves, thus, as social critics, voices warning of dangers ahead, even 
as prophets offering new visions and new formulas.’  
 
The last Yugoslav generation had a lot to say on the societal crisis and 
its most prominent representatives indeed acted as social critics, while many in 
the alternative, artistic circles assumed the role of prophets. The way in which 
the 1980s’ generation rethought Yugoslavism is a central question. This was a 
question that had its roots in the late 1960s when students in the major 
Yugoslav cities, especially in Belgrade, publicly confronted the state during the 
1968 student protests. A 1971 study on Yugoslav youth pointed to its ‘litmus-
paper-like nature’, i.e. its ability to act as a ‘sensible indicator’ for various 
societal phenomena or anomalies, assuming ‘an a priori criticism towards the 
ruling structures.’136 Sociologists preserved this lens of observing the youth as 
potentially rebellious. By the second half of the 1980s it was openly admitted 
that the critique of the new generation had shifted from the ‘ruling structures’ to 
the very ‘ideological labels’:  ‘In the eyes of the ideologues and the institutions, 
the young individual acts as a subject whose “desires” are already known to 
society and which the society tries to satisfy, while in his/her own eyes s/he acts 
as subject which often ‘doesn’t know what it wants’, which is in search of 
him/herself, entangles him/herself in conflicts with the representatives of 
‘society’, which less and less identifies him/herself and the rest of the youth with 
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the ideological labels of our society’.137 In the second half of the 1980s, a 
process of moving away from the institutionally-coded socialist youth movement 
signaled an attempt for the creation of a new form of politics/culture, one that 
did not necessarily reject Yugoslavia or progressive (liberal or center-left) 
politics, but searched for a new version of it.      
Despite the various political and geostrategic polarisations within the 
Cold War context, cultural borders appeared to be porous, in particular in the 
realm of youth culture. For instance, Yugoslav-British trajectories of cultural 
influences were visible in the sphere of music production as many Yugoslav 
bands travelled to Britain and some even recorded their albums in London, 
while the New Music Express and Melody Maker in the 1980s published articles 
on the Yugoslav scene and its up and coming bands. While punk youth in the 
USSR existed at the margins as an informal sub-culture, Yugoslav punk rock 
bands not only had their albums released by major state record labels, but they 
also frequently visited London and imbued the adopted ‘form’ with Yugoslav 
content. Consumer socialism in this context is an essential piece in the mosaic 
of the period and of late socialist youth cultures, mainly reflected in the 
consumption of cultural products, most notably through music and 
travel/mobility. Namely, in the period between 1987 and 1991, the number of 
trips abroad by Yugoslav citizens increased from 20,013,000 in 1987 to 
36,290,000 in 1990.138 A large number of these travellers were young people 
who travelled to Western Europe and perceived their own identity through the 
prism of an incipient Europeanism:  
‘The recognition that much of Yugoslavia was less prosperous than the 
rest of Europe – an observation often reflected in Yugoslav popular 
culture – encouraged a Yugoslav identity as a reflection of hopes for 
greater integration into the European Community. An important step in 
this direction was the abandonment of particularistic, traditional notions 
and movement toward a vague notion of ‘Europeanism.’ Yugoslav 
identification seemed closer to this ideal than more narrow ethnic or 
national identifications’.139  
 
Yugoslavia’s geo-political position meant that in terms of lifestyle and 
culture it was absorbing, importing and adapting cultural content and products 
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and other influences from both East and West, all the while producing its own 
indigenous lifestyle patterns and practices. Different perceptions and 
understandings of Yugoslavism intersected and merged at different points. 
Hence, a notion of ‘layered’140 Yugoslavism could prove more useful. Although 
the cultural products the members of the last Yugoslav generation consumed 
originated both from the Eastern Bloc countries and from the West, one could 
argue that they were socialised in an internationalist rather than in a specific 
Yugoslav spirit. Hence, the thesis partially aims to discern whether such a 
sense of internationalism or cosmopolitanism, openness to both Eastern and 
Western culture was indeed one of the most prominent features of late socialist 
youth culture and of the image this generation wanted to create of itself and for 
itself.  
After the initial 1981 spontaneous ‘Yugoslav boom’, the 1980s saw an 
intensification of the debate over the Yugoslav identification: should it be treated 
as a declaration of one’s national belonging, or should it remain within its 
socialist political non-national frame? Often a subject of ‘stigmatisation’141 in 
public discourse, ‘discredited’ and ‘compromised’142 because of historical 
associations with interwar integral Yugoslavism, jugoslovenstvo and the 
‘Yugoslav nation’ entered the centre stage of a prolonged battle of opinions and 
debates throughout the 1980s. Referring to Article 170 of the Yugoslav 
Constitution which guaranteed the freedom of expression of one’s national 
belonging, a Montenegrin lawyer submitted an initiative to the Yugoslav 
Constitutional Court asking for the 1981 census to be annulled at the point 
which refuses the right to declare a Yugoslav identification in the sense of 
national belonging.143 The numerous publications144 on the other hand, 
engaged with the elusive concepts of ‘Yugoslavism’ and the ‘Yugoslav nation’, 
only to acknowledge the complexity of the notion and to conclude in line with 
what Predrag Matvejević observed - that it is easier to define what Yugoslavism 
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is not, rather than what it is or what it should be.145 Author of one of the more 
prominent studies on the meaning of Yugoslavism, he asserted that the type of 
Yugoslavism which has the Slavic heritage as its main attribute is outdated and 
hence proposed a more inclusive understanding of Yugoslavism with regard to 
Yugoslavia’s many non-Slavic nationalities and minorities. Matvejević claimed 
that there were many different types of Yugoslavism or reasons to feel/be a 
Yugoslav. Similarly, in 1987, Sergej Flere observed that Yugoslavism cannot be 
reduced to South-Slavism due to the fact that in the 1981 census 3,3% of those 
who spoke Hungarian as a mother tongue declared themselves as Yugoslav in 
the national sense.146 In view of the partially conducted 1991 census and the 
overall political developments in the disintegrating federation, Yugoslavism 
came to be identified with anti-nationalism147 in the ideological battle with the 
newly enthroned nationalist elites which sought to do away with the Yugoslavs 
and jugoslovenstvo as ‘supra-tribal phenomena’.148 The Bosnian student 
magazine Valter, for instance, referred to those citizens who ‘nourish a sense of 
Yugoslavism’ as ‘Balkan Palestinians’, who ‘know very well where and how far 
the territory which should be their homeland stretches, but, unfortunately, it is 
nowhere to be found.’149    
      
The crisis generation 
 
As was the case with other socialist states, the youth was considered 
one of the most important pillars of Yugoslav society. The widely popular slogan 
Tito-Partija-Omladina-Armija [Tito-the Party-the Youth-the Army] points to the 
importance given to the youth, as a separate pillar in the socialist order. In order 
to contextualise the developments within the formal youth realm in the 1980s, it 
should be noted that there was a major re-structuring of the youth organisation 
in the previous decade at the initiative of the political elites. The League of 
Socialist Youth was one of the five ‘socio-political organisations’ in socialist 
Yugoslavia alongside the Socialist Alliance of Working People (SAWP), the 
Union of Fighters of the National-Liberation Struggle, the Alliance of Trade 
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Unions and the League of Communists. As such, it was formally part of the 
political system, in particular through its delegates to the SAWP and to the 
various chambers of the municipal, republican and federal assemblies.150 
However, not all members of the LSYY were members of the LCY. Membership 
in the LCY was voluntary and in the 1980s the number of young below the age 
of 28 in the LCY began to decrease (see Chapter 2).    
Mainly directed against the independence of the Student Unions and the 
events of 1968, the decision to reform the Youth League reflected a growing 
concern with the role of the major Yugoslav universities as relatively 
autonomous breeding grounds for oppositional ideas and critical thought (in 
particular within the fields of philosophy and sociology). Consequently, as it has 
been argued, in the period from the student protests in 1968 until 1974 ‘the 
[Belgrade] University became the focus of cultural and political events. A 
dialogue developed on the ideas of counter-culture and the ‘new left’ in frequent 
public discussions, magazines and periodicals, far more so than in the regular 
classroom sessions’.151 While the Youth League was generally criticised ‘for its 
lack of purpose and inactivity’ even by Party officials, the Student Union ‘moved 
into a position of more open conflict with the League of Communists than any 
other political organisation during the period 1966-71’.152 More vocal and 
articulate, the membership of the student unions was less reluctant to voice 
discontent with the policies of the Youth League. For instance, as a sign of 
protest, the student unions in Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia refused to send 
delegates to the congress of the Youth League at the end of 1968. In October 
1970, 6,000 students at Belgrade University staged another strike in protest of 
the sentencing of Vladimir Mijanović to a twenty-month prison sentence for 
‘hostile anti-state propaganda’.153 However, the decision of the political elite to 
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curb the autonomy of the student unions was also related to two major events 
on the Yugoslav political scene at the beginning of the 1970s: the 1971 Croatian 
‘mass movement’ (MASPOK) and the purge of its ‘nationalist’ leaders and the 
1972 removal of Serbian ‘liberals’. As Pavlowitch argues, ‘the response of the 
Yugoslav leadership to opposition from outside and inside the Party had been to 
cleanse the political elite of all those who had acquired a genuine audience, and 
who were accused of ‘nationalism’, ‘liberalism’ and ‘technocratism’.’154 The 
Croatian case exposed the porousness of the borders between the political and 
the youth/student realms, as the propagated ideas resonated with a significant 
number of students at Zagreb University who took part in the demonstrations.155 
Moreover, not only it provided pretext for more decisive backlash against open 
critique, it also ‘served as a backdrop for return to Leninist symbols in the early 
1970s [as] democratic centralism and the dictatorship of the proletariat were 
stressed…’156   
As a consequence, the Third Conference of the League of Communists 
of Yugoslavia in December 1972 was entirely dedicated to the youth. A 
resolution was issued entitled ‘The Struggle of the LCY for a socialist orientation 
and active participation of the young generation in the development of the 
socialist self-managing society’.157 The adjective ‘socialist’ was added to the 
official name of the youth organisation at its ninth congress in 1974: from the 
‘Yugoslav Youth League’ [Savez omladine Jugoslavije] it became the ‘League 
of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia’ [Savez socijalističke omladine Jugoslavije]. 
That was also the moment when the Yugoslav Student League ceased to exist 
as a separate youth organisation, as it was merged with the Yugoslav Youth 
League to form the new ‘League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia’.158 This 
attempt at political and organisational homogenisation of the youth could be 
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interpreted as an attempt to control the relatively independent university-based 
student organisations. Indeed, ‘the student organisations have tended to be 
articulate, active, and autonomous’.159 Azem Vllasi was elected president of the 
newly consolidated LSYY in 1974 and remained at the post for two mandates 
until 1978. According to him, prior to the merging, there were de facto two 
separate youth organisations and the decision was an attempt to reinforce the 
coherence of the institututional youth sphere. Indeed, it could be viewed as an 
attempt to bridge the increasing gap between the urban, intellectual, University-
based student youth, on the one hand, and the working class/rural youth, on the 
other. The attempted unification of the youth organisation under the banner of 
‘socialism’ appeared effective, at least until the first years after Tito’s death. The 
youth organisation in the early 1980s, for instance, ardently pursued the main 
aspect of Yugoslav foreign policy: non-alignment and cooperation with Third 
World countries.160  
This was the institutional setup of the youth realm as the new decade 
dawned. From the beginning of the 1980s, the omnipresent discourse of a multi-
level (political, economic, social) crisis coincided with the emergence of a 
scholarly discourse within the social sciences revolving around the ‘crisis 
generation’. This rise in youth studies/sociology of the youth could be 
interpreted as an evidence of a general concern for the lack of integration and 
political alienation of the youth. A practice of observing the youth through a 
prism of crisis or as an indicator of serious flaws in the society has not been 
alien in socialist Yugoslavia. Seen as a critical pillar of the Yugoslav socialist 
project, the state invested in the youth both symbolic and economic capital with 
the hope that the sense of ‘Yugoslav socialist patriotism’ would supersede 
and/or replace narrower circles of belonging or ethnic and class divisions. It was 
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in particular after the 1968 student riots that there was an increase in the 
number of scholarly studies of the youth. Perceived both as a potential problem 
and as a resource, the youth was put under scholarly scrutiny throughout the 
1970s and the 1980s with the aim of ‘establishing the reasons for its discontent, 
but also of proving its attachment to socialism’.161 For example, in his speech at 
the 1986 congress of the League of Socialist Youth of Macedonia, Vasil 
Tupurkovski, member of the presidency of the Central Committee of the LCM 
said:  
‘Throughout history generations of young people forcefully affirm the 
continuity of the progressive and revolutionary aspirations. The most 
convincing and most glorious example of that is the people’s liberation 
struggle and the socialist revolution […] The revolutionary and progressive 
spirit of the young generations is intertwoven with the historical progress 
and the interests of the working class in the forging of new and humane 
consciousness…’162 
   
The notion of the ‘crisis generation’ persisted throughout the 1980s in 
scholarly and media discourse. Stating that there is awareness among the 
young that the current crisis is part of a ‘crisis of global character’,163 towards 
the end of the 1980s the notion of a crisis generation was supplemented by a 
new derivative: ‘crisis of a generation’. Not abandoning Mannheim’s 
terminology, at a conference entitled ‘The Yugoslav youth of the eighties 
between political apathy and autonomous political subjectivity’ and in the 
conference proceedings it was inferred that one can observe a process of 
‘(de)homogenisation of the generation units’.164         
Strikingly, the JUPIO report noted that the personal predictions about 
one’s individual future or the future of the society were ‘preponderantly 
optimistic’,165 as 82,9% of the respondents stated that they believe their 
personal future will be much better or somewhat better than the present, while 
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62,8% stated that they believe this was true for the future of the society/state.166 
Only 5,8% said that they expect their personal future to be much or somewhat 
worse. The pessimistic view on the future of the society was clearly dependent 
on the federal unit in a way that the youth from the most developed Yugoslav 
republics, such as Slovenia, was the most pessimist and the youth from the 
least developed region of Kosovo expressed the highest level of optimism: 
43,5% of the Slovenian respondents and 11% of the Kosovan youth thought the 
future of the society will be worse. This led sociologists to term this particular 
phenomenon ‘the optimism paradox’. However, as far as the view on the 
personal future was concerned, the figures were strikingly lower: only 6,4% of 
Kosovans and 11,3% of Slovenes thought their personal future will be worse 
than it was. The ability to clearly dissociate one’s personal experiences from the 
perception of the political and the social condition of the state implies that the 
majority of the respondents possessed the ability to critically reflect on the 
socio-political reality, without perceiving things through their own subjective 
experience.       
This sense of optimism that permeated the report led the author to 
conclude that ‘the contemporary youth – socialised in a way suited to idealise 
certain values through the schooling process and protected within family life – 
had radicalised its personal expectations from society to such an extent that it is 
neither prepared for the time and situations of social trouble, nor able to accept 
the “psychology of renouncement”’…167 This expansion of the horizon of 
expectation168 was, for instance, visible in the debates on the distribution of 
socially owned housing/flats to young people/young families, as the state 
organs were repeatedly reproached in the youth media and in various debates 
within the youth organisation for the lack of housing for the young and for the 
long waiting lists. The ‘conformist optimism’169 was without doubt closely related 
to a sense of geopolitical stability in the context of the Cold War and a 
perception that Yugoslavia and its institutions were relatively strong, likely to 
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last for another one hundred years, as Gregor Tomc (born 1952), member of 
the punk band Pankrti and sociologist put it. Indeed, there was a shared 
perception similar to the one in the Soviet context that ‘everything was 
forever’.170 This partially explains why in 1986 politics, national history/relations 
and religion were ranked quite low on the list of interests and topics of 
conversation: 
 
Figure 1: Subjects of verbal communication among the young 
 “Often” “Never” 
Film 63,4% 3,5% 
Work/study 63,3% 3,5% 
Living standard 58,4% 6,8% 
Music 53,2% 4,3% 
Life 55,8% 9,2% 
Sport 53,3% 9,9% 
Science/technology 26,3% 18,3% 
Domestic politics 25,8% 17,9% 
International 
politics 
23,9% 18,4% 
Art and literature 21,4% 26% 
National 
history/relations 
13,8% 37,1% 
Religion171 9,3% 51,3% 
 
Considering the fact that this generation and the decade of the 1980s in 
popular memory in general feature principally as an embodiment of the 
phenomenal musical/cultural/artistic, i.e. non-political output, one could infer 
that culture was of particular importance for this generation. On the other hand, 
the fact that this type of question was asked in the survey may be indicative of a 
fear that the young were becoming depoliticised and more culture-oriented. 
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Indeed, other sections of the survey found that ‘the number of the youth 
interested in politics and political events has been gradually decreasing over the 
past two decades’.172  
A paper presented at the academic conference entitled ‘The societal 
position, role and perspective of Yugoslavia’s young generation’ that took place 
in Kumrovec in September 1982 echoed one of the arguments of the 1980 
UNESCO report that ‘the present crisis is structural’ and that ‘It strikes at the 
abundance-oriented optimism that things will somehow work out’.173 The paper 
noted that ‘The new generation of the young becomes progressively sensitive 
since it is exposed to the ‘aggression’ of a society experiencing increasing 
bureaucratisation and multiplication of economic problems. It turns into a ‘crisis 
generation’, having a potential to transform itself into a key critical societal 
grouping’.174 Srđan Vrcan, one of the most prominent Croatian and Yugoslav 
sociologists, similarly observed that the contemporary youth was ‘a generation 
which lives and acts in a society caught in serious difficulties, permanent 
stagnant state of affairs and crisis-related processes [...] It is aware that it lives 
in a society that belongs to a world that is in a deep and long-lasting crisis, the 
end of which is not visible…’175 Similarly, other scholars pointed to the socio-
political state of affairs as conducive to the emergence of a ‘disabled, hampered 
generation’,176 stating that the crisis is ‘progressive-functional’ since it forces 
Yugoslav society to re-direct itself towards anything that would help create solid 
basis for a more prosperous future. In a similar vein, Slovene sociologist 
Mirjana Ule named the youth of the 1980s ‘the generation of the shocked’,177 
explaining that unlike the ‘carefree generation’ of the late 1960s and early 
1970s, which experienced both economic growth and social improvements, as 
well as witnessed Yugoslavia’s increasing international role and prestige, the 
present generation is primarily experiencing a reality of a social and an 
economic crisis, a decline in living standards, risk of unemployment and 
decrease of the international prestige of Yugoslavia. This generation, Ule 
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claimed, was suddenly awakened from the optimistic dreams of its childhood 
years.  
Finally, a prominent marker of youth culture and identity was the 
perception of urbanity or rurality. The rural-urban divide178 among the young 
was a well-established fact which surfaced in the comprehensive surveys 
conducted in the 1980s. The sense of urbanity was a prominent component of 
the overall feeling of proximity to Europe and the modern world. What is 
particularly striking is the internalisation of the urban/rural dichotomy in a large 
part of the personal testimonies. This does not come as a surprise when taking 
into consideration the fact that the cultural institutions within the youth 
infrastructure were gradually taken over by a young, educated and ambitious 
urban strata which embraced the novel trends in journalism, music and arts. 
The principal youth magazines were indeed at the helm of promoting what was 
considered to be ‘urban’ culture. As it has been argued: ‘This continuous 
commitment of the editors to “urban” model of newspapers was instigating 
cultural production that used referent frames of city scenes, which did not take 
into account the national context of culture and its ethnic definitions, which will 
become so important not even a decade later’.179 Moreover, throughout the 
decade, official youth bodies and forums were complaining and expressing 
concerns that the youth press was not representative of the rural and the 
working class youth. Even the federal youth magazine Mladost at a meeting of 
its publishing council was advised to ‘deal more with the problems of the rural 
and the working youth’.180  
The reality of the economic crisis which hit Yugoslavia from the early 
1980s, the appropriation of a crisis discourse by the media and the political 
elites and, finally, a sympathetic scholarly discourse within Yugoslav youth 
studies/sociology of youth in the 1980s, all contributed to the proliferation of a 
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generation defined through the all-pervasive Yugoslav late socialist crisis. This 
was a process of external labeling, which took place primarily within sociological 
research dealing with the youth, and especially due to the fact that the two big 
all-Yugoslav research projects on youth were conducted in 1985 and in 1989. 
The somewhat hyper-production in literature dealing with the youth reflects a 
classical Yugoslav (or for that matter, socialist) preoccupation with the young 
which in times of crisis should stand at the helm of (progressive) change. 
Hence, it is not surprising that often authors were recalling the fact that the 
absolute majority of those who carried out the antifascist liberation struggle 
were young under the age of 30. Indeed, due to the fact that the young had 
played an essential role in carrying out the revolution and in rebuilding the 
country in the post-war period, the older generation stuck to an unwavering 
conviction that the youth was crucial for the development and survival of the 
Yugoslav socialist project and that under the right circumstances and guidance, 
the seeds of progressiveness and revolutionary potential it carries would grow 
as desired.    
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1. ‘Pockets of freedom’ – the youth sphere and its spaces of 
negotiation and dissent  
 
Moje su nebo vezali žicom 
Po mome mozgu crtaju šeme 
Žele još jednu kopiju svoju 
Da njome vrate nestalo vreme. 
Al’ ne dam svoje ja ideale 
I ješću snove umesto hleba 
Ja svoju sreću nosim sa sobom 
Ona je parče slobodnog neba.181 
‘Nebo’, Električni orgazam (1981) 
 
In the 1980s, the voices of dissent coming from the young Yugoslav 
generation were not, for the most part, expressed within a clearly delineated 
alternative sphere, but rather within the wide framework of the League of 
Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia. Whilst most work on political alternatives in late 
socialism has focused on the rise of alternative spheres or parallel societies, 
contention and negotiation from within official institutions has seldom been 
studied in detail.182 Addressing the last Yugoslav generation through the ways it 
articulated its generational specificities and preoccupations in the institutional 
youth sphere - more specifically in media and culture - this chapter maps the 
wide, decentralised youth infrastructure of the LSYY as a form of public space. 
It outlines the processes of change in the late socialist youth institutional realm 
and reflects specifically on the ways contestations nested, became voiced or 
accommodated within the existing framework of the LSYY. It argues that the 
very existence of its decentralised network allowed for novel youth cultures and 
politics to emerge and develop - through the venues, events and in particular 
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through the youth media/press network. In addition, the chapter reflects on the 
limits of toleration, the appropriate forms of expression, and the acceptable 
boundaries of freedom and criticism.  
The sense of a multi-level crisis and the decline of trust in the Party and in 
the LSYY in the first half of the 1980s led many young activists to argue that the 
institutional youth sphere had to be reformed. In the early 1980s, youngsters who 
wished to express alternatives found possibilities in the ‘peripheral’ parts of the 
LSYY, i.e. in the cultural realm and the youth media. It was in particular the 
decentralised nature of the LSYY which allowed ‘pockets of freedom’ to be created 
or (re)claimed by a new generation of political activists, journalists, musicians and 
artists, within its very institutional infrastructure - consequently producing cross-
fertilisations of ideas and initiatives that did much to promote a burgeoning 
music/media scene. By the late 1980s, most of the major youth magazines 
contained hardly any trace of what was their originally conceived role of acting 
as official organs of the Leagues of Socialist Youth. While differences between 
federal units and regional variation have to be acknowledged, a new pan-Yugoslav 
network of alternative voices was created though the LSYY’s cultural and media 
infrastructure. Yet, in the first half of the 1980s, these challenges remained on the 
periphery: it was not until the second half of the decade that the LSYY began to re-
invent itself as a space where political alternatives could be articulated and where a 
more pronounced challenge towards the institutional set-up as a whole emerged 
(see Chapter 4). 
The processes of contention, negotiation and change unfolding within the 
youth sphere were certainly embedded within the larger societal and political 
developments and the all-pervading discourse and sense of crisis. A history of a 
relatively liberal youth culture and a semi-free press coupled with on-going 
processes of freer public debate and a consensus on political reform 
contributed to the creation of the youth media as an arena for various 
articulations of demands for freedom of speech and critical reflection on the 
contemporary socio-political reality. Essentially, this chapter engages with the 
ways the last Yugoslav generation chose not to withdraw or completely opt out 
of the institutional framework, but met the state in its own ‘official’ territory and 
challenged it there. 
The first part addresses the debates and changes which ensued in the 
institutional youth sphere as a consequence of the crisis and explores how the 
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organisation sought to re-invent itself, deal with withdrawal in active 
membership and participation and respond to increased criticism both from 
without and from within. The principal question this part engages with is how the 
transformation of the official rhetoric, politics and practices within the 
institutional youth sphere unfolded. How did the Youth League engage with and 
respond to the wider socio-political crisis and its own internal crisis in terms of 
cadres, democratisation and reform? The second part introduces the 
‘peripheral’ parts of the youth infrastructure (the youth cultural venues) which 
were the most porous and open to alternative culture and new forms of 
expression. The third part engages with the ways the youth press - the most 
vocal, popular and visible part of the youth institutional framework - 
progressively carved out new spaces for debate and re-thinking of the socio-
political reality and articulated demands for freedom of speech, all the while 
navigating a series of bans, court cases, pressures and public stigmatisation.  
 
1.1. The youth organisation in the 1980s 
 
The 1980 UNESCO report on youth noted that ‘Schools, political parties, 
trade-unions and governments enter the 1980s under the threat of massive 
withdrawal of confidence by the younger generation’.183 Furthermore, 
youngsters ‘seem to find little reflection of those goals of social progress and 
justice in day-to-day workings of governments and political parties’.184 In a 
similar vein, the 1986 JUPIO report in its introductory notes underlined the fact 
that  
‘the contemporary youth is living in conditions of relatively wide-spread 
democratisation of social life […] Hence, the youth lives in a context 
where it is no longer possible to implement some earlier mechanisms of 
prohibition of certain aspects of the socio-political reality, through 
systematic institutional closures or limitations of people’s existential and 
spiritual horizons […] Ultimately, the youth lives in a general context 
where it is absolutely no longer possible to achieve the desired socio-
political goals through a comprehensive, consistent and limited political 
indoctrination, as well as through occasional virulent ideological 
campaigns’.185    
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Writing about the Yugoslav political realm of the early 1980s, Haug notes 
that ‘The seeming inability of the SKJ186 leaders to deal with the crisis seriously 
shook public confidence in the Party. This led the SKJ to immerse itself in a 
large-scale self-criticism exercise.’187 Archival material from the League of 
Socialist Youth branches in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia and Macedonia, as 
well as official reports from the League’s congresses demonstrate a replication 
of the extensive ‘self-criticism exercise’ within the multi-level structure of the 
Yugoslav youth organisation. Internal documents emphasised that ‘the LSY 
lacks a long-term and well-planned activity for [its] engagement in the Socialist 
Alliance [of Working People]’.188 Indeed, the LSYY was reproached at different 
levels and resorted to self-critique concerning the low numbers of youth 
delegates to the SAWP and the other organs of the political system.189 Studies 
on the institutional youth structures in other socialist states have pointed to 
similar, yet context-specific phenomena. Writing about the Hungarian youth 
organisation, Laszlo Kürti notes that ‘the most serious wound to the youth 
organisation was self-inflicted by its self-preoccupation and political pressure to 
maintain a hegemonic status quo over its youth through participation in its 
activities’.190 Indeed, ‘self-preoccupation’ resonates with the above-mentioned 
observation by Haug and is visible in debates within the LSYY from that time.  
It was at approximately the same time that a more vibrant discourse on 
the necessity for ‘democratisation’ emerged. In April 1983, the presidency of the 
‘conference’ of the LSYY at its eighth session decided to initiate a country-wide 
discussion on ‘Some questions on the democratisation of relationships within 
the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia’.191 Among other things, the 
existence of widerspread discontent was acknowledged and it was concluded 
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that the youth organisation cannot become a genuine social actor as long as 
there are different types of ‘”benevolent mentors”, tutors, techno-bureaucratic 
structures [which] would be able to impose work content, to create politics and 
even impose leaderships.’192 In compliance with the guidelines, the LSY of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina launched a program of ‘broad discussion’ round-tables and 
public debates in May 1983 within all of its associated branches and youth 
bodies, with the aim of ‘assessing the basic causes which lead to the slowing 
down and weakening of the development of democratic relations in a number of 
organs and organisations of the League of Socialist Youth…’ However, four 
months later, once the deadline for the organisation of public discussions 
passed, the Presidency of the Bosnian LSY concluded that the discussion ‘was 
not implemented well, nor it had the breadth and the mobilising component, as it 
had been outlined’.193          
As it has been noted above, the Yugoslav youth sphere in the 1980s was 
permeated by such ongoing debates taking place at the official political level, by 
various youth-related phenomena coming from below, as well as by issues 
central to the maintenance of the LSYY as a mass youth organisation.194 During 
the first half of the 1980s, criticisms were voiced and debates were articulated 
with certain reluctance and in a manner that was still tailored to fit the socialist 
self-management discourse. Although there was public acknowledgement that 
the number of young people in the different self-managing organs and decision-
making bodies was decreasing and that the Youth League had not managed to 
engage and mobilise enough young people, publicly the focus was the 
economic decline and the possible ways of improving the existing political and 
socio-economic framework. Domestic debates revolved exclusively around the 
Yugoslav crisis and the malfunctions of self-management.195 Nevertheless, 
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youth unemployment and deprivation was a global problem, as demonstrated 
by the 1980 UNESCO report which underlined that ‘What is scarce, therefore, 
and will become scarcer, is not only energy, investment capital, and domestic 
and international credit, but the jobs that carry with them the adult rights and 
responsibilities that the young expect’.196  
The opening speech of the 11th Congress of the LSYY in December 1982 
by its President Bogić Bogićević was in line with the inherited political rhetoric 
and conveyed the sense of determination to pursue self-management and 
preserve the legacy of Tito: ‘At this occasion too, we clearly underline that we 
are resolutely against anything that is anti-self-management and anti-socialist, 
that is contrary to the ideology and the politics of the LCY…’197 He reminded 
that that was the first youth Congress ‘without Josip Broz Tito, the most 
cherished friend and teacher.’ The question of the extent to which this already 
presented only a formalised discourse versus a genuine articulation of political 
values remains open. While lauding the role and legacy of Marshal Tito, the 
official stance of the federal Youth League critically targeted and denounced the 
various flaws and abuses of self-management (corruption, lack of discipline at 
the work place, failure to attend meetings and effectively participate in self-
managing organs, social gaps). In the years immediately following Tito’s death, 
there was a tacit consensus among the political elites for pursuing a discourse 
of unity and perseverance on the road paved by the old revolutionary 
generation, as much as the socialist parlance in its specific Yugoslav variant 
had functioned as a sort of a frozen narrative or political correctness which 
began to fade away progressively - especially in the second half of the decade.  
The first signs that the LSYY could become a site for voicing critique 
targeting the system came from a critique denouncing entrenched party 
interests, abuses and corruption. For most of the first half of the decade, the 
official youth milieus at federal level engaged in a debate that revolved around 
the discourse of the economic crisis, unemployment and the malfunctioning of 
self-management. The LSYY appears to have demanded more socialism, i.e. 
strengthening of the self-management system in all of its complexity and more 
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discipline in all social spheres through a status quo with regard to the existing 
political framework and the established social values. Denouncing the reality of 
a ‘red bourgeoisie’ through a radical leftist critique, the President of the Youth 
League targeted the ‘fraudulent behaviour or privatisation of socially owned 
property, bribe and corruption. The LSYY is going to uproot those and similar 
phenomena, exposing the hypocrisy of those who “sacrifice themselves in the 
struggle for socialist progress” while unjustifiably amassing and acquiring 
material wealth with no great effort and refusing to share the fate of the working 
class’.198 Although it was not clearly stated in his speech, this criticism also 
targeted the youth officials and high functionaries within the branches of the 
LSYY, who enjoyed a considerable number of privileges and often turned into 
permanent and not so young position holders. Even two years earlier, there was 
a manifest awareness within the official youth circles that the LSYY promotes 
conformism, careerism and materialism through its personnel policy, rather than 
progressive action. At the end of his mandate as president of the LSYY in 
December 1980, Vasil Tupurkovski, aged 29 at that time, voiced unsparing 
criticism: ‘Many youth functionaries believe they are irreplaceable, so we have 
arrived at a strange situation in which to discuss the problem of rejuvenating the 
youth federation’s leadership’.199 As an illustration, the average age of those 
employed in the municipal branches [opštinska konferencija] in the Bosnian 
Youth League was 27.4, in the city branch [gradska konferencija] – 28.4, while 
at republic level [republička konferencija] the average age was 33.5.200 This was 
an indicator that the higher levels of the Youth League were in a way usurped 
by career-seeking individuals whose activism was formalised and represented a 
mere stepping stone on their way to political careers in other ‘socio-political 
organisations’ and bodies at republican or federal level.201 The problem of 
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position-seeking cadres appears to have persisted throughout the decade. 
Research conducted on the subject of youth functionaries in Serbia in 1984 
demonstrated that the high positions in the branches of the youth organisation 
were held by people with questionable academic or professional skills: 3/4 had 
only finished secondary school and 80% of those who were enrolled at 
universities had failed one or more years of study, their main motivation for 
taking up the position being the relatively high salary.202  
Igor Vidmar’s testimony (born 1950) reveals this perception that the 
young political elite/the youth functionaries in the LSY were purely conformist, 
acknowledging that, after all, that was an individual, rather than a generational 
trait: 
They were always careerist – from the very beginning. First, they were 
orthodox Marxists, then, they were entrepreneurs, then they were the 
liberal youth organisation guys, and then they were the civic movement 
guys, and then [Igor Bavčar] the Minister of Interior… I mean… It’s that 
kind of people. Very ambitious, very opportunistic… But that is a matter of 
individual character.   
 
Nevertheless, after a decades-old practice of generally acting as junior 
branches of the Party, the Youth League was indeed facing a decline in 
membership. As it was observed, ‘The young more visibly manifest distrust and 
even enmity towards their own youth organisation which de facto has lost its 
members and artificially constructs its leadership pyramid.’203 Indeed, there was 
a widespread sentiment of contempt among the youth, in particular among 
those from the alternative cultural circles, towards the ‘little bureaucrats’ in the 
LSYY, as several of my interviewees had referred to them. This excerpt from 
the interview with Petar Janjatović (born 1956), journalist and rock-critic, 
confirms this wide-spread perception, or a stereotype which existed among the 
urban youth: 
Firstly, it was only the least intelligent and the most appalling, slimy 
students which got involved in the youth organisation at school. They 
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knew it was the way to forge a career – literally from seventh grade 
onwards, they were like – I’ll be the president of the class, I’ll join the 
League of Communists, me this, me that…  We had an aversion towards 
that. In general, they were fools. But once I started moving around the 
redactions of the youth press, I saw that the people who sit on those 
editorial boards are perfectly normal. 
 
By 1985 a more elaborate discourse of the crisis penetrated the Youth 
League, as it began to organise round-tables addressing its impact on the 
younger generation. The LSYY was progressively opening up to critical thought 
and began to act as a forum for different debates. For instance, the proceedings 
from a public debate entitled ‘Close perspective on Yugoslavia with a focus on 
the societal position of the youth’ began with the following statement:  
‘Over the past few years our society has found itself in a socio-economic 
crisis which manifests itself in different ways: dropping rates of economic 
growth and stagnating production, growing unemployment, decrease in 
income levels, extreme debt […] dying out of self-management and 
strengthening of polycentric etatism, disorder, idleness, lengthy meetings, 
erosion of the moral and the legal system, rise of nationalism, 
irresponsibility, corruption and increase of criminal activity [...] If we want 
to leave the crisis behind, we need to get rid of the dogmas […] we must 
adjust the definitions of socialism and self-management to our objective 
circumstances and possibilities.’204 
 
It is worth noting that this and many other similar public discussions were 
not only organised by the federal Youth League, but the publication of the 
proceedings in a book format (i.e. not only as a report or an addendum in a 
youth newspaper) was financed and undertaken by the LSYY itself. Since 
debate was systematically and institutionally encouraged, the battle of opinions 
and visions therefore progressively intensified.   
After stepping down as president, Tupurkovski also pointed to the lack of 
democracy in the decision-making process within the LSYY, its inability to 
appeal to and mobilise the university student population, and most intriguingly – 
to the existence of ‘two sorts of young people: those in the forums and those 
outside them’.205 This was indeed one of the most prominent division lines 
within the youth sphere: the youth that gravitated around the alternative cultural 
spheres or was associated with the vibrant youth press was generally a-
political, indifferent and/or inimical to the official youth organisation and its 
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functionaries. As an illustration, in a survey conducted at the University in 
Skopje (Macedonia) in 1981 only 5.4% of the students considered themselves 
politically ‘very active’. 23.2% saw themselves as politically ‘not active at all’; 
28% ‘little active’; 24.4% ‘average’; and 16.9% ‘active’.206  
By 1990, the trend of distancing and retreat from the political institutions 
was a well-established fact. However, the results from the 1989 all-Yugoslav 
survey showed a striking difference between the attitude towards the youth 
organisation and the Party. While only 15% said they were members of the LCY 
and more than half (52%) are not and would not like to become members, 65% 
said they are members of the LSYY, 18% are not, but would like to become, 
and only 17% are not and would not like to be members.207 By integrating many 
of the alternative/new social movements and groups within its structure and by 
consensually abolishing the grand celebration of Tito’s birthday in early 1988 
(see Chapter 2), the League of Socialist Youth was reforming faster than its 
original senior sibling – the League of Communists. This is captured by 
following excerpt from the interview with Janjatović: 
When you look back now, you realise that the entire rock, punk and new 
wave at the time was financed by the League of Socialist Youth! [...] 
In the summer of 1982, we organised a two-day festival of new punk 
bands which was called ABRS – Alternative Belgrade Rock Scene. You 
know the ARA album – Artistic Work Action. So, the idea was to promote 
those bands. Our guest bands were Idols, Electric orgasm and Šarlo 
Akrobata, along with the pile of those new bands. The organisation went 
smoothly, because they gave us the money for it. We commissioned the 
best sound engineer from Zagreb, we got Tašmajdan [hall] or we rented it, 
I can’t remember, but nothing was complicated. You would submit a 
project proposal and they’d say – yes, here’s the money.  
Today, if [a governmental body] gives you the money, you’d be forced to 
make a lot of compromises. At the time they didn’t ask us to do anything 
in return, no speeches, no flags. […]  
What is crucial is that absolutely no one made us get involved into any 
type of propaganda. That’s the key story. And what’s more, you didn’t 
have anywhere a big sign or a logo saying – ‘The League of Socialist 
Youth’. Nothing. Once or twice they asked us to organise a round-table, a 
public lecture along the lines of the creativity of the youth in the socialist 
something. But later they realised it doesn’t make sense and it never 
happened again.208   
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Similarly, Igor Vidmar noted in an anecdotal manner that ‘they’ in the 
Youth League eventually had to join ‘us’, change their course sometime in the 
middle of the decade, which allowed the League of Socialist Youth to recover its 
legitimacy and support among the young: 
The Youth Socialist League sometimes helped, sometimes tried to 
hinder, control things, but without much  success - they were hopelessly 
behind with their ‘official’ youth culture, until they joined ‘us’ by the mid- 
eighties. 
 
So, despite a general withdrawal in trust from political institutions which could 
have exacerbated the decline of the LSSY, it forced its reinvention, as a place 
where multiple communities and spheres could interact. Hence, scholars were 
right to observe that ‘there is an impression that in certain parts of the country 
[…] the interest for this [youth] organisation has been revived, alongside the 
confidence in it.209 Dejan Jović (born 1968), himself younger than Vidmar and 
Janjatović, witnessed the liberalisation and de-ideologisation of the Youth 
League in the second half of the decade. He testified to the unravelling of the 
strictly socialist ideological frame of the institutional youth realm: 
Over time, the criteria for being chosen [to work] at the youth organisation 
stopped being of ideological nature. Only in extreme cases, for example - 
not allowing someone to become a President unless one was a Party 
member […] 
I think the majority of the people [in the LSY] were progressively oriented 
and very successful at what they were doing, as was proven later […] 
After all, you had to win some sort of elections [in order to move up the 
hierarchy, starting from primary school and the elections for president of 
the class]. At least there was one additional candidate […] For example, I 
lost the election for the city [youth] organisation, but it was a fair battle […] 
You had to have the ability of persuasion and lobbying and that is the 
thing I personally think I learned in that organisation. You see politics from 
the inside. I found it immensely boring to sit at those meetings […] 
However, you saw it was real politics. You couldn’t impose anything […]  
 
Although the progressive transformation of the official youth rhetoric, 
politics and practices reflected the wider societal debates and calls for reform, it 
was essentially a product of internally generated debates and concerns, some 
of which were penetrating the higher political levels of the LSYY from the 
League’s ‘peripheral’ domains, such as the youth media and the new music 
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cultures. Questioning of the inherited traditions and reflecting upon venues for 
democratisation and re-invention of the youth realm were made possible by the 
advancement of a young political elite which internalised the critique of the 
youth organisation and the youth cadres.  
 
1.2. Mapping the youth infrastructure 
 
An observation from the 1980 UNESCO report that ‘In the more 
desperate structural crisis of the coming years, the young may turn to the 
camera and microphone in order to protest against the economic and social 
limitations impinging on their lives’210 proved true in the Yugoslav context. 
Because of its complex structure which also included ‘collective members’ such 
as the organisation of the Red Cross, the Scout Union, the Music Youth, the 
Literary Youth, etc., as well as a network of youth newspapers, magazines and 
scientific/research and publishing centers, the LSYY directly or indirectly 
involved hundreds of well-educated, creative young people who did not even 
distantly fit the stereotypical profile of the conformist, careerist young 
functionary. Hence, the youth organisation was far from a monolithic structure; 
on the contrary, it provided platforms for critical re-thinking of political 
dogmatism and exposure of counter-cultural styles and alternative standpoints. 
In the early 1980s, political change in the LSYY’s elite echelons was still 
blocked; however, within culture, and at the youth sphere’s peripheral locations, 
the LSYY’s infrastructure encouraged the emergence of new political and 
cultural alternatives. 
The complex youth infrastructure which stretched beyond the narrow 
confines of the LSYY (see Tables 1 and 2) consisted of event venues, 
publishing houses, weekly and scholarly magazines, student centers and radio 
stations. It was ideally positioned and equipped to channel creativity, alternative 
and novel approaches to art and journalism, post festum facing bans of whole 
magazine issues or public criticism for certain events or attitudes. Although 
there were apparent manifestations and consequences of regional variation and 
of what has been termed ‘republicanization of sovereignty’211 - since the youth 
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infrastructure did function along the lines of the federal units – nevertheless, a 
pan-Yugoslav cultural sphere and a media space gained strength, linking 
progressive groups in different cities. Senad Pećanin (born 1965), former editor-
in-chief of the Bosnian daily Dani, was part of the team which worked in the 
Youth Program [Omladinski program] at Radio Sarajevo and was actively 
involved as a young journalist in the Bosnian youth magazines Naši dani and 
Valter. As he recalled:  
We had an excellent cooperation with Radio Index [from Belgrade]… For 
example, every Wednesday I had a program called ‘Youth YU media’, 
which used to give an overview of the youth press – from Novi Sad’s Stav, 
to Belgrade’s NON, Yugoslav Mladost, Mladina, Maribor’s Katedra, Polet, 
the radio stations like Index, B92, Radio 101, Radio Študent. That 
program ran from 1988 until 1990. Definitely there was a supranational 
sphere, we had great cooperation.  
Petar Janjatović similarly recalled this arena of young journalism and youth 
media cooperation:      
At the moment when rock n’ roll became very intriguing, and through 
writing about music I realised that one can write about everything – 
politics, literature…  and then we began to sneak around the different 
music festivals and to meet people who did the same in other cities. I 
started writing for [Slovenian] Mladina, for Naši dani in Sarajevo. Between 
Jukebox and [Croatian] Polet there was a natural cooperation. The youth 
press gave an additional layer of freedom, one was totally… disburdened. 
[…] As if the network of the youth press was composed of very like-
minded people. At one point when Polet was very famous, almost the 
entire editorial board was bought out and moved to [Croatian weekly] 
Start. Even today those people are the journalist elite of Croatia. 
 
An urge for greater freedom in cultural expression which had been 
growing within the youth realm since 1968 was to play an important role in 
creating the possibilities for alternative expression in the 1980s. The youth 
realm provided many venues which were meant to cater for the various 
cultural/artisitic and media interests of the young. In addition, the network also 
consisted of publishing houses related to the youth organisations, such as the 
Center for Research, Documentation and Publishing Activity of the Presidency 
of the Conference of the LSYY [Centar za istraživačku, dokumentacionu i 
izdavačku delatnost predsedništva Konferencije SSOJ], the Research and 
Publishing Center of the Serbian LSY [Istraživačko-izdavački centar SSO 
Srbije], the Center for Social Activity of the Croatian LSY [Centar društvenih 
djelatnosti SSOH]. Beside the weekly magazines, most of the republics’ Youth 
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Leagues and their associated publishing centers, also published journals. 
These often featured academic articles and more in-depth analyses of different 
social phenomena212 (for example, the journal of the federal Youth League 
‘Ideas – journal for the theory of contemporary society’ [Ideje – časopis za 
teoriju suvremenog društva], the journal of the Croatian Youth League 
‘Questions – journal for theoretical and social questions’ [Pitanja – časopis za 
teorijska i društvena pitanja], or Bosnian ‘Faces – youth review for social 
questions, culture and art’ [Lica – revija mladih za društvena pitanja, kulturu i 
umjetnost]).  
The Student Cultural Center in Belgrade is certainly one of the most 
iconic student venues which had acquired by this period an almost mythological 
status. The cultural officers’ venue of pre-WW2 Yugoslavia and the home of the 
Yugoslav secret police from 1945 until 1968, the building was handed over to 
the students of Belgrade University after the student riots in 1968.213 It is a 
predominant perception that the Student Cultural Center in Belgrade was not 
only the cradle and safe haven for alternative and progressive youth culture – 
from art, to debating, publishing and music – but also a space which embodied 
internationalism/cosmopolitanism and provided a platform for all the new global 
developments:  
‘SKC from the very beginning was an important and cult place, and 
remained one until today. It was completely normal to encounter there 
Bob Wilson, to have a drink in the late hours with Sam Peckinpah, to have 
a chat about modern art with Joseph Beuys, with Luigi Ontani about the 
Italian situation and Sandro Pertini, with Oriana Fallaci about politics, or 
with Petra Kelly about ecology and the Green Party…’214 
 
Dunja Blažević was director of the Belgrade Student Cultural Centre Art 
Gallery from 1971 to 1980 and editor-in-chief of the visual arts program at TV 
Belgrade from 1981 to 1990, where she presented a famous program – ‘Fridays 
at 10pm’ [Petkom u 22]. This excerpt from a published interview is illustrative of 
the discursive obsession with freedom and the somewhat occupation of the 
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major cells of the youth infrastructure by people who perceived themselves as 
non-conformist and willing to stretch the boundaries of permitted critique:     
‘SKC of that time was truly a micro-territory of freedom. It offered 
programmes that were pushing the borders of the perception of art as well 
as the borders of social thought. Our projects and events had that 
innovative component and, in parallel, they were in line with what was 
called for in those days in contemporary arts and culture worldwide. […] 
 … and [it was the time when I had] also complete freedom! I was given 
carte blanche to create this programme [Fridays at 10pm] according to my 
poetics and beliefs. Thus I had the opportunity to explore continuously 
that which was my primary and lasting interest: the historical avant-garde 
and neo-avant-garde. It was precious for me to be able to create a certain 
climate and provide substantial information on the tendencies in world 
contemporary art for such a wide audience.’215 
 
The lead singer of Belgrade band Električni orgazam [Electric orgasm] 
Srđan Gojković-Gile (born 1961) talked at length about the importance of the 
Belgrade Student Cultural Center, referring to it as ‘a big factory’ with regard to 
its wide scope of activity, but also as ‘a vent pipe’ which was one of the ‘gains’ 
from what initially seemed to be a successful 1968:     
I think SKC was a compromise dating back to the student revolt in 1968, 
when the students got some concessions from Tito and one of those 
concessions was SKC. It was allowed to be some sort of a vent pipe for 
some silly young people - they could entertain themselves in there so that 
they don’t protest on the streets […] SKC in a way was simultaneously an 
educational institution for us and also for the new generation which was 
educated through our work. This is the place where we first watched the 
French new wave, many Yugoslav censored films […] some exhibitions by 
avant-garde artists, different performances - there were all sorts of things 
in SKC […] It was like a big factory. We used to practise in the basement 
and we would then just climb upstairs and play a gig. It was the only place 
and the main one for the first two-three years, for the Belgrade alternative 
scene…   
The Ljubljana Student Cultural Center was also one of the most 
prominent places on the map of youth venues. As Barbara Borčić (born 1954), 
artistic director of ŠKUC from 1982-1985 recalled: 
‘Backed by an abundance of new theory we entered into opposition to 
institutional culture; we were to radicalise the relation, and the gallery took 
up a progressive stance. We began systematically to present alternative 
art production from the (former) Yugoslavia. Surprisingly, the Škuc Gallery 
was the first to present the most important (conceptualist) artists (for 
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example, R. Todosijević, G. Đorđević, M. Stilinović, T. Gotovac, V. 
Delimar, and others) and their radical views to the Slovene public. 
ŠKUC became a meeting point of youth, and in addition it was opened for 
exhibitions of works by young authors not attending art academies. Its 
audience was specific - very critical and without any prejudices. ŠKUC 
became a focal point of ideas and inspirations; people gathered to plan 
joint projects... A whole new generation of photographers was formed […] 
The border between art and life, between public and authors, faded - they 
were all included in the process, one way or another. The gallery began to 
publish cassettes, fanzines...  
The programme in that period - in contrast to the programme before and 
after that - was devised according to exclusion: the Škuc Gallery 
organised the projects which were not admitted to other galleries, but at 
best to some club (FV 112/15216, for instance). This stimulated atypical, 
unconventional exhibitions, special installations, multi-media projects, art 
performances - events that in other galleries were not possible.217 
 
The ‘unusually decentralised’ nature of the socio-political system was 
replicated on the level of the institutional youth arena. This, of course, was 
closely related to the practical implications of the system of socialist self-
management and in particular the Law on Associated Labour218 from 1976. The 
1974 federal constitution reaffirmed the doctrine of self-management which was 
an all-pervasive principle of social and political organisation, ‘a means of 
restricting the accumulation of political power at the center, a guarantee against 
the abuse of power, and a device for making compatible the seemingly 
incompatible demands for a stable one-party state on the one hand, and for 
genuine democracy on the other’.219 For instance, in 1989 the Student Center 
[Radna organizacija Studentski centar] in Zagreb was composed of five ‘Basic 
organisations of associated labour’ [Osnovna organizacija udruženog rada – 
OOUR]: Student dormitories [Studom], Social student alimentation [Društvena 
prehrana studenata], Culture [Kultura], Student service [Student servis], Graphic 
service [Grafički servis] and Working association of common services [Radna 
zajednica zajedničkih službi].220  
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The Student cultural center in Zagreb (SKUC) was located at the ‘social 
pavilion’ [društveni paviljon] which opened in 1979 in the student settlement 
‘Stjepan Radić’ and it was under the larger institutional umbrella of the Student 
Center. As each working unit [radna jedinica] or basic organisation was free to 
expand its network of activities, or, according to the provisions of the Law on 
Associated Labour it could leave the larger working organisation which it was 
part of, the youth infrastructure was indeed prone to expansion and 
diversification.221 Thus, it was the Student service which was financing the 
Zagreb Youth Radio [Omladinski radio] founded in 1982 at the initiative of the 
Zagreb city branch of the League of Socialist Youth. In 1989 the Student service 
also initiated a school for foreign languages, a computing workshop and 
facilitated student job placements abroad. OOUR Culture, on the other hand, 
was the initiator of the student television STV [studentska televizija] in 1987-
1988, first as an internal media outlet and later as part of the Croatian state 
television.222 
In the Macedonian capital, despite the lack of an official ‘student cultural 
center’, it was the Youth Centre ‘25 May’ [Дом на млади ‘25 Мај’] which acted 
as the principal venue for youth culture. It consisted of concert halls, cinemas, 
exhibition spaces and performance halls. Personal testimonies confirm that like 
the other youth venues across Yugoslavia, it featured as an epicentre of 
alternative culture which was nested within and hence promoted by the 
institutional youth infrastructure. Toše Filipovski (born 1969) was actively 
involved in the post punk and hard-core scene in the 1980s. He recalled a 
concert by Slovene punk band Pankrti at the Youth cultural centre and an 
atmosphere which in his view resembled more the streets of London than what 
was considered to be a socialist youth event:     
Everything was happening at MKC […] One of the things that got me 
infected was the last concert of Pankrti in Skopje, the promotion of their 
Red Album – ‘Rdeči album’ in 1984. As a fifteen year-old kid I happened 
to be visiting relatives in Skopje and my older cousins took me to this 
concert. What I saw left a lasting imprint on my memory. That was the first 
time I saw so many punks in one place – a classical scene from King’s 
                                                 
221
 For example, following a referendum in 1987 the working unit ‘Cinema and bookshop’ 
decided to leave the OOUR ‘Kultura’ and form a separate OOUR ‘Cinema Student Centre’, but 
the decision was annulled by the District Court in Zagreb. In 1990 the Student Radio left the 
institutional framework of the Student Centre and formed a separate joint-stock company ‘Radio 
101’.      
222
 Tomislav Ćorić, Pola stoljeća Studentskoga centra u Zagrebu. 
 
83 
 
Road in London – punks with Mohawk hair, chains, all that punk 
iconography in one place. That was the last time I saw that in Skopje […] 
The hall was packed and I have never again seen such a packed punk 
concert.            
Apart from the main youth cultural centers which were widely known and 
frequently used for concerts, debates or exhibitions, the youth infrastructure 
network had many other subsidiary venues, both in the capital cities and in 
smaller provincial towns, some of which were equally important in providing 
platforms for the production of alternative culture. The sheer number of those 
made it almost impossible for the mainstream media or the LC branches to 
follow every event or censor every transgressive initiative. One of those smaller 
venues was recalled by Petar Janjatović:    
Dadov, the youth amateur theatre, was also very important. They had a 
small, phenomenal venue which could take around 200 people. Someone 
had an idea, probably the director of the theatre, who was also related to 
the Youth League, to organise concert gigs of unknown bands every 
Monday. Dragan Kremer was in charge for a while, through Jukebox 
[magazine]. So, every Monday night one could drop by, knowing that 
there would be at least ten people you knew. There were three bands 
playing and by definition at least one of them was great. That was the 
ideal place for us – you go out, have a beer, hang out, and you hear 
what’s new. It was there that I saw for the first time the unknown band 
Partibrejkers, for example […] That was also all within their budget, you 
know, the equipment, the person who took care of it, none of that was 
cheap. Kremer was also paid for his job. There were tickets which cost the 
price of a beer, 100 dinars, symbolic price. That lasted for a couple of 
seasons, it was really important.  
Certainly, it was the availability of funds for the vast youth infrastructure 
which was one of the main factors for the phenomenal output and cultural and 
media production. As it has been recalled by a former editor of the Croatian 
weekly Polet, 
‘What is so different today from that time is the amazing amount of money 
that used to be invested in students and youth culture. Every youth 
organisation in Zagreb had its own newspaper, magazine, or theater; 
some even started radio stations or sponsored rock festivals. Polet 
created the punk scene and helped invent those bands. It was not private 
money, all if it was pumped in by the state into that scene. Youth 
activities, then, were sponsored at the highest level. In fact, the amount of 
money invested at the time was probably equal to the entire amount 
allocated to arts and culture by the government today’.223       
 
The pluralisation and fragmentation of the youth sphere was surely not a 
phenomenon typical of the late socialist era. With the emergence of jazz and 
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rock n’ roll in the late 1950s and in the 1960s, the public outlook of Yugoslav 
youth culture was profoundly transformed.224 Although Yugoslavia shared many 
socio-political traits with other European socialist countries, from consumer 
socialism to censorship and one-party politics, by virtue of being open to 
Western culture and cooperation with both sides in the Cold War, it was clearly 
a very different place for a young person in the 1970s and the 1980s compared 
to the rest of the socialist world. However, at the heart of this lay the fact that 
Yugoslavia was a highly de-centralised, de facto confederal state where levels 
of control and censorship varied among the federal units and by virtue of the 
fragmented nature of federal institutions (including the Party) and the doctrine of 
self-management, the exercise of coercion and power was diluted. Often, what 
was unacceptable for publication in one federal unit could pass in another. 
Srđan Gojković-Gile reflected on this: 
L: Did you experience censorship? 
 
No, we never had that problem […] Actually, [Belgrade-based record 
label] PGP did not allow us to record the album with the songs ‘Crocodiles 
are coming’, ‘Sky’ and ‘You’, whose lyrics were considered problematic, 
but we could do it in Zagreb […] I think by the mid-1980s it [censorship] 
was all gone. There were a couple of affairs, like ‘Marshall’s dead’ with 
[Sarajevo band] Zabranjeno pušenje.      
                          
However, as control and acts of banning were still a reality in the first half 
of the 1980s, adjusting to the confines of tolerated freedom was also present, 
along with a practice of self-censorship and pragmatism. Gregor Tomc’s 
testimony illustrates the willingness to compromise and an awareness that if 
one wanted to pursue one’s artistic/musical activity, one had to step inside what 
was considered to be the institutional space: 
We made fun of them [the official Youth League] publicly, we would 
always speak of them as ‘official youths’ - they were the official youth, we 
were ‘unofficial’. We would always call them ‘uradna mladina’ – people 
who are youth by profession, for making money. But, in actual life, we 
needed them. I mean, if you wanted to organise a concert, you had to do 
it through the youth organisation. Although we were pretending to be in a 
separate world, in a communist country it was impossible to be in a 
separate world. You always needed the state, for anything – organising a 
concert, publishing a record. We didn’t really care about the verses, they 
could change the verses. Because this was not what punk was all about. 
It was about the community. So, if they would say – change the words 
‘throwing bombs’, we would change them and we would be throwing 
cakes, it was not a big deal. But it was a big deal for the communists 
because they believed in the power of the word. Their whole concept of 
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rule was that whoever controls the word is in control of authority. So, if 
somebody speaks out of line, that’s very dangerous. So, when punks 
were speaking out of line, you had to censor that. We had no project, we 
didn’t believe in the magic power of the word, so we changed words 
without any problem. And people later would say – that was a 
compromise. Of course it was, I mean… That was the only way you could 
function. If you were a completely principled person you would never have 
a concert. 
 
Yugoslav socialist youth culture in many respects mirrored the unique 
form of socialism applied in Yugoslavia at the central state level. Due to the fact 
that it was highly porous to influences from the West, all the while preserving 
ties with the youth organisations in the Eastern Bloc and pursuing the discourse 
of non-alignment, there was an emergence of a rather unique Yugoslav socialist 
youth culture. The diversification of styles, themes and public outlooks became 
especially apparent during the 1980s. As an illustration, in the official book of 
the proceedings from the 1982 congress of the LSYY there was a full-page 
photograph of a young delegate wearing a black biker-style leather jacket with 
many badges, John Lennon style sunglasses and finger rings. A global outlook 
and a sense of internationalism, an ambition to engage with global, extra-
Yugoslav cultural developments, styles and standards was a prominent feature 
of Yugoslav youth culture in the 1980s.225 
The punk, rock and New wave bands more often than not had the Youth 
League as their patron, and were invited and paid to play concerts during youth 
congresses, Baton of Youth226 celebrations or at the youth voluntary work 
camps. One could argue that there was a two-way process of co-optation, since 
both sides were exposed to the influence or the interest of the other. The Youth 
League pragmatically tried to appeal to its membership and appear in harmony 
with the contemporary trends in music and culture, while the young musicians, 
many of them openly a-political and indifferent to the espoused ideology, were 
happy to profit from the infrastructure and the funds of the youth organisation. 
Vlatko Stefanovski’s band Leb i sol [Bread and Salt], Zoran Predin’s Lačni 
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Franz [Hungry Franz] and Gregor Tomc’s Pankrti [Bastards] were all awarded 
the prize ‘Seven Secretaries of the LCYY’227 by the Croatian Youth League. The 
prize was introduced in 1964 and was awarded by the ‘city conference’ [gradska 
konferencija] of the League of Socialist Youth from Zagreb to young artists, 
writers, musicians, journalists, scientists and sportsmen below the age of 30.  
Senad Avdić (born 1960) was editor-in-chief of the federal youth magazine 
Mladost in 1987-1988 and was also active in the LSY in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Like other interviewees, he referred to the professional youth functionaries in a 
sarcastic, if not derogatory manner, underlining that ‘even’ they had realised 
that the old concepts and ways have lost their appeal:      
It was a pretty confusing time […] The [new] times had already prevailed 
over the old matrix […] Even the ‘small youth communists’ had 
understood that those times are gone. At that time Pankrti got the ‘Seven 
secretaries of SKOJ’ award, which was shocking! So, a thaw was 
commencing […] though it took them some time [to realise change was 
needed]. 
 
Vlatko Stefanovski (born 1957) similarly reflected on what he perceived 
to be a pragmatic attitude by the youth political elites within the LSY:  
That mainstream youth-functionary scene, the young little bureaucrats, 
they understood that things are turning sour, that there is no joking any 
more, and they were trying to fuse the Youth Baton with rock ‘n’ roll. And 
they were successful in it… We were playing concerts which reconciled 
those two principles – young socialists and young rockers. The authorities 
realised that you can’t leave rock ‘n’ roll on the margins. […] I know that 
those youth organisations were trying to reconcile the rock musicians with 
the rest of the youth. 
 
Zoran Predin (born 1958) was leader of the Slovenian band Lačni Franz 
[Hungry Franz]. He was blunt about his band’s own pragmatic relationship with 
the youth organisation: 
So, we charged a fee every time we performed at youth congresses. 
When they would ask us why we perform for a specific congress, we 
would say – no, we perform for money. That’s why we weren’t so popular 
[with the regime], there were those other so-called regime bands, such as 
Plavi orkestar, or Bijelo dugme.    
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Young journalists and researchers were similarly paid by the same 
organisation which they openly targeted for its malfunctioning and were 
employed by the functionaries whose competence they publicly questioned. 
This could be interpreted as an indicator of the latent and gradual 
democratisation of Yugoslav society in the 1980s.228 Described as 
‘schizophrenic’ (see below), the outlook and content of the official youth print 
media in the 1970s and in particular in the 1980s was eclectic to the extent that 
on one page it would feature a report from a session of the Party, an interview 
with a legal theorist on the contested ‘verbal crime’ article, and on the next a 
critical review of the new album by David Bowie, or an article on female orgasm 
and the G-spot!229 Although by the late 1980s it was taken for granted that the 
majority of the main youth magazines hosted polemical views, debates, open 
critique and did not reflect the official policies and politics of the Youth Leagues 
which financed them and figured as their founders, as early as the beginning of 
the decade the official bodies and institutions publicly acknowledged the fact 
that ‘in some cases [there is] even complete alienation of the magazine from the 
organisation it belongs to’.230 This and similar observations were expressed at 
the one-day round table dedicated to the youth press of the Commission for 
information of LSYY and the Section for information and public opinion of the 
federal Socialist Alliance of the Working People (SAWP).231 Petar Janjatović 
emphasised this aspect and the phenomenon of a bi-polar youth media space: 
When the youth press begins to open up towards non-conventional topics, 
which you have probably noticed, they begin to appear totally 
schizophrenic. On the first ten pages – workers, miners… after that come 
the music and pop culture pages and there you have f*** sakes and going 
to hell, boobs and bums, funny comics, totally Frankenstein-like! We can 
only guess what happened there. My take on it is that at some point, 
within those structures, there began to appear people who were not only 
careerist, but were talented and figured out that the structure of the 
League of Socialist Youth should be used for doing something original, 
individual. Vlada Bajac, a well-known writer and the owner of the 
publishing house Geo-poetika, at the time was an editor of the weekly 
program ‘Young, crazy world’ [Mladi, ludi svet] at Studio B, a program 
which was financed by the Belgrade League of Socialist Youth. Then 
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someone decided that the program should be aired five times per week 
and Vlada Bajac asked me to be the music editor. The program changed 
its name into ‘Ritam srca’ [Rhythm of the heart] and that was the first time 
I began to encounter the presidents of the youth organisation, the 
president of this or that commission and I realised that half of those 
people are actually okay. The other half was real imbeciles, but, all of a 
sudden, you see people who really know what they’re doing…    
 
 
Similarly, the Research and Publishing Center of the Serbian Socialist 
Youth League (Istraživačko-izdavački centar SSO Srbije) among its mainstream 
publications featuring sociological analyses of the youth or documents and 
reports from the youth congresses, also financed high quality journals and 
edited volumes dealing with the new (sub)cultural phenomena. Most 
prominently these included the remarkable 1983 edited volume entitled Drugom 
stranom – Almanah novog talasa u SFRJ [The Other Side - Almanac of the New 
Wave in SFRY], featuring essays on graffiti, fanzines, photography and lyrics 
from the acclaimed Yugoslav New wave bands; as well as the extraordinary 
journal Potkulture [Subcultures] published from 1985 until 1989, approaching 
the phenomenon in a broader and more scholarly manner. The journal featured 
translated articles by British scholars and experts on youth sub-cultures such as 
John Clarke and Tony Jefferson, texts by Polish and Russian authors on sub-
cultures in Eastern Europe, or by Yugoslav theoreticians and young intellectuals 
on gay counter-culture, lesbian literature and the Yugoslav artistic alternative 
scene, for instance.232 Trans-national cultural flows, gazes directed at both East 
and West and appropriation of the youth venues as ‘spaces of freedom’ were 
not phenomena which were unique to the decade of the 1980s. However, while 
one of the main novelties in youth culture in the late 1960s and the 1970s was 
conceptual art, the scope of the notion of subcultures in the 1980s was so wide 
that it could include anything from new music trends such as punk, new art 
forms, photography, or new literary trends. Velimir Ćurgus Kazimir was the 
editor of the Research and Publishing Centre from 1979 until 1988. His 
testimony reveals some astounding trans-generational patterns of identification 
and attitudes: 
 
It was an institution which had a political roof, but inside people worked on 
many serious and interesting things which had little to do with the official 
establishment. One stream was the research on the value orientations of 
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the youth, and the second was the publishing stream. I think we published 
around 150 titles […] After all, it was us who published the first book by 
Zoran Đinđić Subjectivity and violence, along with other titles which dealt 
with Trotskyism, democratic pluralism. […] And, of course, there was our 
pioneering attempt to deal with subcultures. Potkulture was the first 
journal to deal with subcultures from various aspects […] Those were 
texts by our young sociologists who were at the beginning of their careers. 
There was no other space where they could publish such texts. We also 
made the Almanac, the story about the New wave and its impact, which at 
that time was not recognised as being political. One of the main criticisms, 
also coming from our circles, was that the music is totally a-political, not 
engaged. Later it became apparent that that music was a very direct, 
political answer to the situation of the 1980s. That represents an 
interregnum which marked a certain kind of a liberalisation of the state 
which primarily did not unfold in a political, but in a cultural way […] It was 
extremely exciting […] That was a time when we shed light on something 
which existed, but was concealed and we said – we have to deal with this 
in a serious way, it’s here, we can’t pretend that it doesn’t exist.    
 
Most of us were leftist, but we were not communist. That’s the big 
difference, in particular [relevant] today, when one speaks from an anti-
communist position which assumes that everyone who belongs to the Left 
deep inside is a Stalinist. And here we come to this paradox, when talking 
about 1968, and I belong to that generation, that we were the critics of 
what we were calling the ‘red bourgeoisie’, the undemocratic nature of the 
system, the manipulation of the press. One of our primary demands was 
freedom of speech and freedom of the media. […] We never perceived 
the Soviet Union as a place where we would like to live, that was rather 
the West, Scandinavia, even the USA.   
 
Petar Janajtović also recalled the initiative for the publishing of the Almanac: 
He [Velimir Ćurgus Kazimir] proposed that we compile an encyclopedia of 
Yugoslav rock ‘n’ roll, provided it was ready in five months’ time. I told him 
that was impossible. Not only it was impossible, it was also stupid, 
because there was so much going on, almost every week a new album 
was released. We suggested that we do something dealing with punk and 
New wave and we got a complete support from the publishing house! You 
saw it, it’s huge and it materialised thanks to Kazimir. Kazimir also had to 
answer in front of someone, he had to convince someone to assign a 
budget for that, but it seems all of those structures realised that something 
significant was going on.  
                       
Apparently, more senior figures in the management of the youth 
publishing houses and media outlets took a decision to promote, support and 
protect these and many other similar initiatives. As Senad Pećanin noted: 
In essence, there were no real consequences, I can’t say there were. At 
work we didn’t suffer any serious consequences because we had Boro 
[Kontić], he protected us, he took upon him everything, we didn’t feel 
anything.  
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Boro Kontić (born 1955), although not significantly older, was higher on the 
institutional ladder in terms of professional seniority and as an editor of the 
youth program at Radio Sarajevo, he acted as the main mediator between the 
governing organs who had to make sure programs do not stray away from the 
Party line and the young journalists and comedians at the radio:    
I was fined several times because of TLN233 or PRIMUS and those fines 
were usually in the amount of 10% of the [monthly] salary. It was awful [...] 
Once they removed the entire show [TLN] without my knowledge […]   
He was also fined several times ‘because of the Slovenes’ in 1987: ‘I say 
- by virtue of playing Laibach music I certainly deserved to have a Slovenian 
passport’. 
In the 1980s, the peripheral parts of the youth sphere - the numerous 
youth and student cultural venues and media outlets - hosted and promoted 
novel forms of youth culture which progressively worked to pluralise and 
modernise the organisation. As has been observed, ‘Under socialism you could 
(mis)use the socialist infrastructure and framework in order to establish your 
own “free territories”’.234 The political core of the LSYY and the professional 
youth cadres were initially perceived as out of pace with the popular trends in 
youth culture and journalism. A process of negotiation, compromise and reform 
from within gradually replaced an initial sense of mutual distrust and hostility 
between the youth functionaries and the young journalists, musicians and 
artists. Through what could be interpreted as a reluctant, pragmatic, if not 
populist move to neutralise growing criticism from within and from without the 
Youth League and appeal to its ‘base’, the peripheral parts of the youth 
infrastructure opened up the LSYY to new trends in culture, journalism and 
publication.         
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Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The League of Socialist 
Youth of Yugoslavia 
- LSY of Bosnia-
Herzegovina
- LSY of Croatia
- LSY of Kosovo
- LSY of Macedonia
- LSY of Montenegro
- LSY of Serbia
- LSY of Slovenia
- LSY of Vojvodina
- LSY in the Yugoslav 
People's Army (re-
introduced in 1974)
Republic conference
Basic organisation
Municipal/city 
organisation
University organisation
Collective/interest-
based members
- Youth Hostelling 
League
- Music Youth
- People's Engineering
- Red Cross
- Scouts' League
- League of 
Organisations for 
Physical Education
- Pioneers' League
- Esperanto League
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Table 2 
 
Federal unit Magazine of the 
League of 
Socialist Youth 
(LSY) 
Magazine of the 
University branch 
of the LSY in the 
capital 
Local youth radio 
station/program 
Principal youth 
venues  
SR Slovenia Mladina Tribuna Radio Študent ŠKUC - Ljubljana 
SR Croatia Polet Studentski list Omladinski 
radio/Radio 101 
Studentski centar 
(SC) - Zagreb 
SR Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
Naši dani Valter Omladinski program/ 
Omladinski radio 
Dom mladih 
(Skenderija) - 
Sarajevo 
SR Serbia 
(proper) 
Omladinske 
novine/Nove 
omladinske novine 
(NON) 
Student Radio Index Studentski 
kulturni centar 
(SKC)  
Dom omladine - 
Belgrade 
SR 
Montenegro 
Omladinski pokret Univerzitetska riječ 
 
No data235 
Dom omladine 
‘Budo Tomović’ - 
Podgorica 
SR 
Macedonia 
Млад борец Студентски збор Клуб 100 Дом на млади 
„25 Мај„ - Skopje 
SAP 
Vojvodina 
Glas omladine 
(Stav – from 1987) 
Index / Kulturni centar 
mladih ‘Sonja 
Marinković’ - 
Novi Sad (from 
1984 : Kulturni 
centar Novog 
Sada) 
SAP Kosovo Zani i rinisë/ Zëri i 
rinisë (1968-
1986)/ Zëri 
Novi svet /  
Bota e re 
/ Pallati i rinisë, 
kulturës dhe 
sporteve ‘Boro 
dhe Ramizi’ - 
Prishtina 
SFR 
Yugoslavia 
Mladost Ideje – jugoslovenski 
studentski časopis 
/ / 
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1.3. The youth press and freedom of expression  
 
In November 1980, the editor-in-chief of Polet Zoran Franičević wrote: ‘It 
is apparent that in the context of the crisis of the youth organisation, the state of 
the economy and the socio-political relations, as they are, the youth press has 
an opportunity and space for a more decisive and more concrete action […] We 
know the enemy, as well as their means […] It seems that our (youth) press is 
preparing to become more open, more engaged and more protruding than the 
organisation which is paying us. For that battle of ours we should not, of course, 
expect to have our housing question solved, [to receive a] better pay and nice 
office space, but some possible bruises – yes!’236  
Indeed, throughout the 1980s the youth press sought to expose the 
contradictions within the Yugoslav legal framework with regard to freedom of 
speech and freedom of expression. This led foreign scholars to observe that ‘Of 
all the periodical publications appearing in Yugoslavia, it is the youth press 
which has proven the most consistently nettling to the authorities. Outspoken to 
the point of rebelliousness, the young editors […] have repeatedly ignored even 
the most fundamental taboos’.237 Yet, this was not without a precedent. In the 
late 1960s the youth and student press displayed a similar level of 
outspokenness and were therefore subject to political pressure, public critique 
and bans.238 A 1970 Radio Free Europe report dedicated to the youth press 
observed that ‘Criticism is usually merciless. The youth press shows no respect 
for any social or political elements in the country.’239 The subsequent federal 
Constitution nominally guaranteed freedom of thought and freedom of 
expression in the public and the media space, as article 166 of the 1974 
Constitution stipulated that ‘Freedom of thought and deciding shall be 
guaranteed’ and Article 169 guaranteed that ‘Scientific and artistic creation shall 
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be free.’240 On the other hand, however, Article 133 of the Penal Code 
proscribed any type of ‘hostile propaganda’:  
‘Whoever in an article, leaflet, drawing, speech or in some other way calls 
on or incites the overthrow of the government of the working class and 
working people, the unconstitutional change of the socialist self-
management social system, breaking-up of the brotherhood and unity and 
equality of nations and nationalities, overthrow of the organs of social self-
management and authorities and their executive organs, resistance to 
decisions of competent organs of authorities and of self-management 
which are significant for the protection and development of socialist self-
management relations, the security or defense of the country; or whoever 
maliciously and untruthfully represents the social and political situation in 
the country, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 
year but not exceeding 10 years.’241  
 
Article 133, along with article 157 which related to ‘Damaging the 
reputation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’242 and article 134 
which prohibited ‘Inciting national, racial or religious hatred, discord or 
hostility’243 represented the core of what was considered non-negotiable and 
hence inviolable in political/constitutional terms. In the wider public sphere the 
struggle for change and greater freedom of expression had begun earlier in the 
decade with several petitions which targeted this part of the legislation. Serbian 
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lawyer Srđa Popović, who was engaged in many court proceedings defending 
individuals accused of ‘verbal crimes’ and ‘hostile propaganda’ in 1980 
submitted a formal request with the federal Presidency demanding amendment 
of article 133 – a petition which bore the signatures of 103 intellectuals and 
public figures predominantly from Zagreb, Belgrade and Ljubljana.244 That same 
year in Zagreb 43 public figures (including former rector of Zagreb University 
Ivan Supek, the future Croatian nationalist President Franjo Tuđman, the 
personal physician of Croatia’s Party leader Vladimir Bakarić and 
representatives of the Catholic church) also petitioned the Yugoslav Presidency 
asking for a new amnesty law that would free all political prisoners.245 In 1981 
the President of the Federal Court in an article in the law journal Naša 
zakonitost acknowledged that the formulation of article 133 was not precise, 
while at the 1983 conference of Yugoslav criminologists several professors of 
law called for the repeal of the article.246           
When in 1984 the Croatian youth magazine Polet commissioned film, 
conceptual and performance artist Tomislav Gotovac (born 1937) to take part in 
a marketing project on the streets of Zagreb, acting as a ‘colporteur’ and 
dressed up as anything from a mummy, Superman, a worker with a hammer 
and a sickle, or Santa Claus, it was not the first time that non-conformist art, 
performance and photography was being transplanted from print media and the 
conventional confines of the gallery space onto the public cityscape. Yet, it was 
without a precedent that an official youth magazine stepped into a provocative 
event intelligently fusing marketing and art - Gotovac was detained by the police 
almost on every occasion, while the City Secretariat for Internal Affairs received 
more than 200 complaints from disturbed citizens.247 The awareness that there 
was a space which allowed for the claiming of freedom of expression in the 
youth media, albeit with certain risks, was present in the absolute majority of the 
testimonies I collected. They were all aware that there were ways to navigate a 
spectrum of restrictions and were not reluctant to take up certain risks. Dragan 
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Kremer (born 1960) was a music critic and journalist in several youth media in 
the 1980s. He recalled that sense of limited liberty:  
It was indeed possible to push certain attitudes through those media 
which were indeed alternative in outlook. The media themselves were not 
alternative per se, however. There was that level of tolerated freedom 
[dopuštene slobode] – there was a line which could not be crossed, but 
also a space beyond that line where one could do whatever one wanted.  
 
Sašo Ordanoski (born 1965) was a young journalist in Macedonia. He similarly 
recalled:  
Yugoslavia was not a dictatorship, but it was a communist state and the 
public debate on certain issues had a significant effect. At the same time, 
the youth press in Macedonia and in Yugoslavia was living its 
renaissance. I was a correspondent for Belgrade’s NON, I was also 
writing for [youth federal magazine] Mladost and I was employed for 
several years in [Macedonian] Mlad borec. All of these magazines were at 
the forefront of promoting those novel ideas which would later in a way 
produce the cadres and the platforms of the nineties... I was twenty-
something, with no other obligations, no family, well-paid… We used to 
read a lot – it was still the time of books… we travelled a lot, we were very 
mobile, especially within Yugoslavia, which was one boiling scene 
[вриечка сцена]. 
 
Senad Pećanin related the loosening of ‘the communist bondage’ with the rise 
of a generation of young journalists who dared ‘shift the boundaries of freedom’:  
Working for the [Sarajevo] Youth Program was a brilliant experience, it 
was the last time there was such a generation, an entire generation of 
exceptional journalists… My generation and I were lucky to make a start 
in the period when the communist bondage began to loosen and not to 
feel a real pressure of censorship. There were certain problems here and 
there, but Boro [Kontić] was managing it brilliantly and reduced the 
damage. He took upon himself all those pressure, fines, salary cuts, while 
protecting us. We thought that is a normal way of communicating - talking 
freely. We were really shifting the boundaries of freedom.  
 
As the decade wore on, the overall public debate on freedom of the media was 
intensifying. For instance, a book by professor Mihajlo Bjelica published in 1985 
entitled Велике битке за слободу штампе [Great battles for the freedom of 
the press] raised questions about auto-censorship, the prospect of establishing 
private newspapers in Yugoslavia and the ways to fight for freedom of the press 
in the context of a societal and economic crisis. However, the Yugoslav reality of 
a semi-free media space and a relatively permissive post-1968 youth sphere did 
not necessarily imply an absence of arbitrary clamp downs or strictly enforced 
boundaries of expression. Pečanin also recounted at length a close encounter 
with ‘the regime’ on the occasion of the withdrawal of the candidature for a 
member of the federal Presidency by politician Nenad Kecmanović:  
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No one knew why he did it, he didn’t say anything, while everyone was 
speculating that it was under pressure, that was a Yugoslav topic… In the 
media we were all trying to find out the reasons, since we knew he didn’t 
do it willingly […] I remember it was Saturday. I called him [Muhamed 
Berberović, President of the Council for the protection of the constitutional 
order] and asked if I can drop by – I was already working as a journalist 
for the Youth Radio. I asked him why Kecmanović withdrew and he said: 
‘You know, he cooperated with the English information agency, we had all 
that on file, we warned him that if he doesn’t withdraw voluntarily we’ll 
publicise that.’ Aha! Then I went straight to Boro and told him 
everything… The program was on at 2pm, we announced that at 2:15, I 
read it, of course we didn’t reveal the source… That was a blast. At 2:17 
the director of the radio called Boro to stop the program, because we 
used to have live phone calls in the program without censorship, which 
was revolutionary for the time. We had to stop the program and the next 
morning at 5am there was a knock at the door – I used to live in the 
student dormitory with my girlfriend… The guy showed his ID from the 
state security agency and said I had to go with him. I told my girlfriend to 
call Boro if I don’t come back. And then there were 5-6 hours of 
questioning, threats, yelling – I endangered I-don’t-know-what, I put into 
question the relations between Yugoslavia and Great Britain…  
 
Negotiating the boundaries of freedom was thus a prevalent practice in a 
context where public debate on certain issues was limited and where there were 
acknowledged, yet navigable restrictions in the public space. Hence, in order to 
embed one’s non-conventional artistic or media practice within the existing 
infrastructure, one had to work with the conventions and find a way through the 
institutional set-up to carve out ‘spaces of freedom’. Individuals used different 
strategies in what sometimes resembled a process of delicate bargaining, a 
complex web of practices, or simply ‘a game’ of testing the boundaries. Oral 
history gives us important evidence from below concerning the changing rules 
over public expression and the new spaces available within the youth press for 
discussion of public issues. 
Miha Kovač (born 1960) was editor-in-chief at Ljubljana’s Radio Student 
and later at the Slovenian youth magazine Mladina. He was also member of 
UJDI – the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative formed in 1989. Like 
many other interviewees, he stressed his one month work experience in London 
in 1988 - at Simon & Schuster where he was ‘learning book publishing’. He 
underlined the art of negotiating one’s way within the formally proscribed 
boundaries of youth journalism, as well as the fact that conflicts with the 
authorities for the most part did not materialise into legal prosecution or 
imprisonment: 
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All the time we were playing a game with the authorities […] After being 
banned, I sometimes took a problematic text to the print shop three days 
in advance and if I got a call – ‘You will be banned!’, I would remove it and 
I would publish it two weeks later […]  
I mean, we never took the system seriously. So, the bottom line is that in 
those days in Slovenia the communist system was already somehow 
disintegrating. Although there were conflicts all the time, they never took 
us to prison, or whatever. They were yelling at us, pressuring us, but we 
were, you know, negotiating, making two steps back and one step 
forward, as Lenin would say.  
 
L: What kind of pressure was that? They would summon you to the Party? 
 
Yes… They would call us… There were some funny things. For example, 
May the 13th was the official day of the Yugoslav police. And on that day 
we played the Lili Marlene tune and we said we are testing how long the 
police needs to come and arrest us. They needed about half an hour 
(laughs). We were released very quickly, in a few hours. There were some 
hard-liners in the Party who were trying to close down the radio station, 
but the soft line in the Communist Party defended the radio-station. We 
always somehow survived. The bottom-line is that the situation was not 
black and white, in the sense that on one side there was an opposition 
and on the other side there was the Communist Party. There was very… 
how to say… It was a kind of web of very strange relations and everybody 
was playing his or her own game. I would say that for most of us who 
were involved in this movement, we were to a certain extent very, very 
pragmatic, willing to make compromises, but pushing the limits of the 
possible further on all the time. 
 
This excerpt reaffirms the fine line which existed between 
transgression/contention and calculated negotiation within the existing political 
and institutional boundaries.248 The navigation of the institutional and political 
boundaries oftentimes required intelligent manipulation and improvisation, as 
Boro Kontić recalled: 
After we had done the montage, I knew exactly which parts could be 
problematic – the fifth, the eighth minute, after this and that line… Now it 
might seem ridiculous, but that was the way it was. I play the tape, we sit 
down with him [the editor], we keep silent and listen to the program. 
Precisely when that part approaches… I mean, I swear, I didn’t do it 
because someone had told me [to do it], it was pure instinct […] During 
that sequence I ask him if he wants a cigarette and he replies yes or no. 
The sequence is over and later I start coughing and ask him to open the 
window […] And so on, the program ends, he tells me – ‘Well you’ve got 
one boring program there’, I reply - ‘The next one will be better’, and so 
on. I mean, hilarious stuff, but that was the only way… 
 
Cross-republican influences were also crucial in shaping attitudes and 
media activism. Kovač emphasised the importance of the trial of the six 
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Belgrade intellectuals arrested in 1984 and charged with counter-revolutionary 
activity:249  
Actually, many things in Slovenia started to happen because of the 
‘Belgrade Six’ […] Radio Student and Mladina were writing a lot about this 
trial […] We were claiming that we will not solve the Yugoslav economic 
crisis by arresting people who think and discuss about what’s going on. 
This trial helped form quite strong links between Ljubljana and Belgrade 
[…] So, for a while, we were quite close. But those disintegrative 
pressures finally destroyed UJDI too.  
 
Robert Botteri (born 1963) was appointed editor-in-chief of Slovenian 
Mladina in 1987 after having worked as an editor in the student magazine 
Tribuna. He recalled that he began working for Tribuna at the time of the ‘Free 
University’ affair in Belgrade in 1984, i.e. the above-mentioned ‘trial of the 
Belgrade six’ and, like Kovač, he emphasised its importance in enhancing the 
debate on article 133 and freedom of speech: 
Mladina and Tribuna were the only media in Yugoslavia which dared 
report about that trial in a non-conformist way. They labeled us counter-
revolutionaries, to which we replied that we are professionals and we only 
report about the court case and [we asked] whether that was a ‘crime’. It 
turned out that they are tried for ‘verbal crime’ and that goes against 
freedom of speech. So, we immediately initiated a campaign in the student 
press […] We made badges with the number 133 crossed out. That was 
one way how the idea of freedom of speech was being spread around. 
Things then came one after the other. First it was freedom of speech, then 
the petition against the death penalty, a petition for the liberation of all 
political prisoners, for civil military service, for the rights of homosexuals, 
and at the end came the Youth Baton. We said that seven years after the 
death of the Marshal it is […] idolatry, carrying the Baton and bowing to a 
dead man was anachronistic. All our actions were condemned, while the 
real confrontation happened around the Baton and the Army, it was where 
it climaxed […] 
 
Indeed, over time the struggle for greater freedom of expression worked to 
expand the scope of the debate and the range of demands. The Slovenian 
youth press was at the forefront of these debates and acted as a model for 
young journalists in the other republics. Eventually, the spectrum of demands 
and debates which were voiced in the youth press, boiled down to the questions 
of democratisation/pluralisation in general and freedom of expression, in 
particular. There is a consensus among the interviewees who were active in the 
youth media that an aspiration for the democratisation of Yugoslavia was what 
underpinned their activism. Its formulation in these precise terms could be 
equally interpreted as a posthoc construction. Botteri summarised it thus:   
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From the mid-eighties we were constantly advocating democratisation. To 
us, human rights were sacrosanct. That is why we were signing the 
petitions for the release [from prison] of Vojislav Šešelj, Vladimir Šeks and 
Alija Izetbegović […] That is why we also published interviews with all of 
them. With Šeselj in particular we had many problems, the interview was 
banned, then we published only the questions, and later the answers […] 
That is where we located the only chance for that state, the chance of its 
democratisation […] I still believe that everything could have been solved 
like in the Czech case. Had the ruling party accepted that model of 
democratisation and had it put a halt to nationalism in the beginning… If 
Serbia had a liberal leadership things would have turned out differently.  
  
 
Because of the very nature and political organisation of socialist 
Yugoslavia as a highly decentralised ethno-territorial federation, comprehensive 
analysis of the response of the authorities is quite challenging. Dealing with the 
elite discourse on ‘tolerated freedom’ in the youth realm would necessitate an 
analysis of the separate republics’ contexts and the responses of the respective 
Party branches and the republics’ political/legal authorities. Although Yugoslavia 
was arguably the ‘cutting edge of East European socialist theory and practice, 
the most open and liberal society in the region, the socialist country with the 
region’s highest per capita income, and deemed most likely to join the European 
Community’,250 until the final days of the federation the Party played the central 
role in almost all spheres of social and political life in what was a de facto 
‘confederal party-state’.251 Nevertheless, by the mid-1980s the federal Party, no 
matter how fragmented and far from being unanimous, was arguably dominated 
by reformist forces.252 Moreover, by the end of the decade there was a shared 
sense among federal circles that Yugoslavia’s future lay with an indispensable 
‘europeanization’, as ‘[…] there was a consensus within the federal government 
(including the army) in favor of westernization and liberalization’.253   
However, factions within the republics’ Party branches were a reality, and 
although cleavages along ‘reformists vs. conservatives’ lines were not always 
easily discernible, shifts in policies towards the Youth Leagues, the alternative 
cultural practices and the youth media were largely conditioned by party 
factionalism and/or changes in the Party’s top echelons. The responses of the 
republics’ political authorities to the various ‘affairs’ in the youth domain differed 
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from republic to republic. More often than not it was local, republican media 
outlets which channelled the critique and different form of public discrediting 
aimed at what was perceived to be subversive youth behaviour. For example, in 
1984 Sarajevo-based band Zabranjeno pušenje was attacked in the Bosnian 
press in an article entitled ‘The toxic fumes of “Smoking Forbidden”’, which was 
followed by the band being temporarily banned from performing and from radio 
and television shows. The so-called ‘Crk’o Marshall’ [The Marshall’s croaked] 
affair was taken up by the media and the local authorities after a concert in the 
Croatian town of Rijeka, where the band leader’s comment after their Marshall 
amplifier had broken was interpreted as an act of ridiculing, a distasteful allusion 
to (Marshal) Josip Broz Tito. The journalist concluded that ‘This short period of 
time was enough for the youth eager for fun and spectacles to be imbued with 
new thoughts, with continuous underestimating of everything we have achieved 
so far and the banal, vulgar ridiculing of the fundamental slogan from the 
People’s Liberation Struggle “What belongs to others we don’t want, what is 
ours we will never surrender”’.254         
Dejan Jović was involved both in the youth press and in the Croatian 
LSY. He raised the issue of Party faction impact on the youth media and the 
youth organisation, as he recalled the removal of the editor of Croatian youth 
weekly Polet: 
I was angry when [editor Mladen] Babun was removed, to me that 
seemed inappropriate […] We regarded that as an intra-Party conflict 
which was reflected upon our editorial staff. He [Mladen Babun] was 
indeed close to [Stipe] Šuvar’s255 [Party] faction, as all of us were, but we 
didn’t like the way the faction led by Mika Špiljak transferred the intra-
Party conflict onto the youth organisation. And that happened quite often. 
Not only in Polet, but also in the daily press. The intra-Party conflicts were 
always reflected there […] There were big conflicts and from that you can 
conclude that there was proto-pluralism, huge conflicts in the media…    
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In a similar vein, Botteri located a major shift in the Slovenian youth realm after 
the 1986 Krško congress of the Slovenian LSY, which coincided with a change 
in the Party leadership and a new liberal camp. At the same time, a younger 
generation took over the youth organisation and over Mladina. Outside of the 
official framework, he claims, they had normal, good interaction and 
communication even with the federal youth president Hashim Rexhepi 
(originally from Kosovo): 
Even the politicians in private conversations used to tell us – ‘We know 
that, but it is still not the right time, wait a little…’ Everyone shared the 
opinion […] It was becoming clear that some sort of democratisation is 
indispensable. Those waves were already underway in Eastern Europe as 
well. 
 
Yet, court cases and bans on specific issues of youth magazines 
persisted throughout the decade. Often, the bans followed the legal framework 
which regulated the press and were not necessarily related to the federal Penal 
Code and the infamous article 133. From 1950 practices of pre-censorship had 
been abolished, the ‘Law on prevention of abuse of the freedom of the press 
and of other types of information’ [Zakon o sprečavanju zloupotrebe slobode 
štampe i drugih vidova informisanja] from 1976 provided the legal framework 
and it was the public prosecutor who could act ‘only ex-post facto, after a 
broadcast, publication or film presentation’.256 It is what happened on 16 March 
1988, when the public prosecutor in Ljubljana ordered the confiscation and a 
ban on circulation of the eleventh issue of the youth weekly Mladina. The article 
in question was the editorial signed by the ‘Counter-revolutionary editorial staff’ 
and entitled ‘In the name of the people – to the defenders of the Revolution’.257 
The editorial was addressed to the Yugoslav leadership and appears to have 
summed up the main points of contention and debate, as it accused the elite of 
wasting time dealing with the youth press and suggested that it should rather 
focus on financial affairs and corruption; on the public debt of more than 20 
billion dollars which was spent on elite villas and privileges; on a foreign policy 
which diminished Yugoslavia’s reputation abroad; and an inhumane and greedy 
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sale of arms. In addition, the text outlined 14 ‘counter-revolutionary demands’ 
among which the establishment of a market economy, direct elections, doing 
away with the monopoly of the Party and public control of the Army.258 Although 
many of these points overlapped with the views reflected in the other Yugoslav 
youth media, Mladina’s approach and articulation were sharper and hence more 
prone to criticism and controversy. Also, what set them apart in this case was 
the demand for a public control over the Army and a halt to the arms sale. The 
precedent to this was a highly controversial and debated article entitled 
‘Mamula go home’ which labelled the federal defense secretary a ‘merchant of 
death’ [trgovec s smrtjo]:  
‘the guilt of the Yugoslav commander of the armed forces is even bigger 
because he is selling rifles with roses of non-alignment in the barrels and 
with fake smiles about non-interference in interior affairs […] It was damn 
clear to Mamula why and against whom the Yugoslav arms in Ethiopia 
and Uganda are going to be used: in the civil wars, i.e. against the 
domestic guerrilla’. 259 
Although Slovenian Mladina was most of the time in the focus of what 
was seen as controversial youth journalism, the bans and court cases were in 
no way unique to the Slovenian youth press. The prosecutor’s office on 28 
January 1988 issued a temporary ban (upheld by the District Court) and on 2 
February issued a permanent ban for issue number 3 of Zagreb’s Studentski 
List from 27 January 1988, quoting a number of problematic articles among 
which ‘We are condemned to a status quo’, ‘Oasis of fake liberty’ and ‘Media 
courtesans’.260 The first article reported on a lecture by Dr. Marijan Korošić in 
Ljubljana’s Student cultural center SKUC and quoted a comment and a question 
from the audience which implied that a coalition between Stipe Šuvar and [Serb 
Party leader] Slobodan Milošević was hampering the process of 
democratisation, calling it a ‘military-police-party lobby’.261 Another problematic 
argument was from an article entitled ‘Oasis of fake liberty’, which dealt with the 
attacks on the magazine of the students of Maribor University in Slovenia and 
similarly targeted the Party as ‘a factor that progressively deepens our crisis 
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and uses national hatred for the protection of its own interests’.262 The editorial 
staff replied by publishing part of the poem ‘To those who follow in our wake’ by 
Bertold Brecht263, in addition to a reprint of the official decision of the public 
prosecutor and a reply which qualified the act of the ban as ‘civilizational 
anachronism’ and quoted a number of official figures, politicians and other 
statements in mainstream newspapers and magazines which raised similar 
issues regarding the inefficiency and disunity of the Party without being 
criminalised or banned.264 Not long afterwards, the public prosecutor issued 
another ban for the issue number 9 for the article ‘The dictator is coming’ 
dedicated to the visit by Congolese (Zaire) president Mobutu Sese Seko. The 
prosecutor’s decision quoted ‘the offensive claims [which damage] the honour 
and reputation of the Republic of Zaire and its President Mobutu Sese Seko’, as 
well as the friendly relations between the two countries.265 After the ban, the 
magazine published an overview of the recent history of Congo and more 
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strikingly, a series of quotes by President Tito dating from 1960 and 1961, 
where he had openly attacked the overthrow of Patrice Lumumba: ‘Since all 
manner of expression of our own opinion about [our] friend Mobutu, [including] 
the quoting of foreign sources or even quoting from our own press could lead us 
again into a situation where SL could be banned, we decided to look into what 
was said about our friend Mobutu by the man whose opinion, although sharper 
than ours, could help us avoid a ban…’266 The ‘publishers’ of the magazine - the 
University assembly [skupština Sveučilišta] and the city branch of the Croatian 
LSY renounced their right of appeal and the Council of the magazine (presided 
by a delegate from the city conference of the Croatian SAWP) called for the 
resignation of Ivica Buljan, the magazine’s editor [odgovorni urednik] and 
attacked the magazine for not being representative of the city youth it was 
meant to address. On 27 April 1988, after the appointment of a new editor, the 
magazine published a statement by the ‘former’ editorial board following its 
collective resignation entitled ‘The limit of political compromise’:  
‘Our intention was to initiate a serious and well argumented dialogue 
about the most sensitive questions and problems of Yugoslav society. Our 
efforts, however, were declared politically illiterate and irresponsible. It 
was said, in one way or the other, that ‘the time is not yet ripe’ for 
whatever we were attempting [to raise] […] without doubt the times that 
are coming are going to be even worse if we don’t start discussing about it 
today […] We wish the new editorial board both courage and knowledge, 
and of course, less political wisdom than the times require.’267 
 
This episode offers an illustration of the common, often arbitrary legal 
obstacles the youth press used to encounter throughout the 1980s. It also 
points to a specific way of ‘disciplining’ young journalists in a context where the 
mainstream media were openly discussing many of the sensitive issues which 
the youth press was often sanctioned for. For instance, that same year at the 
end of May, the LCY held its first conference (a smaller forum between two 
congresses) where party leaders and delegates formulated an openly 
expressed critique addressing the very issues which were subject to 
criminalisation upon appearance in the youth press: ‘corruption in the party, the 
possibility of leadership changes and the party’s relinquishment of the monopoly 
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on power, and the need for different opinions to be recognised…’268 In essence, 
the youth press was attacked and subject to temporary or permanent bans 
because it was seen as overstepping the boundaries of its prescribed scope of 
topics in this sphere. Political critiques did occur (semi-) publicly at different 
political levels, but the youth press was not considered an appropriate venue for 
such discussions: rather, the authorities often argued that the youth press 
should focus on issues of importance for the young and the student population, 
by which they meant a focus on culture and entertainment. Indeed, political 
developments in the country, social and economic issues, i.e. ‘high politics’, did 
come to occupy a significant portion of all of the main youth magazines in the 
1980s.                    
Articles appeared which exposed the socio-economic structural 
inequalities and the many forms of corruption, especially among the top Party 
officials, linking these phenomena as the products of the authoritarian traits of 
Yugoslav socialism, in particular the Party’s monopoly on power. In December 
1984 Polet published an ironic call for the ‘Big, bigger, the biggest Yugoslav 
competition for the photograph of the most beautiful, richest, most luxurious and 
most unavailable house for the working class on the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia’, printed over a black and white photo of a big mansion.269 It also 
noted that ‘precedence will be given to the photographs which will also supply 
information about the location, the size, the owners and their occupation’.270 
Similarly, an article published in the main Bosnian youth magazine Naši dani 
addressed a big public debate which exposed the practice of building summer 
villas by high Bosnian political officials at the sea-side resort of Neum.271 The 
article unreservedly attacked high ranking politicians and named them 
individually: ‘To nationalise what had been robbed. To take away once and for 
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all from the red bourgeoisie and give to the working class’.272 Finally, a similar 
affair burst into the open when Slovenian Mladina accused Minister of defense 
General Branko Mamula273 of having a summer villa being constructed for him 
by army recruits in the sea resort of Opatija.  
These acts by the youth press, however, need to be seen as embedded 
within the context of the time, i.e. within the public debates on the economic and 
political crisis which were already under way both in the mainstream media and 
in politics.274 From a contemporary perspective, however, those acts might 
appear naïve, as Senad Pećanin reflected on their attacks in the press targeting 
late socialist functionaries: 
It’s ridiculous – we would publicly destroy them for having roast lamb for 
lunch, for eating on invoice. Today I feel like the biggest idiot for doing 
that… This post-war Bosnian elite here, and I could see some evidence – 
millions of marks were spent. I spoke to [former president of the Yugoslav 
Presidency] Raif Dizdarević a couple of years ago and he told me about 
his neighbour who was the Federation’s Prime-minister, a notorious 
criminal – every morning he could see a governmental car coming to pick 
up his son, take him to school and back. That was unthinkable at the time. 
Raif says […] as member of the Presidency he had a car and a driver, a 
flat for temporary use while on the post, two phone lines - the bills for one 
of which he had to pay himself […] at the first or second Presidency 
meeting he proposed and the comrades agreed that the cost for the food 
at the restaurant at the Presidency building would be deducted from their 
salaries at the end of the month. Oh! - I am thinking – f***, what are we 
talking about? These [post-socialist elites] swept away hundreds of 
millions… And we brought down that elite at the time […] for a weekend 
house in Neum. The man worked for forty years, he was a revolutionary, 
held all kinds of offices – and we asked why he owned a weekend house 
in Neum and a 40 square meter flat!        
Although the JUPIO report underlined the limiting of the spaces for 
autonomy and free initiative of the young, as well as societal tendencies which 
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aim for ‘maximal politicisation and ideologisation of everything’,275 the 
youngsters active in the peripheral parts of the youth infrastructure - the cultural 
and media circles - found ways to navigate the system and carve out spaces of 
independent initiative and alternative art and media culture. As it was already 
mentioned, these phenomena were not particular to the decade of the 1980s. 
As Valerie Bunce notes, ‘The result was that socialist Yugoslavia was, by 
regional socialist standards (especially from the late 1960s onward) unusually 
decentralized, unusually liberalized, and unusually situated with respect to East-
West economic and political-military rivalries’.276 This came not only as a result 
of the unique Yugoslav political and theoretical takes on classical 
Marxist/Leninist theory – most notably the concept of the withering away of the 
state277 – but also as a result of the existence of a critical mass of young people 
who took advantage of the resources and the spaces of the youth sphere.  
 
This chapter introduced the wide, decentralised network of the LSYY, 
outlining some of the major debates which occurred within its strictly speaking 
political/institutional core, as well as in the peripheral, i.e. its media and cultural 
realms. Although its political elite was not challenged until later in the decade, 
its cultural and media spheres within a very decentralised structure increasingly 
provided prominent outlets for alternative expression. The first half of the 
decade, i.e. the period immediately after Tito’s death, was the time when 
different oppositional ideas and radically new youth cultural streams and styles 
were progressively invading the youth realm. Expressed reluctantly at official 
level and still within the institutionalised vocabulary of Yugoslav self-managing 
socialism, novel ideas and contestations were fermenting under the shrinking 
layer of the politically correct discourse of socialist self-management. The 
internally engendered critique aimed at careerist and position-seeking cadres 
and at the alienation of the LSYY was upheld by the youth press which began to 
drift away from its originally conceived role as a media platform of the Youth 
League(s). The increasing involvement of the youth media in contemporary 
political debates was met by a range of obstacles – from bans and dismissals, 
to public attacks. In the context of progressive liberalisation of an already highly 
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decentralised federation and a youth infrastructure, young musicians’, artists’ 
and journalists’ acts in the public sphere frequently cut across the fine line 
between negotiation and dissent.         
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2. ‘Comrades, I don’t believe you!’ – youth culture and the 
rethinking of historical legacies 
 
The image of freedom changes over time;  
The freedom that is possible in a period of plenitude  
is no longer viable when want reigns.  
Our freedom is the freedom of those who think alike.278 
 
Laibach (1982) 
 
This chapter focuses on the way some representatives of this new 
generation articulated an unprecedented critique in the realms of culture and 
youth commemorations. Indeed, they conceived of their challenge in explicitly 
generational terms, questioning some of the values embodied in contemporary 
politics and culture, but above all in an older generation which was seen to 
perpetuate inherited rituals and rhetoric without being able to respond to the 
contemporary challenges and crises. Without doubt there was a parallel 
process of ‘cautious political liberalisation’279 unfolding at the 
institutional/political plane and the atmosphere of open public debate and 
acceptance of the reality of the crisis fed into the debates within the youth 
realm.  
However, for the most part, this critique was not reduced to a demand for 
outright abolishment of Yugoslav socialism, but it was rather about challenging 
the norms of an older generation and reinventing socialism through the state’s 
youth institutions. This critique often manifested itself in cultural forms. Hence, 
this chapter will address some of those cultural responses as sites for 
generational contestation. In particular, it will focus on how mainstream political 
discourse and inherited youth rituals were questioned in debates over the 
personality cult and the Baton of Youth relay race, and will explore how 
mainstream socialist youth culture was critiqued through new music trends.  
The first part looks into what was defined in the Introduction as the 
second generational marker – a new ‘sense of citizenship’ which manifested 
itself through a new way of articulating conceptualisations of ‘rights’ and 
‘identity’. It examines how, despite a sense of crisis, fundamental aspects of 
Yugoslav identity and belonging survived. Indeed, surveys confirmed that most 
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still belived that change could be engineered through institutional forms. The 
second part examines the changing role of the inherited youth rituals such as 
the voluntary work actions and the celebration of 25 May - the Day of Youth and 
Tito’s birthday. The last part of the chapter offers insight into the debates 
provoked by the rise of new youth music scenes, some of which were seen as 
contesting Yugoslavia’s antifascist legacy. Overall, the chapter reflects on the 
anti-regime critique which sought to expose the authoritarian traits of the 
Yugoslav socio-political system and to stretch the discursive boundaries of 
rights and freedom(s). 
 
2.1. A new sense of citizenship 
 
Surveys and interviews from the 1980s show a degree of crisis of faith in 
the status quo. However, they also demonstrate, especially amongst the 
younger generation, a fundamental faith in the Yugoslav project, both in terms 
of national/ethic identifications, and with regard to the future of a form of 
socialism. Indeed, even some of the most critical voices believed that change 
could be engineered through institutional forms. Below I will examine this 
phenomenon – demonstrating that although the rights and identities that 
constituted citizenship were being rethought, this was nearly always done within 
a Yugoslav framework.  
Respondents in the 1986 JUPIO study expressed a high dose of 
pessimism concerning the future of the Yugoslav society. Neverthless, few 
could envision a radical transformation or a disappearance of the Yugoslav 
framework: rather, ‘the main concern of the vast majority of the population was 
their economic well-being in the face of the economic crisis.’280 When asked 
what were the most important problems the society was facing, the majority of 
respondents in the JUPIO survey located the core problems with the economic 
sphere – most prominently youth unemployment and the representatives of the 
state bureaucracy who in the eyes of the young generation failed to live up to 
their roles and could not be held accountable for political or economic decisions.  
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Figure 2: The most important problems the society is facing 
 SLO CRO VOJ SRB BIH MKD MNE KS 
Economic 
problems 
41,3 52,3 55,7 47,9 52,9 44,9 60,5 50,3 
Unaccountability 33,1 26,8 21,8 26,5 19,7 23,5 17,6 15,9 
Political system 17,3 / / / / / 7,3 / 
Social gap 15,6 13,7 22,2 14,0 12,2 12,0 13,7 17,1 
Unemployment 13,0 37,1 33,7 38,3 50,0 51,5 49,4 47,8 
Financial crime / 8,5 / 9,7 9,8 7,8 / / 
National 
problems 
/ / 7,7 / / / / / 
 
 
Figure 3: The most important problems the youth is facing 
 SLO CRO VOJ SRB BIH MKD MNE KS 
Unemployment 41,8 67,2 64,0 70,4 76,1 72,5 73,8 72,0 
Housing 17,8 14,3 16,0 15,2 9,0 12,5 / 12,1 
Economic 
independence 
16,9 18,1 17,1 17,9 14,9 19,7 27,0 20,9 
Moral crisis 15,4 / / / / / / / 
Alcoholism/drugs  / 16,7 11,7 22,0 22,5 14,9 / / 
Social gap / / / / / / 12,9 10,9 
Education 
system 
/ / / / / / 10,3 / 
 
*According to data from Srđan Vrcan et al. Položaj, svest i ponašanje. 
 
The JUPIO research also demonstrated a relatively high degree of 
identification with Yugoslavia. The part dedicated to the ‘national attachment’ 
[nacionalna vezanost] among the youth revealed a rather low interest and 
identification in ethno-national or religious terms: 
Figure 4: National attachment 
Absence of national attachment 11,9% 
Weak national attachment 43,8% 
Medium national attachment 41,9% 
Strong national attachment 2,3% 
Extreme national attachment 0,1% 
  
*According to Sergej Flere in Srđan Vrcan et al. Položaj, svest i ponašanje.  
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By summarising the results according to the federal units and taking into 
account the last three degrees (medium, strong and extreme), the research 
revealed that the highest degree of national attachment is among the youth in 
Kosovo (72.5% + 5.7% + 0.4% = 78.6%) and in Macedonia (60.2% + 3.7% + 
0% = 63.9%), while the lowest was found among the young of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (30.3% + 1.5% + 0 = 31.5%).281 The results according to the 
‘contingency strata’ showed that the level of national attachment is lowest 
among the students (30.4%) and highest among the farmers (the rural youth) – 
57.5%. The survey also showed a high percentage of acceptance of nationally 
mixed marriages, which echoes the tendency of valuing individual (as opposed 
to cultural/ethno-religious) traits when choosing a marriage partner or a 
friend.282   
Figure 5: Nationally mixed marriages are doomed to fail  
(percentage of those who agree) 
Yugoslavs – 10% Members of the LSY – 15% University students – 11% 
Croats – 12% Non-members of the LSY – 
43% 
Employed – 15% 
Slovenes – 14% Not sure of their LSY 
membership status – 23% 
Students (high school) – 19%  
Montenegrins – 15% Members of the LCY – 14% Unemployed – 20% 
(Bosnian) Muslims – 15% Non-members of the LCY – 
19% 
Farmers – 27% 
Serbs – 17% 
  
Macedonians – 29% 
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Albanians – 45% 
  
 Average: 18% 
 
 
As the majority of the 5.4% of the Yugoslav population who declared 
‘Yugoslav’ in the 1981 federal census were young people, scholars among 
other things sought to measure the levels of national and Yugoslav attachment. 
In order to map certain conclusions on the sentiment of Yugoslav belonging as 
supranational or national, the JUPIO research posed several different 
questions. The percentage of those who agreed with the statement ‘The 
feelings of Yugoslav belonging and my national belonging are not the same, but 
I care about both of them’ was 61%. The highest percentage was among the 
Macedonians (69%) and the lowest among the Albanians (56%) – although in 
all of the cases that meant that the majority espoused a Yugoslav identification 
as a supplementary, supra-national sentiment, where the ethno-national and the 
Yugoslav were not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, this points to the fact 
that this generation embodied what I call ‘layered Yugoslavism’, i.e. it had 
internalised the basic postulates of the Yugoslav polity – its parallel ethno-
territorial and its supra-national character. Having been born and socialised 
within the quasi-confederal political framework of Yugoslavia, where the 
separate national/federal units and identities publicly and institutionally 
coexisted with the Yugoslav level/sense of identity and citizenship, it had 
internalised a two-tier sense of belonging and self-perception, where the 
national/republican, on one hand, and the Yugoslav dimension, on the other, 
were perceived and appropriated as complementary rather than exclusive. 
Secondly, coming of age and being active in the 1970s and 1980s, this 
generation was particularly exposed to the tension between the strong 
centrifugal and weakening centripetal forces and tendencies at institutional and 
everyday level.283 Nevertheless, the research concluded that ‘there is a very 
                                                 
283
 In addition, the research quoted the ‘surprising finding’ of 72% of young people across the 
entire survey who declared that they agree with the statement ‘I am a Yugoslav and I can’t give 
priority to any other affiliation/belonging’. The highest percentage was among the Bosnian 
Muslim youth (80%), the Macedonians (78%) and the Serbs and Montenegrins (76%), while the 
lowest among the Slovenes (49%). The fact that even the lowest percentage implies that half of 
the respondents demonstrated a surprisingly high level of ‘Yugoslav orientation’ is very telling of 
the way this generation perceived Yugoslavism and self-identified in broader terms, beyond the 
traditional ethno-national framework. Although it was predominantly among the Bosnian youth 
that the Yugoslav was adopted as a ‘primary identification’, even the youth belonging to the 
other national groups which demonstrated a relatively high level of national 
115 
 
high potential for Yugoslav identification [opredeljivanje] among the young […] 
which is not a matter of fashion and transience, but of more profound integrative 
processes’.284  
The testimony of Sašo Ordanoski offers a synthesis of all of these points 
by reflecting on what Yugoslavism represented and meant at individual level: 
First of all, there was a sentimental dimension to the Yugoslav 
identification. A sentiment related to the fine, decent life which certain 
social strata nowadays can only long for. There was also a political 
platform within it – no matter how caricature-like it sounds today, the idea 
of brotherhood and unity did not sound like a pamphlet… Ultimately it 
appealed to a core human emotion and that is the fundamental need for 
security. That idea allowed people to feel safer and engendered a need to 
preserve that union, which consequently resulted in the large number of 
people who declared Yugoslav [in the census]. In any case, the feeling of 
being Macedonian, Serb, etc. came a little later, when the conflict 
intensified and when eventually the people were pushed into their national 
corrals and forced to identify according to their primary ethnic belonging. 
The Yugoslav idea was a synthetic idea, a more cosmopolitan idea, hence 
it could not be negative in itself. It didn’t however imply an erasure of the 
consciousness of ethnic belonging, but a desire to pluralise that ethnic 
belonging and to integrate it with other ethnic belongings into a new 
quality – more powerful, bigger, more comfortable… The instigators of the 
events which destroyed this proved to be more powerful than the 
instigators of the integrative idea – ‘and the rest is history’.  
The idea that Yugoslavism was not understood as an attempted ‘erasure 
of the consciousness of ethnic belonging’, but it was rather a ‘cosmopolitan 
idea’ which essentially helped to ‘pluralise’ and raise the ethnic onto a higher 
level, echoes the finding of the JUPIO study. The majority of my interviewees 
spoke of ‘togetherness’ as a way to avoid using the notion of ‘brotherhood and 
unity’ which might appear ‘caricature-like’ nowadays. It is also important to note 
the capacious quality in both spatial and abstract terms, raised in many 
testimonies, implying that Yugoslavism allowed plurality and was able to 
accommodate difference. Yugoslavia, in this sense, was understood both as a 
spatial framework which was bigger and hence more commodious than the 
narrower national/federal unit, and as a wider identity framework which offered 
more freedom and an extended scope for self-identification.     
In an atmosphere where scholars were observing a trend of a 
progressive increase in the ethnic distance from the 1960s onwards, the last all-
Yugoslav research on youth published in 1990 revealed some astounding 
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results which echoed those from 1986. When asked to declare whether and to 
what extent they are prepared to personally engage in the preservation and 
realisation of the following group interests and tendencies, the majority (54%) 
chose ‘SFR Yugoslavia as a whole’.285 Although the authors noted that there 
were differences along national/regional lines, the research found that the 
prepraredness for engagement for the interests of one’s nation and the interests 
of Yugoslavia as a whole are actually connected as ‘for the majority of the 
young these two attitudes do not appear as incompatible.’286 Indeed, an 
ethno-national and a Yugoslav sense of belonging seen as complementary 
rather than mutually exclusive persisted until very late into the decade.  
 
              
      *According to data from Srećko Mihailović et al. Deca krize. 
 
Although the survey revealed that 86% of the respondents declared 
preparedness for engagement for the interests of Yugoslavia, with generational 
interests (82%) and national interests (74%) ranked just below that, it concluded 
that the youth mostly identified with the social-class group it belonged to.287 The 
sense of belonging to a socially, culturally or generationally defined group with a 
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relative disregard for the ethno-national aspect indeed surfaced in many of the 
interviews I conducted. Robert Botteri’s testimony is particularly illustrative: 
I have to say I never identified as Yugoslav. I was at the age when I would 
rather identify as a punk than a Yugoslav. I used to claim that I have more 
in common with a punk from Belgrade, than with someone who is into folk 
music from Ljubljana (laughs). So, we had a rather internationalist 
understanding/outlook. We felt closer to the punks in England. So, we 
never perceived it in a nationalist way. Moreover, being a Yugoslav at that 
time was also some kind of nationalism. It was an antipode. We saw 19th 
century remnants in all of the nationalists. We thought they wouldn’t be 
able to re-surface, we thought the world was becoming global and it didn’t 
matter what you were. We probably underestimated the power of 
nationalism. Especially with those who were not supposed to be 
nationalist… Because the top echelons of the communist parties were 
always describing themselves as internationalist. If there was anything 
valuable in Marxism, it was internationalism.  
 
The sense of multiple layers in one’s identification with Yugoslavia is 
evident in the majority of the testimonies I collected. The awareness of one’s 
ethno-national belonging is clearly present and discernible, whereas the 
Yugoslav identification is present, but stripped of national content. Dejan Jović’s 
testimony provides an illustration of this:  
Formally I never declared Yugoslav […] In the student index there was a 
box for ‘nationality’, which I left blank. I enrolled in university in 1986. And 
that is how I felt. The student index is the evidence. First of all, I 
considered that question inappropriate, intrusive. It was completely 
incomprehensible for me why one is asked to declare their nationality. It 
made you wonder – what is the purpose of that question? On the other 
hand, as I have dual national belonging, Croatian and Serbian, I found it 
difficult to decide and I simply never wanted to decide. If I had to, I used to 
say I have dual belonging, Serb and Croat, to be fair to both. Formally I 
was ‘undeclared’, but not ‘Yugoslav’ at the censuses. Why? Because I 
think I bought in, I followed the dominant politically correct logic, which 
was that Yugoslavs in the ethnic sense do not exist. That was what we 
were taught in school, that Yugoslav is not an ethnic category. Yes, all of 
us are Yugoslav, that’s how we feel, but in the ethnic sense we are Serbs, 
Croats… So, I was not that big of a rebel in that sense to dare say – ‘I am 
an ethnic Yugoslav, precisely because everyone says they don’t exist’, as 
many people actually did…  
 
Culture played an important role for this generation in the 1980s, in how 
they made sense of Yugoslavism. The majority of my interviewees identified 
Yugoslavism in broad cultural terms. Gregor Tomc drew a line between the 
political and the cultural poles of the Yugoslav project, pin-pointing, as did the 
majority of the interviewees, 1987-1988 and the rise of Milošević as the turning 
point:  
For me it was a cultural concept. […] I wrote a text in Nova revija 57 
where I said that I don’t feel as Slovenian, but I feel much more as a 
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citizen of Ljubljana and a fan of my football team, and I like Yugoslavia as 
a multicultural event, but I really hate the political system. So, I always 
hated Yugoslav politics, but I had no problem with Yugoslav culture. But, 
unfortunately, we had such incapable politicians that messed up the whole 
project and it can never be revived.  
But this was never translated into secessionism until Milošević. Milošević 
had to come up with this very aggressive nationalism for people to start 
thinking – look, maybe we should redefine this cultural idea into a political 
concept. […] Later everybody became anti-Yugoslav because we 
simply… when you watched those generals threatening you on TV… 
these are not the kind of people I want to be in the same country with. 
 
This was also a generation that was defined in terms of a crisis in political 
socialisation by contemporaries. The beginning of the 1980s saw an emergence 
of debates about the ideological fragmentation of the youth and its 
disillusionment or lack of support for socialist self-management. New Left ideas 
or ‘ultra-left radicalism’ mainly penetrated the youth through intellectual circles 
and university professors associated with the Praxis group and its journal which 
was banned in 1975. Sociologists noted the emergence of various ideological 
streams among the youth – ‘liberal, statist-bureaucratic, ultra-left, and other, 
along with a worrying trend of a growing number of young people turning to 
careerism, opportunism, conformism, egoism, etc.’288 At the beginning of the 
decade, in November 1980, Ratko Butulija, the Secretary of the Belgrade Party 
Committee complained that young people are behaving ‘in a liberalistic manner’ 
and that ‘ultraleftist radicalism’ has become ‘sort of the fashion’.289 Similarly, an 
earlier research from 1977 on conformism and political behaviour found that 
younger Party members with a shorter membership history prove to be more 
conformist than older ones, especially when compared with the most senior 
ones who fought in the Second World War.290 This observation points to a 
crucial gap which ran along generational lines – i.e. the fact that unlike those 
who fought in the liberation war, for the generations born in the 1950s, 60s and 
70s, the liberation struggle of the Yugoslav partisans was often reduced to the 
narratives from the history textbooks or the fictional films. As one foreign 
scholar observed in the mid-1980s, ‘We find that the legitimating effect of the 
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wartime liberation is less effective for those for whom that war is no more than 
the memory of their parents’ generation’.291  
Moreover, throughout the decade scholars and politicians sought 
explanation for the rapidly declining number of young members of the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia. The number of the youth in the LCY, like the total 
number of party members, was steadily increasing from 1969 until 1980: from 
295,115 (23,3%) to 614,106 (32,6%) in 1979. In 1980, 32% (649,428) of the 
2,041,270 members of the LCY were young people below the age of 28. 
However, in 1985, the number was already down to 504,368 (23%).292 By 1989, 
43% of the respondents in the last youth survey thought that the work of the 
LCY (referred to as a ‘senior organisation’ [seniorska organizacija] or ‘the locus 
of control’ [lokus kontrole]) is unacceptable and 42% said that the LCY should 
be only one of several political parties.293   
What is particularly intriguing is the fact that only 25% of the activists in 
the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia were at the same time members of 
the LCY. In 1982, a study on the involvement of the youth in the political 
system, noted that ‘one can conclude that a huge number of young people is to 
be found outside of the active participation in the structure of the political 
system’.294 This turned out to be the beginning of an irreversible process. In 
1989 the percentage of those who declared that they are members of self-
management bodies in 1985-6 dropped from 20% to 7%, while the percentage 
of those who said they would not like to be members increased from 33% to 
56%.  
However, the discontent with the functioning of the system and with the 
political elite did not imply an outright refusal of the Yugoslav model of 
socialism. In the 1989 survey, more than half of the respondents (53%) 
declared their acceptance of socialism as a theory, while socialism in practice 
(i.e. as implemented in Yugoslavia) was not acceptable to 41% of the 
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respondents.295 As it was observed, ‘Despite seven or eight years of increasing 
economic crisis, there are no immediate signs of complete loss of confidence in 
the system. But there is a growing sense of disillusionment.’296 The following 
testimony by Zemira Alajbegović (born 1958), one of the leading members of 
the FV 112/15 theater group and the Borghesia band, famous for its video art 
and multimedia performances, is illustrative of this: 
There is an inherent contradiction: on the one hand, it was normal to 
criticise a system which was fossilised, it ran out of ideas, and was 
endlessly repeating certain phrases – we portrayed that well in our videos, 
for example. On the other hand, it was very important for us and our 
activism and we believed in the socialist postulates of art and culture for 
the masses, in the fact that it’s not necessary to go either in some sort of 
a bourgeois art or towards a consumerist model which we now live. That’s 
why we were basing our work on the Russian activist art. That was a 
utopian project. It seems to me that back then we were all utopians – not 
only us in FV, but all of us believed that things can change only for the 
better. In that situation one didn’t think that once socialism is transformed 
into capitalism, capitalism will be here to stay (laughs). So, on the one 
hand, one was critical towards the socialist system, the project, but on the 
other hand we genuinely believed in some of those ideas.       
   
Senad Pećanin similarly underlined that their activism was not inspired by an 
anti-socialist outlook: 
We were not anti-communist, especially not anti-antifascist. No, no. We 
were socialised in that spirit and antifascism was never put under 
question. On the contrary. What we found unthinkable was censorship. 
The regime, freedom of expression, multi-party system, why wouldn’t it be 
possible?  
 
Beside an apparent discontent with the state of affairs in the society and 
with the functioning of the state, it is striking that nearly half of the respondents 
in the 1986 survey said that social change could be achieved in an institutional 
way. However, 42,9% reported that they had not thought about the issue, which 
echoed concerns about the ‘depolitisation’ of the youth.  
Figure 7: Modes of realisation of social change 
 
‘Social change can be achieved above 
all through…’ 
 
% 
Working within the institutions of the 
socio-political system (LCY, SAWP, 
LSY, etc.) 
40,9 
Working outside of the institutions 10,2 
Working against the institutions 4,1 
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I haven’t thought about it 42,9 
No response 1,8 
 
A new sense of Yugoslav self-identification understood in non-national, 
but, rather, in broader cultural or civic terms, and often synthetic and inclusive in 
nature, was a dominant generational marker. The rapid decline in membership 
in the LCY and the decline in support for ‘really existing’ self-management, on 
the one hand, and the acceptance of the Yugoslav framework, on the other, 
informed this new generational ‘sense of citizenship’. Many wanted a 
decoupling of dogmatic socialism and cultural Yugoslavism and believed that 
such a move was viable. In essence, the generational critique which targeted 
the inherited norms and values of an older generation and the functioning of the 
political system they had built, conveyed the need for new forms of political 
legitimacy and the re-inventiion and democratisation of Yugoslav socialism and 
the Yugoslav state.   
 
2.2. Under Tito’s shadow – rethinking youth rituals 
 
 
A significant part of the budget of the League of Socialist Youth of 
Yugoslavia was dedicated to the organisation of a number of traditional youth 
events – commemorative, competitive and cultural. 25 May - the Day of Youth - 
was considered the main event which carried the most symbolic weight, 
commemorating the legacy of the liberation struggle and Tito’s leadership, and 
celebrating the achievements and the role of the youth in Yugoslav society. 
Competitive events such as the ‘Festival of work of the youth of Yugoslavia’ 
[Festival rada omladine Jugoslavije]297 were designed both to foster a 
competitive spirit and endorse the doctrine of self-management. A large portion 
of youth took part in a range of cultural and art festivals in cinematography, 
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theatre, literature, music and science that were – at least in an institutional 
sense - devoid of politics. The second most important youth event for the LSYY, 
which embodied these commemorative, competitive and cultural dimensions, 
was the so-called ‘voluntary work action’ [omladinska radna akcija - ORA]. 
Young brigadiers were introduced to the practices of self-management as the 
actions were organised as small self-managing enterprises, but also preserved 
certain elements of the revolutionary past (the headquarters, the commanders 
of the brigade and the action, etc.). An excerpt from a report on the ‘Neretva ‘87’ 
work action sums up their role: ‘…at “Neretva” young people from different 
national, social and age strata took part. The mass participation and this 
[diverse] structure allowed the spread and development of the legacy of the 
socialist revolution, development and nurturing of brotherhood and unity of the 
nations and nationalities, strengthening of friendship and solidarity, the creative 
spirit and enthusiasm’.298  
However, as of the late 1970s, the youth voluntary actions had lost 
almost all connection to its post-war ideological moorings and progressively 
came to represent and embody ‘a youth tourist culture’299 – in which the young 
were distanced from the ideological content and saw it as an opportunity for 
travel. What remained one of their main features throughout the socialist era 
was their supranational dimension, i.e. their role as spaces where youngsters 
with different ethnic and social backgrounds could socialise, get to know each 
other and explore the country. Dragan Kremer recounted his experience of 
going to a summer voluntary camp and remembered the slight cultural shock of 
meeting a young miner from a small Serbian town:  
The first time I went to a work camp I met a guy who was two years older 
than me and who was a miner by profession, from Aleksinac. What did 
you know until then about miners? That a miner is the guy from the 
banknote, that miners are in the history textbooks, and sometimes in the 
news when an accident occurs. But a miner was never represented as a 
22-year old guy. You meet this guy and he turns out to be very nice, 
funny… Probably I would have never met him.         
With time, the majority of participants came to be secondary school 
students and youth from less well-off families. For instance, of the 789 
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participants at the youth work action ‘Neretva ‘87’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 442 
were pupils, 257 were young workers and only 32 were university students.300 
As funds became scarce in the midst of the economic crisis, the whole concept 
began to be reconsidered. Yet, the so-called ‘federal youth work actions’ 
[Savezna Omladinska Radna Akcija- SORA] gathered a larger number of 
participants even in the second half of the 1980s, when their popularity 
generally began to decline. As an illustration, at the federal work action ‘Youth 
railway Tuzla-Zvornik’ in 1987 there were more than 3,100 participants in 73 
brigades,301 while only in Macedonia 4,348 work actions with 431,822 
participants were organised between 1982 and 1986.302      
Dragan Kremer’s testimony captures very effectively the social divisions 
among the youth, and the role of these events as platforms for pan-Yugoslav 
youth encounters. The memory of these events is almost always underpinned 
by subjective retrospective statements, in this case that no matter how futile and 
unattractive they might have seemed at the time, they had a utilitarian value in 
having taught teenagers practical work skills and habits:      
I am sure that I am among the few who have gone several times to a 
youth work action – to the shock of many of my friends. But, my reasoning 
was – I would spend as much of my summer holidays as I can far away 
from my parents. There were maybe three other people from our high-
school who went as well. But we found out where the signing up takes 
place […] and you encountered a completely different circle of young 
people from the secondary vocational schools […] It wasn’t about an 
exclusivist attitude – ‘I don’t want to hang out with people like that’ – 
simply, the majority of the kids from your street, from your primary school 
went to a gymnasium, in the city centre […] And then you meet those 
young people whom you had heard about from the stories of your parents 
when they’d say to you: ‘You know, there are children who can’t go to the 
seaside for holidays, their parents don’t have the money’. And you realise 
that [the work action] is their only opportunity for summer travel. At the 
work action itself there was an additional, wider circle of people you met. 
You saw people from some places you’ve never been to, people you’ve 
never had a chance to meet before […] When you went to the Army, you 
met yet other people who lived in your country, belonged to the same 
generation, but were significantly different and you would have never 
come across them unless you came to the Army or you travelled a lot… It 
was rare for gymnasium kids to go to work actions, it was almost looked 
upon with contempt – like, that was only for those who have nothing better 
to do. It was great for me – first I went with my parents [to the seaside], 
then at my grand-parents’, and finally at a work action – four additional 
weeks without the parents over your head. Plus, it turned out to be fun 
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and not hard at all - that was abundant socialism [bogati socijalizam], it 
wasn’t work that would kill you […] I realised it was actually very useful, as 
I learned what it means to dig a two-meter trench with a shovel […] you 
simply see what you can do with your own two hands, something which 
proved helpful in the most critical moments of my life – in times of political 
pressures, etc. [I realised] I don’t have to be always a journalist, I can do 
other things, even physical work… it’s not beneath me [nije mi ispod 
nivoa]. I’d rather do that than to compromise myself, my attitudes and 
views. 
 
By the end of the decade, the LSYY through its commissions for 
voluntary youth work, was attempting to modernise the concept of youth 
volunteering. International volunteering camps with specific foci on ecology or 
archaeology, for instance, youth scientific research camps and opportunities of 
volunteering abroad came to supplement the classical model of the ‘youth work 
action’. For example, in 1988 the Macedonian LSY committed to organising, 
beside the classic highway work action ‘Skopje ‘89’, a youth scientific research 
camp ‘Youth ‘89’, two international youth camps on ecology and applied art and 
four Yugoslav youth work camps.303 Thus, the vocabulary had changed as well: 
in addition to the traditional ‘youth work action’ [младинска работна акција], 
‘international/Yugoslav youth work camps [меѓународни/југословенски 
младински работни кампови] were reffered to and were included in the 
program. This implied reinvention of the concept of youth volunteering, as the 
Slovenian and the Vojvodinan LSYs in 1987 and the Macedonian in 1988 
introduced the possibility of travelling abroad to take part in international youth 
volunteering camps. The newly conceptualised ‘youth work camps’ in 
Macedonia were meant to gather smaller number of volunteers (from 10-35), 
both from Yugoslavia and abroad, to be self-financed and to do away with some 
of the features of the old forms of volunteering, such as salaried members at the 
work action headquarters and the construction of a separate settlement for the 
volunteers.304  
However, the single most important youth-related event was the Day of 
Youth. In January 1980, the jury of the federal board for the celebration of 25 
May concluded that they had only received five scenario proposals for the final 
stadium event [slet], none of which satisfied the criteria: ‘The response to the 
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call for proposals was very small, while the quality of the received works was 
such that none qualifies for the award. The Jury suggests that the Presidency of 
the LSYY establishes a working group for the drafting of a scenario for the final 
Day of Youth event’.305 The single most important youth event began to appear 
anachronistic and incapable of inspiring youth from below, even before Tito 
passed away. However, understandably, in an atmosphere of a somewhat 
Soviet-inspired paranoia after the invasion of Afghanistan and Tito’s illness and 
subsequent death, there was reluctance in the very early 1980s to openly pose 
these questions at an official level. Not only did this commemorative and festive 
occasion fail to spark genuine interest or to mobilise the youth as it had done 
twenty years before, it also consumed a significant part of the League’s budget. 
Millions of dinars were spent not only on the organisation of the final event on 25 
May at the Belgrade Yugoslav People’s Army stadium, but throughout the year 
in related events all over the country.  
Challenges to earlier conceptions of the Youth Day, however, need to be 
put in the context of changing debates over Tito’s role. The unraveling of Tito’s 
mythical aura began not long after his funeral on 8 May 1980 in Belgrade. 
Vladimir Dedijer’s Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita [New contributions 
for the biography of Josip Broz Tito] was published in 1981 and Dedijer, Tito’s 
official biographer, was hailed as someone ‘who began reducing Tito’s 
personality cult to human proportions’.306 Although the text did not radically 
challenge Tito’s stature, its publication sparked controversy since it was seen as 
‘eroding many of the myths officially fostered in Yugoslavia during the last three 
and a half decades’.307 Dedijer was quoted saying that ‘one does a disservice to 
such a great personality by writing of him according to protocol, like a Pharaoh, 
extolling him to the sky and hiding his faults’.308   
Two years later, in 1983, after the main event commemorating 25 May at 
the Belgrade stadium, a wave of reactions from senior officials and political 
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bodies swept the media space. Stana Tomašević-Arnesen309, a WW2 veteran 
and at the time president of the SAWP Committee for commemorating Tito’s 
legacy, insisted that ‘It is intolerable that, under the pretext of praising Tito, a 
personality cult, religion, and mysticism have been allowed to develop […] At the 
central celebration Tito descended on clouds that stayed in place like the 
“throne of the Almighty,” while bluish light filtered through the backdrop’.310 It is 
thus important to note that among both the most senior political officials and 
youth circles there was a shared sense of disapproval regarding the nine-metre 
figure of Tito which rose among clouds of smoke at the one end of the stadium. 
This ushered in a new, ‘modernised’ form of celebrating the Youth Day the 
following year, where in addition to the revolutionary and socialist slogans, rock 
‘n’ roll was prominent as a music background both at the final celebration at the 
stadium and on the streets of Belgrade, which in 1984 also hosted the ‘Yugoslav 
meetings of the youth’ [Jugoslovenski susreti mladih].311                  
Thus, the overall critique of the celebration of 25 May was essentially 
based on an attempt to modernise youth events by ridding them of 
classical/excessive Yugoslav socialist iconography and of the postwar cult of 
Tito, as well as to allow greater diversity of cultural expression. The voices within 
the youth realm which first engaged publicly in a more substantial critique of the 
Day of Youth celebrations appeared in the Slovenian youth magazine Mladina in 
June 1983, where, in an article entitled ‘Human or Deity’ [Človek ali božanstvo] 
the author questioned its meaning and relevance.312 In a similar text the same 
year in the Slovenian daily Delo the author concluded that the imagery at the 
Belgrade stadium represented ‘the climax of socialist kitsch’.313 However, this 
did not mean that there was a uniform attitude among the youth. The 1986 
JUPIO study included questions on the Youth Day celebration, the forms of 
which reveal that even official analysts were concerned that these 
commemorations had lost their power through being considered out of date.  
The answers revealed discrepancies between the Slovene and the rest of the 
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Yugoslav youth; yet, at the same time, these showed significant overlaps. 
Namely, while only 18.8% of the Slovenian respondents declared that ‘the 
celebration is good as it is’, 47.2% of the other Yugoslav respondents did so. 
Almost the same number of respondents agreed that ‘There should be some 
modifications’: 30.4% of the young Slovenes and 28.5% of the remaining 
Yugoslavs. That ‘It is outdated and it should be completely changed’ thought 
17.4% of the Slovenian youth and 8.1% of the Yugoslav, while 22.9% Slovenes 
versus 5.7% Yugoslavs said that ‘We don’t need that type of celebrations’. 
Almost an identical percentage - 10.4% (Slovene) and 10.6% (Yugoslav) - did 
not have an opinion or were not interested. These statistics point to the 
emergence of several camps in the debate around the Youth Baton, as well as 
to the fact that there was not a clear division line between those who argued for 
its abolishment and those in favour of its preservation. In Slovenia, the division 
ran along old youth institutional lines: it was the Ljubljana University branch of 
the LSYY which argued for abolishing the event, while the ‘reformist’ stance was 
advanced by the Republic’s branch of the LSYY. Although the University branch 
put forward legitimate arguments concerning the cost of the entire event and its 
disputed symbolic meaning, the referendum it organised in December 1986 at 
Ljubljana University had a relatively low turnout of 43%, out of which 92.4% 
voted against the Youth Baton.314 The idea that change was necessary was 
upheld by almost all and was a central part of the debate within the youth 
sphere in the middle of the decade. Disagreements revolved around exactly 
what form that change should take. 
Although there was a shared sentiment that the inherited models of youth 
commemoration had to change, not all branches of the LSYY were equally 
vocal on the matter. Senad Avdić reflected on the 1987 local Day of Youth 
celebration in the Bosnian town of Zenica:   
I don’t know what role I played there – politician, manager, what not. I told 
[the director of the event] – ‘You have to modernise it entirely’. What 
purpose using bodies for saying yet again that we love comrade Tito? […] 
So, I told the director that it is very important that those patriotic songs 
disappear […] and, believe it or not, we brought Pankrti in Zenica who 
sang [he sings] ‘Bandiera rossa la trionfera’ […] We also brought Plavi 
orkestar, Zabranjeno pušenje, and the ‘Surrealists’ and it was also 
broadcast live […] It was equally important for those bands [to take part in 
the event], as it was important for the youth organisation […] Until then it 
was some yuck pop, folk singers that were performing at the youth 
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voluntary camps. I said – why, why some folk singer would get the money 
instead of Zabranjeno pušenje, Elvis J. Kurtović? […] We were making 
fun of the Youth Baton events where for the one thousandth time you had 
[pop singer] Zdravko Čolić, you know, ‘Godine su prošle pune muka’ 
[laughs], I mean, ridiculous […] The whole idea was passé. Bowing to a 
dead man, that was all stupid… But, apparently it had to take time, it 
couldn’t happen overnight. Eventually, it resolved itself. Many things were 
tested [through the youth baton], in the political, social sense. Mladina, for 
instance, was not one, but two steps ahead of what we would do later […] 
The Slovenian organisation made a farce, a caricature out of the Baton. 
  
The debate on the traditional celebration of the Youth Day reached its 
climax in 1987 with the so-called 'poster affair'. This example illustrates the ever 
growing tensions between the desire to create a more diverse Youth Day and a 
continuing practise from the centre to preserve a degree of control and unity. 
Following a rotation principle, it was the turn of the Slovenian LSY to organise 
the main event, as well as to select a poster and a design for the baton. The 
winning poster was signed by the Novi kolektivizem [New collectivism] graphic 
design studio (Dejan Knez, Miran Mohar, Darko Pokorn, Roman Uranjek), 
which was part of the NSK (Neue Slovenische Kunst) network. The poster  
represented a male figure holding the Yugoslav flag in one and a torch-like 
baton in the other hand (see Annex 3). However, the whole matter did not 
explode into an affair until 28 February 1987, when the Belgrade daily Politika 
revealed the original precedent of the poster – a 1936 Nazi painting by Richard 
Klein entitled The Third Reich, in which the symbols were merely replaced. 
Once revealed and announced, it was interpreted that the artists were making 
an equivalence of Nazism and communism. This caused a heated public 
debate, becoming the topic which animated the media, the social and the 
political sphere in the months that followed. Igor Vidmar was on the committee 
which had the task to select the poster: 
They assigned me a place on the board which was to decide about the 
poster design. The others were designers, architects, artists, etc. I was 
the only ‘insider’, so to say. I was shown both the final product and the 
original – the Nazi poster, and it happened right here, in Café Union, 
because they didn’t have any offices. I sensed that there would be trouble. 
But, I said: ok. The idea is good, the argumentation is coherent and 
precise, it’s also theoretically valid, so – hey, who am I now to start raising 
some fears? But, then, it happened what happened. You know what 
happened. 
 
 
L: Was there a consensus? 
 
Yes, everybody was on the side of Laibach, there was no polemic.  
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The Slovenian LSY found itself under double pressure: both from the 
Slovenian League of Communists which expected it to condemn the Novi 
Kolektivizem design studio and distance itself from the matter, and from the 
social movements and the alternative scene which wanted to see it defend the 
principle of freedom of artistic expression. The Slovenian Youth League took a 
rather neutral stand and eventually distanced itself from the concept, claiming it 
was not aware of the original motive, subsequently attracting criticism from all 
sides.315 An internal document reveals the sense of being torn between its role 
as a formal socio-political organisation and its increasingly diversifying 'base'.316 
The document stresses that their space for negotiation at federal level was 
seriously restrained by the ‘poster affair’. It also reveals the in-between position 
of every republican branch of the LSYY, the Slovenian in particular, that had to 
negotiate both with the federal level and its own republican branches. The 
document concluded that ‘we understand the Baton of Youth as an element of 
connecting the Yugoslav young and their symbolic expression of commitment to 
self-management, democracy and progress. A different way of celebrating the 
Youth Day could be a result of a consensual decision in the conference of the 
LSYY, a consensus which must be marked by patience and willingness of 
everyone involved.’317     
Nonetheless, as Alexei Monroe argues, ‘The new designs were a major 
factor in ZSMS’s reinvention of its image and its identification with alternative 
culture, and the opening up of a generational and cultural conflict in 
Slovenia.’318 The NK design studio issued a Proclamation! in the form of a 
poster, explaining the principles of a political poster and their ‘retro method’, by 
claiming that ‘the creative processes of reversed perspective, metaphors, 
hyperboles, time and space warp, unite and link everything that mankind has 
squeezed from its veins until now. Content and form are only tools which 
combine themes and symbols into dynamicism, tension, excitement and 
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drama.’319 The scope of the debate was at that point enlarged to include 
questions about the undemocratic principles imposed upon artists and the 
limited freedom of (artistic) expression.320 However, in February 1988 the public 
prosecutor of Ljubljana dropped the case against the authors of the poster 
quoting the notion of artistic expression.321  
As it has been pointed above, the Yugoslav youth sphere was not 
univocal on the issue of the Youth Baton. On the surface, the debate was 
indeed about the relevance of old myths, the place and role of Tito’s figure after 
his death and the outdated format of an event which started to appear out of 
pace with contemporary youth trends. However, essentially, the sensitivity and 
the longevity of the debate were due to the fact that it raised the question of the 
entire Yugoslav socialist project as it was imagined forty years earlier. Precisely 
because the event embodied all of the values socialist Yugoslavism stood for - 
brotherhood and unity, self-management, Titoism, the revolutionary legacy of 
WW2 - any voice or initiative for its abolishment inevitably inferred a more 
substantial contestation of the political framework and the essence of the 
Yugoslav state. The controversial poster was replaced by a new one which 
featured a green leaf on a red background with a missing, cut out part in the 
shape of a red star (see Annex 3). In hindsight, the empty, missing red star 
anticipated the end of the Youth Day celebration and the beginning of the end of 
Yugoslavia.  
The official message delivered every year on the occasion of the Youth 
day – Poruka Štafete mladosti [Message of the Baton of Youth] in 1987 echoed 
the sense that something is irretrievably lost. It had a requiem-like appeal:  
‘We are at future’s threshold and it depends on us what it will be like. We 
grew up with the crisis, witnessing its every turn. Our first social 
experiences after the primer and the partisan stories were the inherited 
debt, the divisions, the endless lists of the employment agencies […] 
From individuals insecure in themselves and in society, we became a 
generation uncertain of its own future and of the future of the society. 
Now, when it is needed to defend Yugoslavia, brotherhood and unity, self-
management and this Baton of ours, we often feel powerless, stuck in 
other people’s mistakes and in our own doubts. Where are the signposts? 
We refuse to always repeat that we are strongest when it is the hardest 
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and thus console ourselves with the past. The victory which we hold 
dearest is the upcoming one. We want to get involved in history. To 
support the Revolution means – building it! To be in favour of self-
management means – developing it! We cannot afford anymore to be a 
generation which shrugs its shoulders. We are proud of having our own 
critical way of re-thinking the socialist world and our self-managing reality. 
The future won’t blame us for that. Do not blame us either – you, who are 
still hesitating whether to listen to our voice. Are we storming the sky? Of 
course, the sky is conquered at onset!’322  
 
Yet, as it has been discussed above, for a significant part of the youth 
and of the Yugoslav public the event indeed had symbolic weight and still 
appeared relevant. That same year the mainstream media still reported on the 
Youth Day celebration in the conventional way, while representatives of the 
YPA branch of the LSYY were received by the federal secretary of defense 
Branko Mamula. He congratulated all the soldiers and young officers on their 
holiday and urged them to make ‘Yugoslav socialist patriotism’ grow and 
develop.323 For a large portion of the youth which was not directly involved in 
the debates, it was hard to imagine that the Youth Baton was already nothing 
more than a museum artifact.  
Namely, on 26 January 1988, eight years after the federal Jury for the 
celebration of 25 May concluded that there was a surprisingly small interest in 
submitting scenario proposals for the central stadium event, at its meeting in 
Belgrade, after three rounds of voting, with 83 votes ‘for’ and 6 ‘against’ the 
LSYY decided to abolish the classical youth baton relay and lay what some 
called the ‘baton of absurd’ to rest. This was a major decision which was (rather 
unusually for this period) reached consensually, and which above all 
represented a definite break with a significant part of the socialist Yugoslav 
heritage and political values. Although the event was most fervently and 
persistently critiqued by Slovenian youth, it was in fact the regional LSY of 
Vojvodina which formally submitted the proposal for its abolition in October 
1987. Their original initiative was entitled ‘Concept for the celebration of the Day 
of Youth 1988’ and foresaw a celebration without a baton relay. According to 
the established practice, the initiative was then forwarded to all levels of the 
LSYY for discussion and feedback. The opinions were highly divided, especially 
in Vojvodina and Croatia, while in Serbia, Macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia-
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Herzegovina the youth (or the youth leadership which sent feedback on the 
proposal, like in the case of Kosovo) was predominantly in favor of preserving 
the Baton. The LSYY branch in the Army was, perhaps unsurprisingly, the most 
outspoken defender of the Baton and the most ‘orthodox’ in its views.324 On the 
day of the vote, of the twelve present members of the presidency of the 
‘conference’ of the LSYY, eight were in favor of the Vojvodinian proposal. 
However, it was the ‘conference’ and not its presidency which by the ‘Statute’ of 
the League was the highest organ allowed to take such decisions. The first two 
rounds of voting did not reach the required majority of 77 delegates. After ‘a 
long debate full of pathetic calls for unity and demands for the “minority” to join 
the “majority”’,325 the ‘conference’ approved the proposal of a Youth Day without 
a baton and a relay race. The Slovenian delegates already raised the question 
of the format of the final stadium event, which that year, without the baton, was 
the last. Although the decision did not reflect a unanimous shared sentiment 
among the Yugoslav youth, it was seen as necessary in preventing further 
disagreements, arguments and erosion and denigration of the Baton and what it 
stood for. There was a sense that it had to be ‘saved from ourselves’ and that it 
left an empty space, a need for a search for a new symbol: ‘What is the new 
symbol? Those who claim that we don’t have one and that the abolishment of 
the Baton is a rejection of the last value framework around which there was a 
quasi-consensus, are right […] It is difficult to promote this as a BIG AND 
HISTORICAL DECISION, when it is much closer to a sad necessity’.326  This 
turned out to be one of the rare consensually taken major decisions in the realm 
of youth politics and institutional youth culture. Dejan Jović put it this way: 
In essence, it was a huge hassle for the youth organisation, because it 
had to put up with the organisation of the event. So, the Youth League 
here did not have many regrets when it all came to an end […] The Baton 
and the voluntary work actions were the only two things where the Youth 
League had to demonstrate certain organisational skills - failure was not 
allowed. At one moment it all became too complicated and they didn’t 
complain… 
 
Although the majority of my interviewees referred to the Youth Baton 
celebration in a negative way, the fact remains that a significant part of the 
youth saw it as an elite decision which was taken without wider consultations. 
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What everyone agreed on was that the event had to be subject to change, 
although some did not wish to see it abolished outright. Nataša Sukič (born 
1962) was among the founders of the first Slovenian lesbian group/movement. 
Her testimony conveys the awareness that the old, inherited ritualistic event did 
no longer make sense. In her account there is also a retrospective reflection 
that these events nevertheless embodied some positive values which have 
since been lost: 
 
When you’re young and rebellious, you joke about those things. What can 
I say? In primary school we even took part in a 25 May celebration and we 
were very proud of our outfit […] and we were very disappointed that we 
didn’t go to Belgrade so that Tito can see our performance. That’s my first 
memory of it. In high school, naturally, you are critical of all of that, you 
laugh at it, you rebel, but you would, anyhow, in any system. When I look 
at it now, I look with nostalgia. Yes, it looks as if one big dictator had his 
own ritual, but it was really something which was connecting people. The 
work brigades as well – people were making friends, hanging out 
together. It was great. And they even managed to do something useful for 
all of us, for the common good – I don’t see what is wrong with that. 
Solidarity was something normal back then. Today I think people have no 
clue what solidarity means. The concept of solidarity today is [extinct] like 
dinosaurs. People don’t know what it means theoretically, let alone in 
practice.  
 
2.3. The specter of Nazism – contention, provocation and the 
relationship with the past 
 
New, subtle forms of anti-regime critique shaped by generational divides 
were also emerging within the new music scenes. This section focuses on the 
re-articulation of the antifascist legacy through certain case-studies which 
managed to scandalise the Yugoslav public at the time. It is without doubt that 
one cannot trace a common voice through which these youngsters conveyed 
their artistic or journalistic practices and sensibilities. Although I would be 
hesitant to put the heteroglossic youth cultures and politics of the 1980s under 
the umbrella of a ‘youth movement’, it is tenable that ‘The pan-Yugoslav youth 
movement’s critique was aimed at exactly the structures, ideology and mentality 
represented by conservatives in the ruling party organisations’.327 
 Nowhere was the generational critique more apparent than in artistic 
products, where a new cohort of artists challenged some of the central aspects 
of the value system of the first post-war Yugoslav generation. One of the major 
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transgressive trends in the sphere of young artistic production in the 1980s was 
the attempt to break symbolically with some of the taboos of post-WW2 
Yugoslav society. To be more specific, they were questioning the symbols of 
the state which had been portrayed as sacred and were contesting mainstream 
memory of Nazism, wartime occupation and German culture. While there were 
many cases of appropriating the symbols of the state or of socialism – most 
notably the Yugoslav flag and the hammer and the sickle for artistic/installation 
purposes328, reviving the traumas of the Nazi occupation through clear 
references to German language/culture or the Nazi ideology itself was 
something which, before the 1980s, had been clearly outside of the boundaries 
of possible public expression. 
Laibach, one of the rare bands which did not come from a capital city, but 
from the small industrial/mining town of Trbovlje in Slovenia, were the first who 
managed to destabilise the consensus on the political memory of the Nazi 
occupation of Yugoslavia. In the eyes of the authorities, the band was indeed 
one of the most controversial. With their name coming from the German name 
for the Slovenian capital Ljubljana, reminiscent of the German occupation years 
during WW2, from the very beginning the band was predestined to be perceived 
as a stunning provocation to the political and the social order. Banned from 
using the name ‘Laibach’ and hence forbidden to perform under that name from 
1983 until 1987, Laibach was an unprecedented artistic and musical 
phenomenon in late socialist Yugoslavia, part of the NSK (Neue Slovenische 
Kunst) network.329 Their use of Nazi and communist/Yugoslav iconography, 
shocking video performances, political speeches, frequently provoked reactions 
from the authorities. The principle of ‘over-identification’330 with the prevalent 
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discourse and political ideology is visible from their 1982 ‘Ten Edicts of the 
Convention’ which read: 
‘(1) Laibach works in a team (collective spirit) modelled after industrial 
production and totalitarianism, which signifies: it is not the individual that speaks, 
but the organisation. Our work is industrial and our language political… 
(3) Every art is subjected to political manipulation […] except that which 
speaks with the language of this manipulation itself. To speak with a political 
expression means to reveal and admit the omnipresence of politics […] Ideology 
is the locus of authentic social consciousness.’331  
The lifting of the ban, however, was not solely decided by the authorities. 
In fact, it was the Slovenian LSY that decided to support it and advance an 
official demand for it at its 12th Congress in 1986. The fact that Laibach resorted 
to the Youth League and received support from a body which was part of the 
official institutional political framework yet again throws light on the complex 
interplay of what was considered to be alternative and institutional. As it has 
been argued by Monroe, Laibach’s aesthetics, like self-management, carries out 
some sort of demystification of its inherent ideological contradictions, covering 
ideology with a layer of its own reality. Without the Yugoslav context, Monroe 
argues, Laibach would have surely acquired a very different form.332 Igor Vidmar 
worked with Laibach and highlighted the role of the youth organisation in this 
case: 
Laibach was the next big scandal. The youth organisation behaved a bit 
better, but, still, they were very uncertain about what it meant, they were 
scared. By the mid-eighties, there was a crisis in Yugoslavia and it was 
clear that things would be changing… The youth organisation was 
opening up, they realised there would be some changes and they wanted 
to be part of that. Basically, quite a bit of careerism and opportunism. 
However, there were some authentic new, young people who wanted 
things to liberalise. So, in ’86 they supported the legalisation of the use of 
the Laibach name, which was forbidden after a scandal in Zagreb in ’83. 
But the ban happened in Slovenia, because Laibach were Slovenian, the 
republics had their jurisdiction and they couldn’t be sanctioned in Croatia. 
     
From their establishment in 1980 Laibach assumed an ambiguous 
reflective and performative standpoint. Their aesthetics escapes precise 
categorisation, essentially reflecting the relationship between art and politics, 
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and ‘“rendering audible” of the hidden codes and internal contradictions of a 
series of artistic, musical, political, linguistic, and historical “regimes”’.333 What 
Alexei Yurchak refers to as a ‘mimetic critique of ideology’ seems to be the 
closest to an accurate label for their work. Indeed, this way of formulating 
critique implied the use of a ‘secondary discourse in the form of the primary 
ideological discourse’.334 As Robert Botteri observed: ‘I always saw them as 
having the same function as Mladina - the opening, the sensitisation of a certain 
space. They were a mirror of the society, showing things which the society 
wanted to hide from itself, they revealed the totalitarian image of the society 
which the society didn’t want to see for itself.’ Yurchak’s notion and Botteri’s 
observation are both reflected in Laibach’s song ‘Država’ [State] which 
reproduces official state rhetoric by repeating ‘Oblast je pri nas ljudska’ 
[Authority here belongs to the people]335 and also features original excerpts from 
one of Tito’s most well-known speeches on the importance of brotherhood and 
unity: ‘We spilt a sea of blood for the brotherhood and unity of our peoples and 
we are not going to allow anyone to touch, to uproot from inside or to destroy in 
any way brotherhood and unity’. 
Slovenian band Borghesia336, known for their video art in the 1980s, used 
similar artistic devices for framing their own version of political art. The title 
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video for the VHS cassette ‘Tako mladi’ [So young] featured marching Nazi 
soldiers, with excerpts from Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will, while many 
of their videos used excerpts from political speeches, documentary scenes and 
montage to articulate visually a critique targeting the regime. Their 1983 video 
entitled ‘Socialism’ features one phrase - ‘Socialism in the world is gradually 
becoming a prevailing force’ - pronounced by an old Yugoslav politician, the 
endless repetition of which is stretched to its maximal limits bordering absurdity 
towards the end of the two-minute video.337 Zemira Alajbegović stressed that 
Borghesia and Laibach represented two different artistic concepts and 
approaches, yet she underlined the ‘solidarity’ which existed among the 
different factions at the young Slovenian alternative scene when it came to their 
‘common enemy’ embodied in dogmatic socialism:        
 
We all felt a sort of solidarity, because we all had a common enemy, 
which was that socialist regime we were surrounded by. At that point 
perhaps it was less repressive, but it was equally boring and omnipresent 
[…] There were opposing views, we sometimes had conflicts, but there 
was a sense of general solidarity and we all felt part of the Ljubljana 
subcultural scene […] 
We could all feel, it was in the air, that the regime was not as repressive 
anymore, and probably the regime itself no longer believed in all those 
socialist empty phrases – as passionately as it once did […] 
The [socialist] iconography was very powerful, it was ideal both for theatre 
and video. We used it a lot, we joked with it, with the partisans and that 
revolutionary poetry. It was ideal for video art, with those kilometers of 
recordings and speeches. It’s a very powerful iconography. Not all 
iconography is as well arranged, disciplined and straightforward as the 
socialist and the communist iconography. So, it was an excellent material 
to work with (laughs).  
 
The fact that the early punk wave and both Laibach and Borghesia came from 
Slovenia contributed to a wide-spread popular perception that the most northern 
republic was a hotbed of revisionist and hence anti-Yugoslav tendencies. 
However, in early 1987 Yugoslav public and media were overtaken by another 
youth-related scandal with a Nazi overtone which did not come from Slovenia - 
the Sarajevo ‘Nazi party’ at the home of now famous Serbian writer Isidora 
Bjelica (born 1967). Organised as the host's birthday party in December 1986, it 
gathered people who were considered to be part of the young aspiring cultural 
elite of Sarajevo. Some of the 19-20-year-olds wore Nazi uniforms and finger 
                                                                                                                                               
Turned Out the Light?’ See: Neven Korda et al. FV – Alternative Scene of the Eighties 
(Ljubljana: International Centre of Graphic Arts, 2008). 
337
 Video available at: http://www.ljudmila.org/scca/ip/zanka/angl/Sub.html 
138 
 
food decorated with mayonnaise swastikas was served.338 The LC Sarajevo city 
branch accused the youngsters of siding with the Slovenian youth which 
requested abolishment of the Youth Day celebration: ‘In that (fascistic) decor 
the idea of sending written support to the group of the university youth in 
Ljubljana was pondered, [the group] which organised the incident-provoking 
event demanding the abolishment of Tito's Baton and the introduction of civilian 
military service. They even talked about organising public demonstrations in 
Sarajevo as a sign of support for this “initiative”’.339 Amid a wave of accusations, 
part of the youth press claimed that  
‘For those [generations] who come, the swastika does not have the same 
meaning like for the previous generations, i.e. it has a lesser significance. 
If it wasn't banned and seen as a taboo, the swastika would have no 
useful value for the young angry individual who is protesting and breaking 
the bans. Thus, he is not using it as a symbol which in itself reflects and 
affirms a political idea, but as a sign of moving away from the societal 
[trends of] symbolisation, as a signifier of a simple act of refusal’.340  
 
Unlike Laibach's acts which were public, this one-off incident which 
included the display of Nazi symbols took place in a private space, but 
nonetheless sparked an attack by the mainstream media and a series of acts of 
public discreditings of the invlolved, which was vigorously condemned in the 
youth press. One journalist posed the rethorical question of how long these 
youngsters will have to repeat ‘that unfortunate [phrase]: “I am not a fascist”’.341 
What is striking is the link with the Slovenian youth which was implied by the 
Party city branch as a means to launch an attack on the teenagers by 
associating them with the ‘counter-revolutionary’ Slovenes. More importantly, 
this hints at a connection, a sense of camaraderie and shared ideas and values 
which is overlooked in historical accounts which tend to focus on the Slovenian 
context as the liberal northern republic and leave out the southern Yugoslav 
regions as bastions of dogmatic Party rule. The majority of my interviewees from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia mentioned that they held the Slovenian 
youth initiatives in high regard and looked up to them with a sense of admiration, 
trying to copy or transplant some of those ideas. Senad Pećanin recalled the link 
with the Slovenian youth circles around Mladina and NSK in his testimony: 
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At the time of the debates about the Youth Baton, I was a secretary of the 
‘University Conference’ of the Youth League in Sarajevo […] I also 
organised a public roundtable discussion in CDA. I invited [Robert] Botteri, 
the editor of Mladina, Tone Anderlič was president of the youth 
organisation, Igor Vidmar from Neue Slovenische Kunst. We came up 
with an occasion - 4 April, the Day of Students. Actually 4 April was the 
day of students of Belgrade University, it has nothing to do with Sarajevo, 
but nonetheless, I spread the word that it’s the Student Day, no one asked 
me anything. We put up posters around and the City Committee of the 
Communist League jumped out and insisted we cancel the event. We 
refused. I said – ‘No! You can ban it, but I’ll announce that it was banned.’ 
They demanded that we cancel it ourselves. I refused, so on the day the 
hall was packed. I was still a young, inexperienced journalist and I was 
looking around for one of the more senior colleagues to chair the event – 
no one accepted, no one dared. I found that bizarre, I couldn’t understand 
why, so I thought – ok, I’ll do it. That was in 1988. There were many 
people from the state security agency inside… The themes were the 
Youth Baton, multi-party system, the slogan ‘Slovenija, moja dežela’ 
[Slovenia, my homeland], freedom of expression, article 133, civil military 
service. Then, Saša Hemon [writer Aleksandar Hemon] and I made an 
interview with [Igor] Vidmar, we broadcast it along with some Laibach 
music and that was a reason for me and Hemon to get a three-month 
suspension from the Radio, while Boro lost some 30% per cent from his 
salary…  
It is apparent that there existed a consensus among the urban, educated 
activist youth all over Yugoslavia in that they tended to view the official rituals, 
the frozen historical narratives of the antifascist struggle, or Youth Baton 
celebrations as superfluous or as unnecessary exaggerations. Although their 
acts of critiquing the form and the unchanged discourse used to publicly 
endorse Yugoslav socialism were for the most part interpreted as direct attacks 
on the core values of the state, their alleged anti-Yugoslavism was often a 
media construct or a result of the often exaggerated fears of an older 
generation.      
New music trends in the 1980s also sparked fear, controversy and 
debate in broader society over the development of contemporary youth. Punk 
not only managed to scandalise Yugoslav society; it also incited lengthy 
debates which transcended the initial narrow focus of punk music as a cultural 
form and grew to incorporate other key issues considered to be sensitive and 
off-limits. The late 1970s saw the emergence of the new punk youth sub-
culture, initially completely outside of the institutional youth sphere, then 
evolving on the margins and eventually becoming a legitimate fragment in the 
late socialist mosaic of youth cultures. From an exclusively sub-cultural 
phenomenon in the late 1970s, punk quickly reached the agendas of meetings 
at the LSYY. When, in 1982 at the 11th federal congress of the LSYY in 
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Belgrade a member of the Slovene delegation reacted against the negative 
connotations associated with punk that arose during a discussion within the 
commission for culture, members of the Yugoslav Army delegation reacted. A 
young Army officer’s reaction to the statement that punk was not against the 
system, but against the anomalies of the system, summed up one the most 
prominent lines of division among youth: ‘I am obliged, in the name of the coal 
miners’ children, who do not have the time to eat because they dig coal for our 
new wavers, punkers and other idlers to keep warm; we applauded a discussion 
which is out of place. Please, let’s be politically conscious and united since we 
made an oath to our beloved comrade Tito, that we will never, under no 
circumstances abandon his path. I am not educated enough to express myself 
in foreign words, but I only know that I would give my life for brotherhood and 
unity, for the defense and development of our beloved non-aligned socialist 
Yugoslavia’.342  
The exchange provides an excellent illustration of the type of political and 
lifestyle gaps and fragmentations which existed between people of the same 
generation and members of the same youth organisation.343 This also exposes 
a core aspect of this generation’s media and cultural elite’s self-perception and 
identity: an urban outlook, i.e. strong identification with one of the bigger 
Yugoslav cities.344  
Originally coined to describe punk in the British context, the assertion 
that ‘Punk was a response to the power of social consent’345 seems highly 
applicable in the Yugoslav context, as institutional/socialist Yugoslavism began 
to be contested at the porous boundaries between institutional and alternative 
youth politics and culture. Srđan Gojković-Gile connected the socio-political 
atmosphere of the initial post-Tito period with the emergence of punk and new 
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wave and curiously related the reality of their well-off middle class background 
with ‘the fake prosperity in socialist Yugoslavia’: 
Yes, [the music] was directed against the system, but only in the sense 
that it was about some kids who wanted a different way of life which of 
course did not coincide with that self-managing socialism… That socio-
political moment is very interesting. We as a band were formed during that 
vacuum period, when the level of concentration of some sensors 
decreased, some people got tired… It was the end of Tito’s rule and his 
life and they probably dealt with other more serious problems than with 
us. So, we managed to slip through a crack… And when that crack had 
split to such an extent (laughs), it couldn’t be mended […] I think it was a 
philosophy of some kids who were actually the children of that middle 
class which existed in the fake prosperity in socialist Yugoslavia, in the 
period of the sixties and the seventies when we were growing up. 
 
As it has been observed, ‘Punk obscenities […] were justified as testing the 
boundaries of what society defined as socially acceptable. In this sense punk 
was deemed unusually political for the rock genre in terms of its lyric themes, 
song structures, subcultural style and aesthetic of boredom in mass society’.346 
This echoes Gregor Tomc’s way of explaining ‘the political’ in their music and 
overall outlook:     
 
Absolutely, we [in Pankrti] were political. Using politics was the easiest 
way to shock. When in 1977 you say ‘Comrades, we don’t believe you’ – I 
mean, nobody said that before. Of course, we were doing this partly 
because we were bored by these people, no one was taking seriously the 
Communist Party. For me at the time it was like looking at Indian 
chieftains, Indian tribes. They were completely irrelevant. So, you don’t 
talk seriously about that. But, you use them to provoke, you really want to 
annoy people. That’s the easiest way to do it. If you sing about love, 
nobody is going to notice that. I think we were political in another sense, 
not in the sense that we had ideas about changing society – we had no 
ideas about that. But in the sense that we said – we don’t care about this. 
I’m not interested in your socialist self-management. Do it for yourself, I’m 
doing my own thing. That was a very political thing to say, because, again, 
no one said that before. Everyone was pretending to be part of the 
system. We said – we don’t want to be part of the system. So, this was 
very political. When I was writing – I’m not anti-Nazi, I’m not anti-anti-Nazi, 
I’m not anything, people didn’t understand that. ‘What is this, is he a 
Nazi?’ I was just saying I don’t care about any ideology, you know. And 
this was provocative. I think people understood it well, this was a political 
statement. But it was not a political statement in the sense that we had 
any positive goals. To be a punk, you had to be indifferent towards 
everything. That was the attitude – I don’t give a f*** about anything. But, 
saying that in a communist country was political. 
 
 
It was rightfully argued that ‘the political relevance and impact of art […] 
was also dependent on the political critique it engendered, and even on its 
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prohibition’.347 Although initially perceived and portrayed in the media as an 
insult to socialist morality, as recalled in Tomc’s testimony, punk rock bands did 
not have an explicit political agenda. The desire to shock,348 to appear different 
through wit and irony and to attempt to destabilise and hence question the 
overpowering ‘social consent’ was what shaped the polysemic poetics of late 
Yugoslav youth culture. In addition, the importance of material conditions and 
socio-political context for the appearance of the new music scenes in late 
socialist Yugoslavia cannot be over-emphasised. Like in the British context 
where ‘cheap rent, good book stores, squats and record shops’349 and ‘the long 
decline of the 1970s’350 played an important role in the proliferation of punk, 
similar social circumstances shaped the new Yugoslav music scenes. Srđan 
Gojković – Gile referred to this aspect when talking about the accessibility of the 
youth venues in his testimony: 
At the beginning everything was for free, all the bands were playing for 
free […] That is why that nest was formed where we as kids could idle 
away without having to spend money – you would show up at SKC, you 
could stay there for hours and no one would chase you if you didn’t buy a 
drink. People who were similar to you came there and different ideas 
started to boil.   
 
Punk rock bands eventually became part of mainstream youth culture, or 
what was referred to as ‘subversive pop art’.351 Although their records appeared 
and sold in significant quantities and received public recognition – both in the 
youth press and by awards established by the youth organisation, their music 
was often labeled as ‘šund’, i.e. kitsch or of little or no real artistic value. A 
commission for music records in each republic’s Committee for Education and 
Culture made the selections, which in practical terms meant that the records 
labeled as ‘šund’ were not exempt of VAT, thus being more expensive and 
consequently selling less.  
One event that took place immediately after the death of Tito and 
managed to scandalise the Yugoslav public at the beginning of the new decade 
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was the so-called ‘Nazi-punk affair’. One year after the death of Tito, in a state 
of general insecurity and apprehension of hostile activities coming from outside 
and from within, the Yugoslav state did not hesitate to suppress any sign of 
‘counter-revolutionary’, anti-socialist or anti-Yugoslav activity. The Nazi-punk 
affair, designated as a manifestation of ‘political paranoia’,352 helped release out 
of the Yugoslav Pandora Box what were considered the two principal historical 
demons – nationalism and fascism. In the media and in the Slovene LC heated 
debates were sparked by the trial and imprisonment of members of the ‘4R’ 
band, whose name allegedly alluded to the Fourth Reich.353 Eventually, the 
debates moved within the framework of the LSY and popular youth culture, up 
until the 1986 ‘fascist birthday party’ and the 1987 ‘Poster Affair’ scandal which 
again reinvigorated wider public debates on youth and Nazism.  
Gregor Tomc reiterated the existence of a ‘moral crisis’ and a ‘moral 
panic’ on the part of society which was prone to perceive the new youth 
alternative scene around punk not as a real, but rather as ‘a symbolic threat’. 
Interestingly, he reflected on the relative impotence of the ‘federal level’ and the 
importance of ‘personal taste’:    
It was completely fabricated. There was absolutely nothing to it. It was a 
typical example of a moral crisis […] And people later went to court and 
were found innocent. But, anyway, this moral panic was picked up by the 
media, blown out of proportions and after that I think the punk scene in 
Ljubljana was never the same. Up until then we always had problems, but 
somehow you had the feeling that the state was acting towards the punk 
subculture as a symbolic threat. They weren’t really taking us as a real 
threat to the political system. After that, people had serious problems. And 
it all had to do with the fact that the Party leader of Slovenia France Popit 
decided that there was enough of punk. Before that it was really tolerated. 
After that you still had concerts, but it was very hard to rediscover that 
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spontaneity – the places where you could meet, associate freely, and so 
on. People started to be afraid, because you would never know when the 
police would pick you up. […] All the graffiti writers were arrested, for 
example. It was like a police state at that time. So, from then on, the 
whole scene became more… sort of artistic, you know. There was not so 
much of that spontaneity and the fun.  
The federal level was very dissatisfied with how the Slovenian level was 
dealing with it. I don’t know about this, but there had to be pressures. But, 
the pressure came from the Slovenian level, because the federal level 
could do nothing in Slovenia. It was Popit. Basically, Popit was a big fan of 
our country music, you know. So, he hated rock ’n’ roll. And he especially 
hated punk (laughs). So, that had something to do with it as well. I think 
also it was a question of personal taste.354  
 
In response to the events, in April 1981 the Slovenian LSY organised a 
roundtable discussion entitled ‘Some actual questions concerning the cultural 
politics of the LSYS and the youth activity in the sphere of culture’. Young 
participants from the youth music circles such as ‘Radio Študent’ journalists Igor 
Vidmar and Samo Hribar argued for a change in the public attitude towards 
punk rock, i.e. demanding that it is accepted as part of popular culture and not 
as an excess or a political project. Pursuing repressive measures against the 
punk rock youth, they argued, would expose the weaknesses of the youth 
organisation and the entire society, which in that way ‘a priori launches a conflict 
with its own members using the power argument’.355 The debate which lasted 
more or less until 1984 mainly revolved around the way in which punk was 
presented in the mainstream media – as a cradle of anarchism and Nazism, 
which was strongly refuted by people who were closely related with the scene 
and were attached to the Youth League through its publications, magazines, 
cultural centers, etc. Igor Vidmar in his radio show Rock Fronta in November 
1981 problematised the public stigmatisation of punk and attempted to defend it 
publicly by saying that his colleagues in Radio Student and himself have on so 
many occasions thus far emphasised the anti-Nazi and anti-racist content of 
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British punk, while in the lyrics of the domestic bands or the behavior of the fans 
there is no trace of Nazism or nationalism. Although by the end of 1981 a 
consensus was reached within the Slovenian Youth League that punk rock was 
a legitimate stream of youth popular music and that the sensationalist 
disqualifying media reports linking it to nationalism were unfounded, throughout 
the decade young musicians continued to encounter obstacles mostly related to 
lyrics that were seen as problematic. Although the new music scenes around 
punk rock could certainly not qualify as youth mainstream/pop culture, they 
enjoyed striking visibility and presence in the media which significantly 
surpassed their popularity and numerical relevance. Nevertheless, having the 
youth media as their allies and as platforms where they could promote their 
work and concert activity, they left a significant imprint on 1980s’ youth culture.    
The reiteration of socialist slogans appeared anachronistic to a 
generation which witnessed their pure rhetorical, performative use and hence 
used them to challenge the official socialist discourse through various cultural 
forms. With the mainstream media and the political establishment often on the 
opposing side, the young resorted to acts of (self) justification, distancing 
themselves from an alleged espousal of the Nazi ideology. Pečanin’s testimony 
in this sense reads as a summary:   
What mattered for us was the sense of freedom [osječaj slobode]. We 
took great pleasure in smashing whatever was considered to be a taboo. 
Making jokes about Tito, everything that was forbidden – we really 
enjoyed that. Everything that was official politics, communism… But not in 
the way that we detested communism or we had some big ideology 
behind what we were doing – we just felt the need to do it and we 
considered freedom of speech as the most normal thing: someone’s right 
to express their opinion which doesn’t represent a call to violence, it has 
nothing to do with fascism, hatred, nationalism – why not? It seemed 
perfectly normal to us, generationally speaking [generacijski gledano]. We 
could in no way understand or accept that it was not allowed to speak. 
That was our basic motif and we enjoyed it.  
 
Throughout the decade the youth sphere witnessed a number of debates 
concerning the future of the inherited socialist framework of values and 
commemorative practices and the ways Tito’s legacy should be carried forward 
following his death. The critique which generally stemmed from the youth 
cultural realm sought to re-think the performative and the discursive dimension 
through which the different levels of the Yugoslav post-war consensus were 
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manifested. Although frequently reproached for an alleged appropriation of far 
right ideologies, the actors themselves defended their ‘acts’ as manifestations of 
freedom of expression. Although openly targeting the form of the inherited youth 
rituals and the socialist rhetoric which began to appear anachronistic in the 
context of a multi-level crisis, the different cultural acts cannot be reduced to a 
straightforward contestation of Yugoslav socialism. Rather, they challenged the 
norms and discourse of an older generation, essentially seeking to re-invent 
socialism and youth culture through new cultural tendencies and through the 
state’s youth institutions. 
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3. ‘The phantom of liberty’ – new youth activism 
 
Gdanjsk osamdesete, kad je jesen rekla ne 
Gdanjsk osamdesete, držali smo palčeve 
Rudari, studenti, brodogradilište svi mi 
 
Gdanjsk osamdesete uzazvrele tvornice 
Dvaput se ne šalju tenkovi na radnike 
Nisu se usudili pobijedili smo svi mi 
Poljska u mome srcu…356 
 
  
‘Poljska u mome srcu’, Azra (1981)  
 
The League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia was not simply an arena 
where a younger generation critiqued an older order and value system - it was 
also a space where new political languages and forms of youth activism could 
develop. This indeed stands in contrast to the institutional youth sphere in many 
other European socialist countries, where these organisations no longer 
generated new forms of political expression and where environmentalist or 
peace groups emerged outside of the formal youth structures.357 In Yugoslavia, 
many youth actors still believed in the capacity of the institutional youth sphere 
to be an incubator for new types of politics, and sought to shape a specifically 
Yugoslav youth political realm where new ‘social movements’ emerging from 
the bottom up could be integrated into the LSYY. This echoed the findings of 
the 1980 UNESCO report on youth about ‘an issue-oriented style of youth 
action’.358 It also revealed, as I shall explore below, a tendency to look to 
Western Europe for new forms of politics in evolving ‘social movements’, rather 
than within the Eastern Bloc. Illustratively, Slovenian sociologist Tomaž 
Mastnak (born 1953) argued that  
‘We should not try to repeat what Solidarity tried – and failed – to do. We 
should try to invent new forms of democratic activity appropriate to our 
particular situation… Inventing the single issue-oriented political 
campaigns common in Western European democracies would be a very 
good start… we lack a democratic tradition and popularly shared 
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memories of a strong and independent civil society. Issue-oriented 
campaigns – involving women, opponents of nuclear power, gays, 
pacifists and others – are crucial for filling this gap, and for producing a 
democratic culture in Yugoslavia’.359  
 
This chapter addresses how new areas for political expression opened 
up around issues of peace, anti-militarism, environmentalism/nuclear 
disarmament and sexuality and how the League of Socialist Youth brought 
these issues into its orbit. Linking this with a generational sense of 
‘Europeanness’, the chapter maps the emergence of social and political issues 
which older generations had not previously defined as arenas of political 
contestation. Focusing on rather divergent issues such as military service and 
sexuality that illustrate both the broadening out of political language in late 
socialism, and the ways in which they nested within the LSYY, the chapter 
explores how a new generation shifted the boundaries of the political and 
argues that late socialist Yugoslav society witnessed the proliferation of a youth 
arena of civil initiatives and activist citizenship which, although fragmented and 
often discordant, eventually found shelter and support within parts of the 
existing youth infrastructure. Although they carried the seeds of the processes 
of socio-political reformation and democratisation which were already 
underway, for the most part they were significantly embedded within the 
dominant political/socialist rhetoric - in particular within Kardelj’s notion of the 
‘pluralism of self-managing interests’.360 For example, in the 1986 official 
congress materials, the LSYY argued that it was necessary to accommodate 
the new movements and their demands within the youth organisation: ‘It is 
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impossible to realise the affirmation of the idea of pluralism and democratic 
“youth politics” […] without the acknowledgement of the right of independent 
existence of the social movements […] the LSY should create space for the 
work of the feminist, the peace, the ecological movements, as well as for the 
other progressive movements among the youth’.361 Moreover, the 1986 draft 
documents for the federal congress stated that ‘If the youth organisation does 
not take up the challenge which the new social movements are offering, it will 
suffer grave consequences, it will close itself up and renounce the essential 
struggle to become mass and front organisation.’362 Hashim Rexhepi (born 
1958), President of the LSYY upheld this vision the following year in an 
interview given for the daily Borba by stressing that ‘We want the [new social] 
movements to become an integral part of the LSY. After all, socialism, too, is a 
movement’.363 In that same ‘congress’ year, the Slovenian LSY at its 12th (so-
called Krško) congress, put forward slogans such as: ‘Let’s legalise the new 
social movements’, ‘Let’s democratise political culture’, ‘For an independent and 
responsible Youth League’, ‘For workers’ democracy’, ‘For pluralism of self-
managing interests’, ‘For the word not to be an offense’.364  
The goal of this chapter is not to account for the broader frame of 
Yugoslav socialist civil society, nor for the entirety of ‘acts of citizenship’ related 
to the new social movements. Its aim is to offer a closer observation of the 
process of the nesting of a range of youth ‘acts’ within the wide framework of 
the LSYY, turning parts of the youth infrastructure into ‘new sites of struggle’ 
and constantly testing and stretching its boundaries. Some of the issues raised 
by youth activists combined and echoed both the ‘inner’, that is Yugoslav-
specific contestations of the socio-political framework and ‘outer’ challenges 
resulting from developments at international level, i.e. demands and initiatives 
which did not possess a specifically Yugoslav outlook, but had a trans-national 
or global identity. These included youth initiatives regarding different political 
and institutional matters such as the abolishment of the death penalty365, de-
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militarisation, conscientious objection, anti-nuclear and ecological claims, 
feminism and the rights of sexual minorities.  
The chapter will address several of a range of issues where these new 
forms of activism were articulated. The first part maps what was referred to in 
the Introduction as the second generational pillar, which relates to this 
generation’s own distinct sense of Europeanness which mirrored in many ways 
Yugoslavia’s peculiar geo-political positioning in the context of the Cold War. 
The second part reflects on the ways the myth of (gender) equality was 
challenged by youth activists within a social ambience of proliferation of various 
feminist, lesbian and gay groups within the Youth League and its media 
outposts. The third part engages with the narratives of anti-militarism366, the 
conscientious objection initiatives and petitions that all the while challenging one 
of the major pillars of Yugoslav socialism – the Yugoslav People’s Army and its 
stature in the political and public life, found ways to reach institutional forums 
and incite public debates.  
 
3.1. Facing east, looking west – new transnational identities 
 
The new social movements that were to challenge the official political 
values/language within the LSYY framed their issue-oriented acts in response 
to the specific Yugoslav context. Nevertheless, many of them in fact were 
inspired by similar campaigns and groups from outside the country. The late 
socialist period, in particular after 1975 and the Helsinki Accords where 
Yugoslavia played a prominent role, saw the establishment of a trans-national 
European network of actors and groups voicing various demands concerning 
civil liberties, environmental/anti-nuclear anxieties in the aftermath of the 
Chernobyl disaster.367 As it was pointed above, the Yugoslav urban youth 
attentively followed the events in Poland at the beginning of the decade, and in 
particular those from Slovenia forged links with some of the Central/Eastern 
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European groups which converged around issue-oriented campaigns such as 
conscientious objection and nuclear disarmament.368  
The relative openness of Yugoslavia, alongside its noted presence at the 
international sports’ arena and its remarkable cultural scene which fed into a 
sense of superiority at the European music/cultural scene, contributed to the 
sense of internationalism/Europeanness of this generation, i.e. widened the 
horizon of expectations, references and lines of identification. There has been 
little work on what Europeanness meant in socialist Yugoslavia, or indeed how 
individuals understood Europe and Europeannes and how their lived 
experiences were moulded into a wider European frame. The latter of the two 
major youth surveys from the 1980s revealed certain attitudes of the young 
towards the European Community of the time - in particular in the context of 
support for a potential accession.  For instance, 59% chose the sense of 
European belonging as primary, second in rank under the sense of Yugoslav 
belonging ranked as primary by 73% of the respondents,369 while 50% chose 
their republican belonging and 44% their regional one. Asked about the 
changes in the economic system, the youth in this last survey declared 
preferences for a market economy (‘like the one in the West’), private property 
and an accession to the European Economic Community: for 64% of the 
respondents joining the European common market was a preferential option. 
Yet, pinning down the sense of Europeannes could be best achieved ‘from 
below’ through oral history testimonies. Hence, the individual recollections 
analysed below offer a useful perspective on this generation’s understanding of 
transnationalism, internationalism and Europeanness.    
Not strictly belonging to the Eastern European world under Soviet 
domination, and having the opportunity to travel freely across the continent and 
interact both with the East and the West, was crucial in instilling a different 
sense of transnational/European belonging. As it was observed in the late 
1980s, ‘The right to travel is defined as a fundamental attribute of being a 
Yugoslav by many Yugoslavs, especially, but not only, in Slovenia and 
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Croatia.’370 The geopolitical positioning of Yugoslavia had significant impact on 
the way the youth conceptualised and articulated its self-identification and 
sense of belonging in wider European/international terms. Vlatko Stefanovski’s 
testimony underlined this awareness of being neither East nor West, but also 
taking a certain pride in the fact that Yugoslavia was not part of the Eastern 
Bloc. Indeed, ‘Yugoslavia’s peculiar position with regard to the Cold War divide 
in Europe had thus allowed Western-supported retrospective self-positionings of 
superiority towards those who had been considered “really Eastern” Europeans 
(i.e. citizens of Warsaw Pact states).’371 A sense of superiority towards the 
countries of the Eastern Bloc is common place in many personal narratives. In 
this case it serves as an example of how it worked to feed into the sense of 
dignity, pride and relative Yugoslav patriotism:     
As young people we were very, very lucky to live precisely in-between two 
principles, two blocs… and we were the ‘best of two worlds’, I would say, 
because we had a pretty stable social system which, I think that, after all, 
functioned very well. We enjoyed enough freedom, as well as civil and 
human rights. By human rights I understand the right to food, the right to 
healthcare and the right to education. All social strata enjoyed these 
rights… Each and every one could reach high academic status and titles. 
The more that period becomes distant, the more I look upon it with a 
justified nostalgia [оправдана носталгија], as I look now how the Western 
world crumbles down, and the Eastern world is wondering […] 
 
In 1988 we went on a one month tour to the USSR. It was an exhausting 
tour because there was not enough food, there were no restaurants. 
There were only some little shops with vodka and sausages or cigarettes 
in front of which there was a one hundred meter line… When we came 
back I kissed the runaway, if you can believe it [...] 
 
I had a cultural shock when I first arrived in London after a three-day train 
journey, I arrived at Victoria Station. And I saw this Mecca of rock ‘n’ roll… 
I was totally blown away when I first saw London. I was going to concerts 
every night, to the clubs – to the iconic Marquee Club, the 100 Club, 
London Astoria – every night there were excellent concerts by top 
musicians and top bands… On the other hand, there were charter flights 
from Belgrade to London almost every day and we could fly pretty cheap 
to London, we used to buy equipment, guitars, amplifiers, clothes. We 
used to come back home inspired by what we had seen, we lived our 
dream.  
 
This excerpt paints a contrasting image where a young Yugoslav is fully mobile 
on the international scene of divided Europe, welcomed to perform and travel 
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both in the East and the West, but thoroughly enchanted only by the West – 
which eventually led to a rather wide-spread tendency which allowed them to 
‘see themselves as the West to the Soviet bloc’s East’.372 In Stefanovski’s 
testimony London is the topos of reference for this generation, as most of the 
interviewees who spoke about travelling, or indeed about their work/activism did 
not fail to mention London or Britain.  
Neven Korda (born 1956) was a member of the band Borghesia and the 
FV group. Echoing Mastnak, he reflected on another level of distancing from the 
acts of dissidence and opposition in the countries of the Eastern Bloc:  
For me, that rebellion of theirs against the Soviet Union, and the way I 
saw Lech Walesa – it was reactionary… I said to myself – Well, if I have 
to choose, then the Soviet Union is better (laughs) than their type of 
Christianity, 19th-century type of traditionalism […] The Czechs, too. They 
were more… sort of bourgeois. We didn’t cherish that vision of going back 
to some type of bourgeois democracy. We looked forward.    
 
An excerpt from Slovenian writer Aleš Debeljak’s book links the 
narratives of distinct Yugoslav political and cultural identity, cosmopolitanism 
and mobility in the West to a new generational consciousness: 
Throughout the time I was growing up - the late 1970s and early '80s — I 
shared with my peers the easy feeling that we didn't have it bad at all. We 
were different from our counterparts in the Soviet empire's East European 
satellites by way of the nonaligned politics of Tito, the great guru of the 
"third way," who discovered the trick of playing West and East off each 
other so that both sides would generously contribute money to build his 
Potemkin villages of self-management. But those were issues of high 
diplomacy that for a long time we neither understood nor cared about. Our 
interests lay elsewhere. 
Most of all, we wanted to know in what European town Oscar Peterson 
would be playing next summer and when John Fowles's newest book 
would hit the bookstores in nearby Trieste, Vienna, or Munich, if not 
Ljubljana. We traveled widely and unhindered, both within Yugoslavia and 
abroad. We made pilgrimages to jazz and rock concerts as far afield as 
Moers, Florence, and Montreux. We believed that mass culture gave us 
more in common with youth in London than with our parents. In their 
novels and literary reviews, our older colleagues had told unsettling 
stories of suffering in the clutches of Titoism, of the communist regime's 
brutality, but we understood these then as a far-removed allegory that no 
longer defined us in any significant way.373 
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There is a cynical distancing at three levels in this excerpt: from ‘our 
counterparts in the Soviet empire’s East European satellites’, from ‘our parents’ 
and from the older generations’ denunciatory stories about Titoism and 
communism. At the same time, there is a tension between the 
acknowledgement (and an implicit appraisal) of the fruits of Yugoslav ‘high 
diplomacy’ on the one hand and the remark referring to the ‘Potemkin villages of 
self-management’, on the other. The ability to travel ‘widely and unhindered’ is 
yet again emphasised, along with the proximity in cultural preferences, tastes 
and worldviews with ‘the youth in London’.  
Igor Vidmar, although older, was part of the punk movement and the 
vibrant Slovenian youth alternative scene in the 1980s. To him, as someone 
who worked for a long time in Radio Študent, the link with Britain was a 
reciprocal one: 
We in Radio Študent were subscribed to New Musical Express, Melody 
Maker Sounds, and we travelled there - myself for the first time in 1974, 
then in 1979, etc… It was also the other way around – the first article on 
Slovenian punk was in Melody Maker by Chris Bohn in 1980 or so. 
For a different segment of the youth, however, Western Europe 
embodied another set of values and opportunities. For those who became 
active in the peace or sexual minorities groups, visits to Western European 
countries appeared to be a decisive experience. Marko Hren (born 1959) was at 
the helm of the peace movement in Slovenia in the 1980s. He self-identifies as 
a pacifist whose initial interest lay with the New Age movement and he claims 
he drew his ethical code from the Buddhist teachings on non-violence: ‘My 
inspiration for engagement was radical pacifism and my motivation was fuelled 
by international pacifist movements – War Resisters International, London-
based. I met them sometime in 1974 in Switzerland.’374     
Nataša Sukič was among the founders of the lesbian activist core in 
Slovenia and is still actively involved in the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA Europe). Her testimony reflects the 
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importance of the trans-national aspect, i.e. the exposure to similar events 
unfolding in Western European countries, as well as the pan-Yugoslav, anti-
nationalist dimension of the Yugoslav feminist movement:  
Everything started in the eighties within the framework of the new social 
movements and alternative cultures, which were quite prominent in 
Ljubljana. They were all - how shall I put it? – interconnected and had an 
impact on our own [lesbian] activism. Especially the video art and 
Borghesia influenced us significantly, because they questioned the media 
representations of sexuality and for the first time sexuality began to 
gravitate in the social space as a political question… Borghesia’s videos 
were totally radical for that time and they certainly had an influence on us. 
Later came the MAGNUS [gay] festivals, the feminist movement, the 
peace movement – it was very vibrant and it was only a matter of time for 
the lesbian movement to get established. First I was part of the feminist 
group and later when I went to Holland and for the first time saw a pride 
parade that left a huge impression on me. I thought – if they can have it 
all, why couldn’t we? So, I met Suzana Tratnik and together we founded 
the group [LL – Lesbian Lilith] – that’s how it all began.  
 
Western Europe was the space which the small lesbian activist core 
appropriated as a reference point and a source of inspiration for their activism 
and where they travelled and liaised with fellow activists. Before the foundation 
of LL, they cooperated closely with the group of gay activists ‘Magnus’ and had 
contacts and meetings with activists from the Vienna-based ‘Homosexuelle 
Initiative’ (HOSI). LL became part of ILGA as of 1987, got involved with the 
International Lesbian Information Service (ILIS) and took part in many 
international events that year: from a semi-legal gathering in Budapest in 
November under ILGA’s patronage, to the ‘Gay and Lesbian Pride’ in the 
Netherlands in June, and at the ‘Lesbenwoche’ in Berlin in October. In August 
1988, after having become an independent ‘lesbian section LL’ under the 
umbrella of ŠKUC, they organized an ‘international lesbian camp’ on the 
Croatian island of Rab which gathered activists from both Yugoslavia and 
Western Europe (Italy, Germany, England, Ireland, Austria, Portugal, the 
Netherlands).375 
As the socio-political situation started to worsen in the late 1980s, one 
could observe a rise of a self-ironical, self-critical discourse and a bitterness 
caused by the onslaught of nationalist euphoria and its contribution to the 
increasingly negative perceptions of Yugoslavia abroad. For example, in 
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October 1988 the London reporter for Polet, the youth weekly magazine of the 
LSY of Croatia, reported among other things on an article in The Guardian 
which described an atmosphere in Yugoslavia where foreign journalists were 
being attacked (quoting an incident of a Reuters journalist being beaten up by 
the police at a rally in Titograd, Montenegro’s capital) and concluded: 
‘Yugoslavia is these days a typical example of Balkan backwardness, of 
repressed, basic nationalist instincts which furthermore corrode the otherwise 
corroded union - at a time when Europe is forging economic and other alliances 
in order to make its population richer, more content, happier…’376 As Yugoslavia 
drifted away from a peaceful solution of its political crisis at the end of the 
decade, a growing sense of alienation from the European space and the 
European values was detectable in the youth media. This was then carried 
forward in political and media discourse to the post-Yugoslav era - most 
prominently in Slovenia and Croatia - as a way of distancing from the Yugoslav 
space and the Yugoslav past.377  
The possibilities of mobility across the European continent and the 
experiences of travel both in the East and in the West put this generation of 
young Yugoslavs in a unique position of exposure to the two sides of the Cold 
War. A sense of solidarity with the East emerged at crucial points such as the 
military dictatorship in Poland, for instance; yet, it was coupled with a sense of 
superiority toward the Eastern Bloc countries and with a sense of belonging to 
the cultural realm of Western Europe. Indeed, it was non-state socialist Europe 
which acted as a source of inspiration both with regard to culture and new forms 
of activism, as social movements from the West were crucial in shaping 
expectations of what could be possible under Yugoslav socialism. 
3.2. Gender (in)equality and sexuality 
 
 
Yugoslav feminism and the subsequent gay and lesbian movement of the 
1980s were significantly impacted by Western European theoretical and activist 
developments. Predominantly composed of intellectuals and hence well 
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acquainted with international academic feminism378, an older cohort of Yugoslav 
feminists who were involved in the public debates with the political elites in the 
1970s and organised the international conference ‘Comrade woman’ at the 
Student Cultural Centre in Belgrade in 1978,379 formed the core of a pan-
Yugoslav network of feminists whose theoretical and subsequent activist 
engagements played a decisive role in the intellectual and academic identities 
of the younger generation. Although most of the concrete problems which 
preoccupied the feminists and the young gay and lesbian activists were 
primarily rooted within the Yugoslav reality, they were for the most part eclectic 
and international in their theoretical expertise and their gaze was almost 
permanently directed beyond narrow national confines. For instance, some of 
the participants at the first Yugoslav meeting of feminists [Prvi jugoslovenski 
susret feministkinja] that took place in 1987 in Ljubljana insisted on the 
importance of the notion of solidarity and quoted positive examples of dealing 
with family rape and violence from Peru, Nicaragua, Britain and Canada.380 In a 
similar vein, the demands of the Magnus section of gay activists from Ljubljana 
presented at the festival of the new social movements in the Slovenian town of 
Nova Gorica in August 1986 reflect comparable manifestations of transnational 
solidarity: not only did they demand, among other things, the removal of the 
legal provisions which criminalised homosexuality in Serbia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo,381 they also insisted that the Yugoslav 
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government lodged a note of protest with the governments of states which 
discriminate and imprison homosexuals, such as Romania, the USSR, Cuba 
and Iran.382    
With the exception of the women’s groups within the sociological 
associations of Croatia and Slovenia [‘Sekcija Žena i društvo pri Sociološkom 
društvu Hrvatske’ and ‘Ženska sekcija pri Sociološkom društvu Slovenije’], all 
the other groups which gathered feminist and gay activists found an institutional 
shelter within the youth infrastructure: the women’s section ‘Lilith’ formed at the 
Student Cultural Centre in Ljubljana (ŠKUC) in April 1985 hosted the lesbian 
group ‘LL’ [Lezbična Lilit] until it became an independent group under ŠKUC’s 
umbrella in 1988; the Belgrade-based feminist group ‘Women and society’ 
[Žene i društvo] which sprung from a series of open discussion events at the 
Student Cultural Centre (SKC) in 1982 continued to hold its meetings there; 
while the feminist group ‘Trešnjevka’ was founded in 1987 as Division for 
women’s social activity at the League of Socialist Youth municipal Zagreb 
branch ‘Trešnjevka’ [Sekcija za društvenu aktivnost žena OK SSO Trešnjevka]. 
It was the women’s group within the youth organisation in Trešnjevka that 
initiated the first telephone line for women and children victims of violence. The 
institutional umbrella of the youth sphere provided activists with a sense of 
distance from the realm of official politics: ‘We do not want to define ourselves a 
priori theoretically or institutionally, what we want is a free space for 
development’.383 Some of the texts reveal the ambiguous relationship which 
existed with the institutions of the system – at the same time denouncing them 
and their approach to the ‘unprivileged groups’ and victims of violence and 
suggesting different ways of improving women’s and children’s positions 
through cooperating with the institutions of the state: ‘The cooperation with the 
relevant institutions (in social work, health, justice, legislative, police, etc.) is 
particularly important and therefore we will dedicate special attention to it’.384 
Although they did not receive institutional funding and the work was done by 
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volunteers, the line was supported in terms of space and logistics by the LSY 
branch of Trešnjevka municipality and the city of Zagreb and the activists 
insisted on the principle of solidarity, which was normally upheld as one of the 
official postulates of Yugoslav self-management:  
‘The institutions protect the patriarchal order by trying to make the 
individual adjust to his/her role. The institutions have this attitude towards 
all individuals who experience problems (the unemployed, the ill, those 
receiving social benefits…) […] The SOS telephone line is something 
different: it is autonomous from institutional influence and possesses its 
own raison d’être […] Institutional changes are indispensable, above all in 
the preliminary contacts of the officials with the victims of violence with the 
aim of preventing further victimisation. We are thinking about cooperation 
with the SIZ [Self-managing interest community] for employment…’385  
 
This not only sheds light on the complex relationship which existed 
between the activists who had found shelter in a de facto institutional space and 
the official politics and institutions of the state, it also demonstrates that 
although their activism embodied something that was novel and alternative 
when compared to the official political discourse and established social 
practices, having chosen a semi-institutional setting they inevitably had to 
engage with the state and challenge it on these issues from within. These new 
groups themselves later acted as infrastructural umbrellas. Thus, in 1989 ‘Lila’ - 
the first lesbian initiative in Croatia was launched as a subgroup of the 
Trešnjevka Women’s section, ‘encouraged by the organising of lesbians 
worldwide, particularly in Slovenia’.386 Most of its members were aged between 
25 and 35 and the gay and lesbian activists in Slovenia were looked upon and 
often recalled as a positive example to be followed. As was observed in a youth 
press article, ‘Progressive ideas were always initially encountering fertile ground 
in Slovenia […] Today, when we all publicly declare in favour of democracy and 
pluralism, the Lila Initiative should present a form of concrete action that will 
receive understanding and support on the part of society.’387    
The trend of accommodating new youth initiatives and groups within the 
framework of the LSYY became especially pronounced after 1986, when the 
League first tacitly and later openly endorsed the inclusion of these new groups 
within the institutional youth sphere. In her testimony, Sukič underlined the 
importance of the student and the youth organisation, the ‘huge support’ the 
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activists received and the opening up and liberalisation, which, in her view, does 
not comply with the post-Yugoslav arguments that seek to stress the dictatorial 
nature of the system:    
ŠKUC had a very strong tradition since 1972 and a very progressive 
student scene and it came as natural that it provided space for the new 
social movements – the feminist, the gay and later the lesbian […] I could 
not think of any more natural space for all of them than ŠKUC. 
We cooperated a lot with the peace movement, with the League of 
Socialist Youth of Slovenia, who gave us huge support and I think they 
even issued a declaration saying they support the politicisation of the 
homosexual question […] I say, those were really open times. Today I 
can’t believe how people can get easily manipulated […] in terms of 
saying that those were terrible times, that it was a one-party dictatorship, I 
don’t know what... What dictatorship, please? OK, maybe it was in the 
immediate post-war period, but from the seventies onwards – certainly it 
wasn’t. I mean… and in the eighties – of course not!  
 
The existence of a rather open youth infrastructure that appeared 
welcoming to new forms of art and activism was also crucial for the development 
of a conflated feminist/lesbian circle of activists. Indeed, it was the ‘peripheral’ 
parts of the youth infrastructure, such as the youth press and the cultural venues 
that contributed the most to the raising of their visibility in the public sphere. For 
instance, while LL still acted as part of the feminist/women’s group Lilith, a range 
of their activities were hosted by ŠKUC in 1986 - from presentations on the 
lesbian scenes in Berlin and London to exhibitions and performances such as 
Austrian Krista Beinstein’s exhibition Obszöne Frauen [Obscene Women]. Later, 
ŠKUC Gallery would also host the ‘Week of lesbian film’388 in December 1988. A 
crucial moment for the lesbian movement not only in Slovenia, but also in 
Yugoslavia was the appearance of a special annex to the youth weekly Mladina 
in October 1987 entitled ‘Ljubimo ženske’ [We love women/Let’s love women], 
which featured anthropological and psychological articles on homosexuality, 
alongside the programmatic goals of the International Lesbian Information 
Service (ILIS), a call from Amnesty International for the reporting of cases of 
imprisonment based on sexual orientation, an excerpt from the book Our 
Bodies, Ourselves and the ‘public inauguration’ (or what some of the activists 
referred to as ‘the coming out’) of the LL group. It outlined their program and 
invited those interested to get in touch via the group’s official address and 
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telephone number. Speaking as a representative of the women activists from 
Belgrade at the first Yugoslav meeting of feminists in Ljubljana, Lepa 
Mlađenović spoke about her excitement upon seeing the Mladina supplement: 
‘When we saw the supplement in Mladina, which we didn’t know was being 
prepared, we were very impressed. Of course, the coming into existence of the 
first lesbian group in Yugoslavia for us is a historical event which we celebrate 
[…] What some of us [in Belgrade] dreamed of and wished for was realised by 
our comrades from Ljubljana and we were really impressed/enthused.’389                      
From all the new social movements which found nesting ground within 
the youth infrastructure, the feminist and lesbian movements were the ones 
which had framed their activism within a Yugoslav framework, beyond the 
confines of the federal units. Referring to Yugoslav feminism390 of the 1980s as 
‘a small beacon of opposition to nationalism’, Jill Benderly rightly argued that 
‘Womens’ solidarity above and beyond national identity made feminism a fairly 
unique social movement in the period when most other movements had, to 
varying degrees, become nationalized by 1991’.391 Sukič’s testimony lends 
legitimacy to this argument. Although the Slovenian gay/lesbian scene was the 
most prominent and recognisable in Yugoslavia, they remained open for 
cooperation and forging of trans-republican ties:    
 
Ours was the first lesbian group in Eastern Europe, not only in 
Yugoslavia. We established connections in the Yugoslav context through 
the feminist movement, through Lepa Mlađenović, for example. The first 
Yugoslav feminist festival took place in Ljubljana. During the festival 
Suzana and I presented this initiative. Soon afterwards, there was a 
similar lesbian-gay initiative in Croatia. We were always in communication 
with the rest of the Yugoslav space… Even today we are well connected, 
recently maybe even more.  
 
Hence, Ljubljana seemed as a logical choice for a host city of the first Yugoslav 
meeting of feminists that took place in December 1987. The conclusions of the 
meeting reflect the initial conflation of the lesbian and the feminist cause:  
‘We, the women who gathered at the first Yugoslav meeting of feminists 
that took place in Ljubljana from 11-13 December 1987, conclude: 
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- That all feminist initiatives and groups in Yugoslavia are legitimate and 
legal. 
- That we call upon women to join the existing feminist groups or to 
establish their own. 
- That violence against women is widely spread in our country: marital and 
extra-marital rape, physical abuse of women and children, sexual 
blackmailing and many more. We agreed that we will work on organised 
help and self-help for the women victims of violence through the S.O.S. 
telephone lines, counseling, shelters, etc. We demand that the relevant 
institutions join these actions because so far they haven’t responded 
adequately to this problem. 
- We demand that […] lesbianism becomes publicly visible; we invite all 
lesbians to establish their own groups throughout Yugoslavia; we intend to 
organise the first Yugoslav lesbian festival. We demand a constitutional 
amendment that will guarantee the equality of all women and men 
regardless of their sexual orientation. […] 
- The Yugoslav feminist meetings become one of the modes of our 
common actions and exchange.’392      
 
One of the issues raised at the Ljubljana Yugoslav feminist meeting was that of 
elitism. This example is illustrative of the Yugoslav-specific traits of some of the 
debates. Lydia Sklevicky (born 1952), a feminist from Zagreb, recounted an 
event where a lesbian couple of highly educated and socially well-established 
lesbian friends – a poet and a historian of art – ‘who could afford to carry the 
stigma of lesbianism’ because ‘they were in a way part of the social elite’, did 
not show solidarity for a lesbian from a less privileged background who worked 
as a typist. She raised the question of whether they as feminist activists have 
managed to raise awareness about the class question: ‘We are not reaching to 
other women who are less privileged and who do not have enough free time to 
be raising awareness about their problems.’393 This demonstrates a certain 
degree of self-awareness about the actual degree of ‘elitism’ among the feminist 
activists which, after all, was distinct from the perceived elitism of those women 
who worked for the official women’s institution - the ‘Conference for the social 
activity of women’ [Konferencija za društvenu aktivnost žena] within the Socialist 
Alliance of Working People.  
Nevertheless, socialist theory and in this case the issue of class, were 
important in forging activist identities. As ‘benevolent dissidents’394 in late 
                                                 
392
 Lepa Mlađenović, et al. ‘Ženske akcije sad i ovde’, Student 25-26, 25.12.1987, p.9. 
393
 ‘Predstavitev ženskih skupin v Ljubljani’ in Suzana Tratnik and Nataša S. Segan (eds.), 
Zbornik o lezbičnem gibanju na Slovenskem 1984-1995 (Ljubljana: ŠKUC, 1995), p. 30. 
394
 Arguably, ‘Since the state was not the primary addressee of their demands, because it 
enabled the institutionalisation of equality, feminists did not question the state apparatus. 
Socialist system, on the other hand, promised to work towards the full emancipation of the 
human being, and feminists saw themselves rather as the allies than the foes of that cause […] 
A self-managing socialist state was necessary, but not sufficient for the full emancipation of the 
163 
 
socialism, they were involved in debates over socialist theory and practice, 
recognising that the legal framework (family law, the right to abortion, etc.)395 
provided women with full emancipation, but which in reality did not amount to full 
equality. Indeed, ‘The feminist movement in Yugoslavia did not, of course, 
speak of overthrowing socialism, but it did speak of the need to overthrow 
patriarchy and of the failure of socialism to do so.’396 Patriarchy was seen to 
embody not only the causes for the unequal treatment of women, but also of all 
other groups, alternative lifestyles and individuals who were discriminated by 
virtue of being different: ‘What feminism is against is patriarchy and its system of 
values based on violence and disrespect for human rights, it is against all who 
sustain that system regardless of their gender […] Homosexuality is an 
alternative lifestyle which is equally valid and legitimate as heterosexuality […] 
Patriarchy does not allow any alternative…’397            
Theoretically eclectic and international in their outlook, feminist and 
lesbian/gay activism was nevertheless significantly defined by its rootedness in 
the Yugoslav context. Institutionally sheltered by parts of the Youth League, 
these groups and initiatives gained visibility and voice through the youth press 
and the youth cultural venues. This position allowed them to distance 
themselves from the sphere of official politics and forge alternative identities and 
demands; yet, it also provided them with enough leverage to channel their 
critique more effectively and challenge the state from within.  
 
3.3. Peace and anti-militarism 
 
As in many parts of socialist Europe and the developed world, the 1980s 
saw the emergence, or in some cases, the re-invigoration of peace and anti-
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militarist activism. Yugoslavia was no exception: here, these initiatives mainly 
focused on conscientious objection/civilian service, although other issues such 
as the public control of the Army and arms sales abroad were also addressed. 
What set Yugoslavia apart, especially compared to other state socialist 
countries, was the fact that the Youth League was still seen by a majority of 
activists as the forum for articulating these demands. Moreover, these new 
debates, especially those that concerned conscientious objection, used the 
language of Yugoslav socialism. For example, documents from the 1980s show 
that the initiators of the conscientious objection initiative were still prepared to 
couch their activism in the language of socialist self-management (see below), 
convinced as they were in the capacity for state institutions – who might 
respond to such language – to be the carriers of change. They tried to 
demonstrate that conscientious objection was part of a democratic society, that 
it is connected with Marx’s understanding of human society and human freedom 
and argued that such a position does not stand in opposition to the concept of 
‘general people’s defense and social self-protection’ [opštenarodna odbrana i 
društvena samozaštita].398 
The 1980 UNESCO report on the youth foresaw trends in peace and 
anti-nuclear/environmental activism, claiming that ‘They [the young] protest 
against threats to the environment and against so-called progress […] They 
also are troubled by the resources and knowledge squandered on a highly 
destructive arms race. This ecological awareness is of an utmost importance 
[…] the crucial factor of ecological issues is not properly speaking ecological 
[…] so much as political’.399 Indeed, anti-nuclear/environmental activism 
became especially prominent in Yugoslavia in the aftermath of the Chernobyl 
disaster.400 As it was noted at the time, ‘Yugoslavia is the only East European 
state nation where protests after Chernobyl have been continuously massive 
[…] Yugoslavia’s peace and ecology protest is probably the best example of the 
                                                 
398
 On the organisation of the Yugoslav defense system – the YPA, as well as the ‘Territorial 
Defense’, see: Marko Milivojević, John B. Allcock and Pierre Maurer (eds.), Yugoslavia’s 
Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defence and Foreign Policy (Oxford/New York: 
Berg Publishers, 1988); Zvezdan Marković, Jugoslovanska ljudska armada (1945-1991) 
(Ljubljana: Založba Defensor, 2007). 
399
 Youth Prospects, p.36.  
400
 The debate revolved around issues of cost, environmental damage, and prospective 
divisions of the country into Western and Eastern ‘nuclear spheres’. On some of these debates, 
see:  Slobodan Stankovic, ‘Nuclear Energy: A Political Pandora’s Box’, Radio Free Europe 
Situation Report, 27 March 1986, Open Society Archive (digital archive); Maurizio Olenik, 
‘Zelena ZSMS’ in Kompendij za bivše in bodoče politike, pp.125-142.  
165 
 
way in which independent protest is infused into existing officially-established 
organisations or agencies, in the process making them less dependent on the 
state’.401 In the youth realm, the 1986 federal youth congress was the platform 
where nuclear power and the issue of civilian military service became the 
subjects of vigorous debate. While both the (anti) nuclear and the military 
service debate were significantly informed by similar initiatives and 
developments in Western Europe and in the Eastern Bloc,402 they had 
specificities conditioned by the Yugoslav context. The congress of the LSYY 
had a specific session dedicated to the new social movements and it was said 
that ‘this is a time when new social actors appear on the social and the political 
scene […] which are embodiment of a critique of the classical social movements 
and political institutions’.403 Despite the numerous disagreements, the congress 
accepted the initiative to ask for a more precise formulation of the contentious 
article 133 and almost unanimously upheld the anti-nuclear argument404, 
enhanced by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster that took place in April that year. 
The congress adopted a resolution demanding moratorium on the international 
tenders for nuclear technology Yugoslavia had initiated, termination of all 
activities for construction of nuclear plants and public presentation of what had 
been invested thus far.405 Accompanied by the delegates’ applause, Žarko 
Bokanović, one of the congress delegates, even handed out a bunch of anti-
nuclear badges to the congress guests seated in the first row, among who was 
the president of the Party Presidium Vidoje Žarković. After the Yugoslav federal 
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government had declared support for a moratorium on the construction of 
nuclear power plants in 1987, in June 1989 the Yugoslav federal assembly 
passed a law banning future constructions of nuclear power plants or facilities 
for processing or storing nuclear waste. 406 At the end of 1989, the anti-nuclear 
movement was rightfully labelled ‘the last all-Yugoslav movement.’407 
One of the new groups which followed a vaguely defined ‘green’ politics 
and upheld the demands of the Slovenian peace groups was ‘Svarun’ from 
Zagreb. Dejan Jović recalled the difficulties they faced while trying to 
incorporate them under the institutional umbrella of the LSYY: 
‘Svarun’ from Zagreb was the first group of greens constituted in Croatia, 
a group which gathered the peace and the green movements. They 
wanted to join the League of Socialist Youth, but, of course, the dogmatic 
elements in the youth organisation said – ‘No way’. But I was very much in 
favour of that. I said – ‘Excellent, if we are a pluralistic organisation, let’s 
welcome them’. I was in the minority in that respect, but they found an 
open door at the city level, in the youth organisation in Zagreb, they were 
allowed to use some space and were closely working with the student 
organisation and Studentski List.      
 
More importantly, it was not only activist youth who used the institutional 
youth sphere for channeling their initiatives and demands.408 The LSYY was the 
realm where the professional young army officers and the recruits had a chance 
to interact with the ‘ordinary’ youth and the representatives of the new social 
movements, i.e. with those who began to question the setup of the military 
sphere in the country. Milan Lišanin (born 1960) was a YPA officer who was 
schooled at the Sarajevo military high school and began his military career in 
1979 in Postojna, Slovenia. He took part in the 1986 LSYY congress, where 
most of the amendments and proposals regarding conscientious objection put 
forward by the delegates from the Slovenian LSY caused fierce debates and a 
consensus could not be reached. As Lišanin recalled: 
As an active member of the youth at the time I participated at the last, 
twelfth congress of the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia in 
Belgrade in 198… I have the documents, I can check […] There it was 
already obvious that there are different camps […] As far as I remember, it 
was Slovenia which was sticking out and all the delegates who were 
discussing… but you could already see that something needed to be 
defended. At that point I could not even conceive of the idea that what 
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happened could ever happen. It would not even cross my mind. Not only 
back then, but even in 1990, up until the moment the end was really there. 
 
In addition to the LSYY, the youth and the Army principally overlapped in 
three realms: the obligatory conscription, the military education system (see 
Table 3) and the compulsory military education for all students409 as part of the 
doctrine of GPD and SS. Lišanin reflected on the close-knit relationship the 
Army had with the local community, in particular with the youth:   
The secondary military school in Sarajevo actively cooperated with the 
other secondary schools in the city […] The cooperation of the cadets of 
the military schools with the local youth was very dynamic. Likewise, in 
Slovenia, since I worked at the reconnaissance unit, we cooperated with 
the scouts from the town, we organised technical shows […] functions, 
quizzes… The police youth was also involved, even though later we were 
in conflict, while we were ‘normal’ we used to cooperate […] Also, when 
the Postojna youth used to organise an excursion to, say, Plitvice Lakes, 
to the town of Jajce - ‘On the Paths of the Revolution’, we went with them. 
There was cooperation in the field. That cooperation existed everywhere. 
Later… it was different.  
 
This section addresses the Slovenian branch of the LSYY as it was the 
most vocal on this matter - which in itself reinforces the argument of the 
importance of the decentralised nature of the institutional youth sphere, but it 
also seeks to broaden the established narrative410 by adding nuance and telling 
new stories. Undoubtedly, all of the projects and events of interaction between 
                                                 
409
 In 1987 the Slovenian LSY and its Ljubljana University branch initiated several round table 
discussions with the aim of reforming/abolishing the compulsory military classes in the 
secondary schools and at University level. Referring specifically to the education of pre-school 
and primary school children which included frequent encounters with military content, a 1989 
issue of Mladina asked if it is not the time ‘to put an end to the terror of the Revolution against 
the children?’ ‘Vzgoja oboroženega ljudstva’, Mladina 14, 14.6.1989, p.6. See also: Blaž Vurnik, 
Med Marksom in punkom.  
410
 Without trying to undermine the argument which posits Slovenia at the forefront of these 
debates, it is indispensable to paint a more nuanced picture and consider the facts which might 
counter the already taken for granted anti-YPA/anti-Yugoslav tendencies among the Slovenian 
youth. A classified military report produced by the Slovenian Secretariat for National Defense in 
August 1984 noted that, overall, the number of applicants from Slovenia for the military 
secondary and higher educational institutions decreased by 10% as compared to 1983, while 
the overall number of applicants from the rest of Yugoslavia increased by 20%. (‘Informacija o 
odzivu za vojaške šole v letu 1984’, RK ZSMS 1974-1990, Archive of Slovenia, AS 
538/technical unit 364.) At the end of 1986, it was again emphasised that the claim that the 
attitude of the Slovenian youth towards the Army is negative is unfounded, since one can’t 
equalise a critical attitude with a negative one. The document quotes a survey where 86% of 
secondary school pupils said that a strong army is needed in order to preserve peace and 
confirmed the above-quoted conclusions that the number of Slovenian applicants to the military 
educational institutions is not decreasing, on the contrary (‘Spontana družbena gibanja. Gradivo 
je interno. 3.11.1986’). The report concluded that the military high school in Ljubljana and the 
Air Force High School in Mostar attract 4/5 of all Slovenian applicants. Considered to be the 
elite military educational institutions, the air force high school and the air force academy were 
indeed the most competitive and the most attractive. 
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the army and the local youth were not equally successful and did not target the 
youth which held firm beliefs and who perceived the army through its most 
senior figures, rather than through their military coevals.411 For instance, at 24 
per cent, the percentage of young officers who were members of the Party was 
relatively small, compared to 31 per cent of the overall officer corps and 33 per 
cent of the civilian employees in the YPA.412 These overlaps were indeed 
ignored at the time and are overlooked in scholarly literature nowadays, leading 
to a restricted view of youth culture and activism.               
The unique role of the Yugoslav People’s Army as a ‘politically important 
factor’ and one of the principal pillars of socialist Yugoslavia indeed contributed 
to its image as ‘Yugoslavia’s ninth province’.413 Nevertheless, at the beginning 
of the 1980s the Army still enjoyed a rather positive reputation in public life and 
in the youth media. A 1982 article entitled ‘Some strange army’ underlined the 
unconventional, social/community oriented role of the YPA:  
‘Seven thousand kilometres of roads. Seven hundred kilometres of railway 
lines. Five thousand flats a year. Three hundred thousand [trained] cooks 
a year. Four hundred thousand [trained] drivers a year. This is only a 
small part of the gift by the YPA to our society. While in some parts of this 
crazy planet the army ‘convinces’ its people that they haven’t chosen the 
best road towards a better future, another army takes part in film and 
series shoots. While in some parts of this planet divided into blocs the 
army leaves the barracks in order to demonstrate its ‘great concern’ for its 
people, the same army from the first sentence leaves the barracks only 
when it needs to save its people from natural disasters…’414  
 
The realm of the obligatory military service was a diverse space that 
gathered youngsters from all strata and all parts of Yugoslav society, and it was 
what provided the peace groups with their most powerful argument – the right to 
conscientious objection. Article 172 of the federal Constitution from 1974 
stipulated that the ‘Defense of the state shall be inviolable and inalienable right 
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and the highest duty and honour of every citizen’ and the evasion of the call for 
the military service was criminalised.415 Hence, a refusal to respond to 
conscription entailed imprisonment and military service was strictly confined to 
the YPA. Although the army was perceived and critiqued by peace activists as 
one homogenous, unanimous body that was conservative and unwilling to 
compromise, in reality, a slow process of negotiation and change was 
underway, as individuals who refused to carry arms were appointed to serve 
their military duty in parts of the military where carrying of arms was not 
required. Simo Spaskovski testified to the existence of a rather informal practice 
of accommodating individual cases of refusal of carrying arms:  
‘In 1979, as lieutenant of the Yugoslav People’s Army, I was the 
commander of the platoon in the logistics educational battalion in Skopje. 
Despite the training for logistical duties, the soldiers also had to undergo 
combat training, which means they were given weapons. That year for the 
first time I had a soldier in my platoon who was a professional musician, 
who did not want to carry a weapon, did not want to be trained in 
shooting, but was willing to perform all other tasks. In that situation, since 
there was no legislation, I got approval from my battalion commander that 
the soldier can serve without arms. So, he was deployed in the ‘Military 
Club’ to be in charge of the cultural and entertainment programs for the 
troops […] So, this practice existed before being legally regulated.’416  
 
Marko Hren also confirmed that he was allowed to serve the army without a 
weapon. Yet, his testimony also serves as an example of the often subjective 
criticism towards the army officers seen as inferior - significantly conditioned by 
the subsequent armed conflicts and the role of the YPA in the Yugoslav 
dissolution: 
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I did serve the army and I did not want to carry weapons, so I was working 
in culture. I was in the cultural department, I was playing in a band and I 
was organising cultural events. 
 
L: This was allowed because you objected?  
 
I don’t know. Now when I had an insight in the intelligence service 
archive, I saw they were following me before the military [service]. They 
immediately asked me if I would translate for them the papers I received 
from War Resisters International. So, I did. So, I think they had a plan. 
They wanted to know what our intentions are. They allowed me actually to 
be there without really being a soldier […] And they continued following 
me.  
 
L: Was it a negative experience, would you say? 
 
Being in the military for me was a decisive experience. I faced a ship of 
fools.  
 
L: Where did you serve? 
 
In Belgrade. In the elite barracks. I was in the headquarters as a 
coordinator of news, for example. I did different things for the general 
staff. I was for example at the manoeuvres of the heavy artillery and I 
really saw that this is a pathological institution. People recruited in the 
head-quarters were from the poor areas of Serbia and they were crazy 
[…] completely disorganised. 
 
L: You mean the officers? 
 
Yes! I’ve seen that as a pacifist, I was there. I was inside […] I saw them 
rehearsing the battles […] I saw these drunkards… The whole battle was 
completely planned, but they made millions of mistakes […] When I came 
home I said – this is really, literally crazy institution. Some semi-literate 
officers from the poorest parts of Serbia, who now have a position in 
Belgrade, ideologically completely biased […] So, I came back ten times 
more pacifist than I was. I saw the enemy (laughs). Although it was not 
only an enemy – a sick enemy!  
 
L: But, the Yugoslav Army had a very big education system – academies…  
 
So-called academies. These guys coming out of those academies were 
still intellectually the lowest part of society. Most of them on alcohol. I was 
shocked by the enormous quantities of alcohol in the military. And that’s 
what happened then in Sarajevo on the battlefields – drunkards around 
Sarajevo…  
 
Indeed, conscription was not embraced enthusiastically by many from the 
cultural realm – on the contrary. The absolute majority of my interviewees - in 
particular those from the cultural milieus - expressed strong views on the futility 
of conscription and generally described it as an absolute waste of time. Zoran 
Predin underlined the often-quoted description of the YPA as the ‘cemetery’ for 
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Yugoslav rock bands and ‘the darkest side’ of the country – through the prism of 
its subsequent role in the Yugoslav dissolution wars: 
The YPA was a cemetery for Yugoslav bands. The YPA destroyed so 
many good bands. It was the darkest side of the former Yugoslavia. If the 
politicians were smart enough to decrease the influence of the Army in 
time, probably history would have turned out to be different. What should 
have been the forgery of brotherhood and unity, turned into the very 
opposite. The command cadres were more or less of Serb origin. I served 
the Army in 1981 in Zagreb, after Tito’s death – they were pretty nervous. 
I was sent to the anti-terrorist division. Today all of that makes me laugh. 
After a couple of months I decided I’ve had enough, so I initiated an action 
which ended up with a diagnosis of psychoneurosis nuclearis, they let me 
go and I never came back. The entire Yugoslav project had potential to 
survive only if it was democratised – at the right time, in the right manner. 
But it’s easy to be smart now.  
 
Senad Avdić, although formally a member of the Bosnian branch of the LSY, did 
not hesitate in describing the army as a ‘stupid, inert, sluggish, dogmatic 
structure which was defending something that no one was attacking, as it 
turned out at the end, and was attacking something that no one defended’:   
L: What was your experience in the YPA?  
 
Ever so beautiful! (laughs) It is one repressive mechanism […] An 
absurdly wasted year that I spent in Prishtina. 1986-1987. They were 
preparing us for something without you knowing for what. The entire 
society in the mid-eighties entered a state of an unrelenting atrophy […] 
 
 
Although the debates on the role of the military and the right to 
conscientious objection reached their climax towards the end of the decade, 
there is a much broader story to be told regarding the issues of military 
conscription and the perception of the YPA among the youth in the 1980s, 
which begins well before the often quoted events. Namely, in December 1983 
the federal assembly, through an expedited procedure, approved the 
amendments to the Law on military service. The amendment foresaw a 
continuous 15-month period of military service for students replacing the 
previous system of 12+3 (likewise introduced through amendments in 1980). 
The Presidency of the LSYY lodged a request against the mode of approval 
through an expedited procedure, while the presidency of the Slovenian LSY 
sent ‘substantive comments’ and conclusions from the public debate they 
organised. Both of these requests were ignored.417 The perception of the 
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Slovenian LSY as more progressive and hence exceptional and different from 
the other Yugoslav branches is omnipresent among the interviewees and 
accepted as a well-established fact in the scholarly literature. While it cannot be 
denied that the Slovenian LSY was more outspoken on these issues, it is also 
worth pointing out that there were cases, such as this one, when the federal 
Youth League took the same line and upheld the demands of its Slovenian 
branch. In all of its written communication and complaints from the second half 
of 1983 sent to different political bodies regarding the lack of institutional debate 
on the Law amendments and the ‘expedited procedure’ for their approval, the 
Slovenian LSY referred to the fact that this ‘is also the position of the 
Presidency of the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia’.418 The demand by 
the LSYY that the Law be amended in a regular procedure after all the open 
questions are resolved was even supported by the YPA delegate to the 
LSYY.419 The different local organisations of the Slovenian Youth League 
forwarded their official conclusions and opinions on the proposed amendments. 
The arguments which in this case came from the official youth bodies and were 
signed by the local youth functionaries have striking resemblances to the later 
demands and to the language used by the activists of the ‘peace movement’. 
For example, a letter signed by the secretary of the municipal conference of the 
LSYS in Ilirska Bistrica from 21.10.1983 states the following: ‘As a humanist 
society we must strive to reduce the amount of weapons and to fight for peace. 
That is why we advocate the reduction of the military service […] which would 
be particularly effective and would imply a reduction in the costs of the YPA,420 
which apparently consumes huge resources that in the contemporary difficult 
economic situation could be spent more wisely’.421 The Koper branch of the 
LSYS stated that ‘It is very encouraging that the youth can have a debate about 
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these amendments today, which was not possible in the years 1980 and 1981, 
a right which we have guaranteed by the Constitution…’422  
Although there was a widespread consensus that the 15-month 
obligatory military service should be replaced by a 12-month period, most of the 
letters from the regional Slovenian LSY branches openly stated that a longer 
period does not in itself guarantee an effective Army and well-trained youth, and 
that, on the contrary, there should be continuous exposure to military 
knowledge and training. One could argue that this was a strategically framed 
argument which in no way reflected the genuine attitudes of its authors, since it 
stands in stark contrast with the contentious argumentation against the Law in 
question. This echoes Paul Betts’ claim with regard to the context of the GDR 
that ‘People were good at exploiting the system using socialist civil rights 
language to extract concessions from state authorities’.423 On the other hand, it 
is equally arguable that at this point in time the concept of national defense, the 
YPA and Yugoslav self-management were still not subject of severe criticism, 
nor were they discredited in the public eye to the same extent like in the late 
1980s. There is a telling parallel to be drawn between the East German ‘peace 
movement’ initiated in 1981, which was ‘the campaign for a community ‘peace 
service’ as a real alternative to military service… Whilst protesters of all kinds 
had to expect possible and sometimes severe punishment, the group’s rejection 
of militarism did not necessarily mean that they rejected the GDR and all it 
stood for…’424   
In October 1986 the Presidency of the Republican Conference of the 
LSY of Slovenia drafted ‘theses’ regarding the initiative about an alternative 
(civil) military service for the upcoming discussion within the Commission for 
General People’s Defense and Social Self-Protection (GPD and SS) at the 
Republican Conference of the SAWP. Interestingly, although the document 
advanced demands and propositions which were in opposition to some of the 
core postulates of the Yugoslav socialist defense system, it posited the initiative 
within the mainstream discursive framework:  
‘We are aware that safety is one of the fundamental values of every 
society. We are also aware that we have to fight for freedom over and 
over again and that it is not won forever and never again jeopardised […] 
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We do not find the present way of dealing with the conscientious objectors 
(repetitive sentencing) appropriate and in accordance with socialist 
humanism as one of the fundamental orientations of our society […] Our 
conception of GPD and SS is based upon the individual as a decisive 
factor in our defense capabilities. Our opinion is that we must not give up 
in advance any category of the population (in this case the objectors), nor 
turn them into potential enemies of the system (usually the objectors are 
very loyal citizens) […] The [Second World War] liberation front of the 
Slovenian people included all kinds of people in its ranks who were ready 
to fight for the freedom of the people […] There were those among the 
partisans who never carried arms. But they carried the wounded […] thus 
the society and more specifically the YPA would make an exceptionally 
positive political move by recognising the right to conscientious objection 
[…] Complaints about repression against the objectors would no longer be 
possible, while the society would have more benefit from them […] The 
sense that they are beneficial to society and that the society has not given 
up on them in advance would be important. An appropriate solution to the 
problem of conscientious objection would increase the reputation of 
socialist self-management worldwide.’425  
 
Indeed, ‘Activists’ vocabularies of protests are shaped and limited by 
ostensibly non-cultural political, economic and legal structures’.426 In this case, 
the youth bodies were impelled to frame unconventional political demands using 
the institutional vocabulary of Yugoslav socialism. Similarly, an internal 
document about the new social movements in Slovenia and in Yugoslavia noted 
that  
‘The Yugoslav attitudes about the demands the movements advance and 
which were presented at the youth congresses, belong to two extremes: 
that those are the real concerns of the contemporary times, to those that 
see them as an outright penetrations of liberalism and counter-
revolutionary attitudes […] In Slovenia we have publicly expressed our 
opinion in certain [institutional] spaces that the movements raise 
questions which are also questions [relevant] for socialist self-
management and that because of that their interests are an integral part 
of the pluralism of self-managing interests, and which in this way can gain 
prominence within the socialist alliance as a front of progressive forces. In 
this framework the movements would have to respect the rules of the 
game and eventually succumb to the will of the majority. Having said this, 
we can’t ignore the fact that within these movements there are individuals 
or groups close to the positions of the bourgeois right, as well as that 
there were attempts of abusing the spontaneous movements for anti-
                                                 
425
 ‘Teze za razpravo: Ob pobudi za civilno službo, 20.10.1986’, RK ZSMS 1974-1990, Archive 
of Slovenia, AS 538/technical unit 364. 
In 1986 the federal youth magazine Mladost published a ‘dossier’ on the request for civilian 
military service written by Mirjana Križman, where the argumentation similarly draws upon Marx, 
Kardelj and Yugoslavia’s doctrine of mass participation in the system of all-people’s defense 
and the formal dedication to the pursuit of peaceful conflict-resolution in international relations. It 
also called for democratic resolution of such conflicts, strengthening of democratic instutional 
mechanisms and doing away with ‘authoritarian-repressive forms of decision-making’.  
Mirjana Križman, ‘Civilna vojna služba: Prigovor savesti protiv naoružanog naroda’, Mladost 23, 
28.7-10.8.1986.   
426
 Francesca Polletta, ‘”Free spaces”’, p.17. 
175 
 
socialist or anti-communist aims (certain slogans during the protests, 
certain articles in Mladina).’427  
 
The document further noted that within the Yugoslav People’s Army 
circles there were different views on the matter and that there were signs of 
readiness to accept conscientious objection for religious reasons, but only if 
conscripts remained within the military. Although the official line of the Army on 
the matter was well-known, this didn’t prevent the process of consultation and 
negotiation to continue. For instance, in May 1986 the federal defense secretary 
met with representatives of the Slovenian LSY to discuss the issue.428 Robert 
Botteri similarly recalled his participation at a round-table discussion they 
initiated with the Army, where military representatives who took part agreed that 
reform was necessary, but, later, when the official reports were published, it 
was on a completely different note: ‘They had to write that they don’t agree with 
us.’ A year later, at its 24th session in July 1987, the presidency of the Slovenian 
LSY adopted several conclusions pertaining to the conscientious objection 
initiative. In an official correspondence addressed to the Federal Secretariat for 
National Defense, it requested that the Secretariat provides information on the 
progress of the initiative (commenced in December 1985 within the SFRY 
Presidency) for the annulment of the recurring court cases and verdicts against 
the conscientious objectors.429  
These examples demonstrate how the formal youth structures chose to 
diplomatically articulate the demands and concerns coming from its ‘base’ or 
indeed from without its narrower membership body and to navigate and pave 
the space between the youth discontents and activists and the higher 
political/institutional realm. Not surprisingly, in order to add more argumentative 
weight, activists also referred to Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1987/46 of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights, which recommended ‘to States with a system of 
compulsory military service, where such provision has not already been made, 
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that they consider introducing various forms of alternative service for 
conscientious objectors which are compatible with the reasons for conscientious 
objection, bearing in mind the experience of some States in this respect, and 
that they refrain from subjecting such persons to imprisonment’.430 The fact that 
Yugoslavia was among the 14 countries which abstained during the vote (and 
not one of the 2 which voted against) lends legitimacy to the argument that in 
the second half of the 1980s the Yugoslav state and its Army were already in 
the process of changing their policy on the potential venues for accommodating 
the different demands for civil military service. Hren’s testimony echoes these 
developments. He emphasised that the peace activists were ‘legalists’ and 
confirmed their interaction with the different political organs and instituttions of 
the system: 
Our interlocutors were institutions, both federal and republican […] We 
were in these terms legalists […] We were a human rights movement. 
Conscientious objection was a human right in the understanding of the 
UN. So, we were legalist. We have the UN, which is the supreme 
framework for human rights and Yugoslavia was not following […] The 
moment we came into conflict with the Yugoslav regime was the moment 
when Slovenian policy makers, starting with the LSYS, supported our 
ideas, and the Yugoslav didn’t. 
 
The first battle was won when in December 1985 a decision by the 
federal Presidency provided legal basis for the avoidance of repetitive prison 
sentences for conscientious objectors in a way that upon their second call they 
would be deployed in the army without an obligation to carry arms.431 In August 
1986 the decision was incorporated within the military legal system.432 This did 
not satisfy the demands of the peace activists, as essentially it did not 
decriminalise conscientious objection. As a 1987 Helsinki Watch report noted: 
‘In short, in Yugoslavia, as in Poland, the tactic will probably continue to be one 
of accommodating protesters but not fully institutionalising and legalising 
conscientious objection and alternative service’.433 However, in April 1989 the 
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federal Parliament adopted amendments to the 1985 Law on the military service 
duty to accommodate those refusing to carry arms due to religious beliefs: ‘The 
soldier who refuses to receive arms due to religious beliefs serves the military 
duty term without arms for the period of 24 months.’434 Considering the fact that 
the regular military service was 12 months, this amendment was also generally 
seen as unsatisfactory, in particular because it did not foresee the option of a 
service outside of the military. Marko Hren labelled it ‘an attempt to mislead 
public opinion.’435 Nevertheless, this legal change indeed decriminalised 
conscientious objection and demonstrated that even within the Army – seen as 
a bastion of political conservatism – there were processes of reform underway 
which ran counter to some of the core doctrines it embodied.                             
The event that sealed the possibility of any further negotiations with the 
Army, cemented the anti-Yugoslav image of Slovenia and effectively paved the 
way for Slovenia’s secession from Yugoslavia, was the so-called JBTZ affair, or 
‘the trial of the four’.436 The event has been hailed as the milestone event 
leading to Slovenian independence and the single most important event of the 
‘Slovenian spring’. Following the arrest of the four on 31 May 1988 on suspicion 
of disclosure of military secrets, the ensuing trial at the military court in Ljubljana 
sparked mass protests, shook the Yugoslav political scene to the core and led 
to a relative homogenisation of the Slovenian public. The ‘Committee for the 
defense of Janez Janša’, which was later renamed into ‘Committee for the 
defense of human rights’, came to represent all oppositional voices - the main 
points of contestation being that civilians were tried at a military court and the 
trial was conducted in Serbo-Croatian language. However, the indictment was 
not in breach of the existing legal and constitutional framework. Article 221 from 
the 1974 federal Constitution stipulated that criminal offences committed by 
military personnel and certain criminal offences committed by other persons 
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relating to the national defense and security of the country, as well as other 
legal matters relating to disputes in connection with the service in the Yugoslav 
People’s Army will be decided upon by military court. It was article 224 of the 
federal penal code that the indictment was based on: ‘Whoever without 
authority communicates, confers or otherwise makes accessible to another 
information which constitutes a military secret, or whoever compiles such 
information with a view to convey it to an unauthorised person, shall be 
punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding three months but not exceeding 
five years.’437 The trial came as a convenient occasion to fuse the different 
types of anti-regime critique, as the protests were not so much about the 
defense of Janša or the other three in particular. Indeed, they presented an 
opportunity to articulate a deeper and more serious type of critique of the entire 
existing state, political and legal order. This event could also be considered ‘the 
point of no return’ where an anti-regime, but pro-Yugoslav sentiment was 
irreversibly dissipating and losing any Yugoslav content that was left, and where 
all hopes for the democratisation of Yugoslavia began to wither away. Although 
the ‘opposition’, including Mladina, became openly and unanimously 
antagonistic to the Army and the politics of the Serbian LC, reflecting back on 
the event occurs through a different lens, as Robert Botteri’s testimony shows:         
Janša used to write for Mladina, he even ended up in prison because of 
Mladina, which was some kind of repression against Mladina […] In that 
phase of the struggle for democratisation we were on the same side. 
Later, when he turned into a nationalist and a professional politician, we 
quickly parted ways […] Especially because even before the war, in 1990, 
we proposed that Slovenia unilaterally de-militarises and thus sets an 
example for everyone in Yugoslavia – ‘Look, we stand for a society 
without an army, we call upon you to do the same and solve this 
peacefully’. But, Janša sabotaged that action, they labelled us ‘traitors’ 
and they chose a war. Later he turned into the politician who uses all 
means just to stay in power. 
 
The role of the army in the Yugoslav political system, in society and in 
public life was first put under scrutiny in the official youth media in Slovenia, 
while the Slovenian Youth League decided to uphold the initiatives for 
conscientious objection of a relatively small group of peace activists and hence 
incite an all-Yugoslav debate. As one of the ‘socio-political organisations’, it 
initially framed the demands within the vocabulary of Yugoslav socialist self-
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management. The debate on nuclear disarmament was similarly taken up by 
the LSYY and produced greater consensus at federal level. As the decade wore 
on, the socialist rhetoric was dissipating and the differences in the political and 
public arena deepened, but at the same time there was an increasing 
awareness within the political and the Army leadership that some of the 
demands put forward by the youth organisation should be accommodated. To 
refer back to Isin’s definition of ‘acts of citizenship’, these initiatives sheltered by 
the different branches of the LSYY managed to transform the established 
forms/modes of being political through re-creating and using parts of the youth 
infrastructure as legitimate, institutional sites and channels of struggle, requiring 
the state to respond and engage. 
 
This chapter argued that despite the fact that the federal Youth League 
did not explicitly endorse all of the initiatives stemming from the new social 
movements, it did provide spaces for some of them and increased the visibility 
of their demands in the public space. While the youth bodies were borrowing 
from the state vocabulary in order to frame and articulate their initiatives and 
demands more successfully, the institutions of late socialist Yugoslavia were 
reluctantly, but slowly consenting to the various calls for democratisation and 
doing away with certain taboos and subjects which so far had not been 
considered as legitimate arenas for political expression. The appropriation of 
some of the socialist/self-management values and vocabulary both by the Youth 
League and by the activists themselves reflected an implicit support for some of 
the postulates of Yugoslav socialism – above all the concepts of solidarity, 
equality and emancipation. The way they framed their ‘acts of citizenship’ and 
articulated their demands conflated their particular identity as stemming from 
the Yugoslav context, with a trans-national/international realm which served 
both as a personal inspiration and a platform for meaningful exchange and 
interaction. Thus, Helsinki Watch was right in drawing a line of distinction 
between the young activists sheltered by the youth organisation and the more 
visible nationalist dissidents, when it observed that ‘the young people infused 
the official organisations with their enthusiasm, to “keep the system going, but, 
at the same time, to change it for the better” – thus by-passing the route of 
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repression and preoccupation with personal defense that became the lot of 
Yugoslavia’s civil rights and nationalist dissidents’.438  
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Table 3 
Secondary military 
schools 
 
Military 
gymnasiums/high 
schools 
 
Military academies 
 
Secondary Military 
School of Land Forces 
– Sarajevo [SVŠ KoV – 
Sarajevo]  
 
Air Force High School 
‘Marshal Tito’ – Mostar 
[Vazduhoplovna 
gimnazija]  
 
Technical Military 
Academy of Land 
Forces – Zagreb  
 
Music Secondary 
Military School 
[Muzička SVŠ – 
Sarajevo]  
 
‘Brotherhood and Unity’ – 
Belgrade 
 
Military Academy of 
Land Forces – Belgrade 
 
Procurement 
Secondary Military 
School – Sarajevo 
[Intendantska SVŠ – 
Sarajevo] 
 
‘Ivo Lola Ribar’ – Zagreb 
 
Air Force Technical 
Military Academy – 
Rajlovac 
 
Technical Secondary 
Military School of Land 
Forces – Zagreb [TSVŠ 
KoV – Zagreb] 
 
‘Franc Rozman Stane’ – 
Ljubljana 
 
Air Force Military 
Academy – Zadar 
 
Naval Technical 
Secondary Military 
School – Split 
[Mornaričko-tehnička 
SVŠ – Split] 
 
 Naval Military Academy 
- Split  
 
Medical Secondary 
Military School – Novi 
Sad [Sanitetska SVŠ – 
Novi Sad] 
 
  
Air Force Technical 
Secondary Military 
School – Rajlovac 
[Vazduhoplovno-
tehnička SVŠ – 
Rajlovac] 
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4. The eighty-eighters – the arena of youth politics and the 
break-up of Yugoslavia  
 
Socijalizam sinova ne može  
u svojoj konkretnoj viziji i oličenju biti  
socijalizam očeva.439  
 
Milan Kučan (1986) 
 
The early 1980s witnessed the growth of cultural and journalistic 
challenges to the institutional youth sphere (see Chapter 1). By the late 1980s, 
the entire set-up of the LSYY was being challenged, primarily due to its 
takeover by a new generation of political activists whose political views 
converged around socially liberal440 concepts. Political cleavages among 
‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’ powerfully crystallised around 1988, creating 
divides that would become influential in shaping the politics of a post-Yugoslav 
era. These new elites would play pivotal roles in negotiating the changing role of 
the LSYY, some trying to maintain a trans-republican organisation, some 
increasingly turning to republican-based units that foreshadowed the break-up 
of the country. This chapter seeks to add new perspectives to current narratives 
of youth and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, through the inclusion of republics 
other than Slovenia, and through bringing a new angle to late Yugoslav politics 
by uncovering an overlooked trans-republican convergence around progressive, 
loosely defined liberal values.   
The chapter addresses the ways the Youth League initially sought to 
reform and re-invent its role and mission and was later subsumed in, and 
divided by the wider Yugoslav political debates and developments in the 
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country. Nevertheless, there was a range of shared values and beliefs across 
the LSYY, as suggested by the fact that several of its branches were 
transformed into liberal political parties after 1989.441 The chapter presents the 
events of 1988 (the ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’, the abolishment of the youth 
baton relay, the ‘trial of the four’), as the most important tipping point. In 
addition, it focuses on the debates over the future of the League of Socialist 
Youth of Yugoslavia and its eventual demise. The chapter seeks to analyse the 
outcomes of the debates which unfolded within the late socialist Yugoslav youth 
realm in the second half of the 1980s and some of the solutions which emerged 
and were proposed by different actors considering the future of the LSYY. 
Essentially, it reflects upon the (lack of) consensus about the dilemma of how to 
modernise Yugoslav society and the sphere of institutional youth politics and 
culture. 
The first part engages with the question of how the internally generated 
debate on the reformation/self-abolishment of the youth organisation developed. 
It traces the shift in rhetoric and in the way reform was envisioned. The second 
part offers a perspective on the 1988 events ‘from below’, through the 
experiences of the political activists who worked for the LSYY and/or happened 
to be in Belgrade during the political upheavals. The last section sheds light on 
the process of disintegration of the institutional youth sphere, through the 
debates concerning its future and the future of the country on the eve of 
Yugoslavia’s break-up. At the end, it reflects upon the question of why this 
generation’s sense of multilayered citizenship and vibrant activism failed to 
materialise into a viable pan-Yugoslav political alternative.  
 
4.1. Attempts at reinventing institutional youth politics in the second 
half of the 1980s  
 
A determination for change which, as late as 1986, had not stretched 
beyond the scope of the ‘pluralism of self-managing interests’, was transformed 
by 1988 into platforms, initiatives and demands which were almost entirely 
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stripped of their original socialist shell. Members of the youth political elite 
initially argued for a more assertive role of the LSYY, while later in the decade 
the central issue of contention and debate became the very redefinition of the 
role for the LSYY. A shift away from the vocabulary of self-management and the 
pluralism of self-managing interests and towards a broad interest in human 
rights and freedoms, rule of law and political pluralism in the second half of the 
1980s, unfolded both as a result of internally initiated debates within the LSYY, 
but equally so in response to deepening political polarisation within the 
Yugoslav political scene. After 1987, these new political cleavages clearly 
affected different levels of the Youth League. A national fracturing also saw 
greater divergence developing within the republican Youth Leagues, as what 
had once been a shared culture was gradually being lost. 
In the above-cited 1989 essay entitled ‘The twilight of the youth baton’, 
the young authors concluded that ‘With the abolishment of the Youth Baton we 
lost an archaic ritualistic practice, but in return we obtained nothing. In other 
words, we obtained an empty space, within which democratic struggles could 
commence’.442 Indeed, the space which throughout the 1980s was cleared of 
what was perceived to be outdated Yugoslav socialist rubble by the various 
reformist youth and student initiatives, was only partially filled with new 
progressive and democratic content. The withering class/Marxist paradigm by 
the end of the 1980s was being replaced by an ethno-national one, while in the 
more dominant political and cultural arenas the different voices coming from 
within the youth sphere were outperformed or overshadowed and did not have 
the vigor to counter the ones coming from more senior actors. The radical 
political decentralisation of the state, which in the 1980s opened the way for the 
emergence of many pockets of opposition (liberal, reformist, nationalist) was 
understood by some as the implementation of the Marxist notion of the 
withering away of the state443, which the Yugoslav political elites were 
committed to and upon which they sought to build unity after WW2. More 
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crucially, however, as Dejan Jović convincingly argues, it was the progressive 
‘breakdown of the elite ideological consensus’444 after 1974 that eventually 
brought the country to a collapse. It was in particular during the second half of 
the 1980s that the fractures along what has been referred to as Yugoslavia’s 
‘natural cleavage lines’445 started to become more exposed, during a period of 
intensified intra-party struggles and weakening federal institutional framework. 
Different actors began competing for the space which was gradually emptied of 
the doctrine of socialist self-management. In this context, with the exception of 
the youth leadership in Serbia (proper) and Montenegro, the political youth 
realm realigned mainly around reformist and liberal ideas. Although, in 
hindsight, the dominance and superiority of ethnic politics and nationalist parties 
is often taken for granted and as a fait accompli, the state of affairs at the end of 
the 1980s was such that there were many potential venues for other outcomes 
of the crisis. A consensus that change and doing away with the old was 
necessary, albeit without a common platform about the content and the manner 
in which change was to be achieved, was a dominant discrusive stream within 
the volatile late Yugoslav public sphere. At the same time, reformed 
communists and ardent nationalists were competing with a range of liberal and 
social-democratic platforms and actors, some guarding hope that they would be 
able to triumph at the federal elections that never materialised. In this context, it 
is important to re-emphasise the heterogeneity of the youth leaderships both at 
republican/provincial and at federal level and the fact that different individuals 
within the same presidency or ‘republican conference’ of the LSYY could hold 
disparate views. 
1986 can be considered a pivotal moment for the LSYY in this regard. It 
was the year of the 12th Congress of the Slovenian League of Socialist Youth – 
the so-called Krško Congress, where members of the League pioneered a new 
vocabulary, new demands and forms of youth activism. The ‘liberalisation’ in 
Slovenia arguably coincided with the stepping down of conservative Party 
leader France Popit in 1986 and the rise of a new younger leadership headed 
by Milan Kučan. It was Kučan who at the 27th session of the Central Committee 
of the LCY in March 1986 said something which would become an often-quoted 
statement: ‘The socialism of the sons, cannot be in its concrete vision and 
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embodiement the socialism of the fathers […] Departing from what is already 
achieved, they search for materially and spiritually richer socialism, freer, more 
democratic and more humane. Every generation gives its own creative 
contribution…’446   
It was also the moment when the federal congress of the LSYY for the 
first time abandoned mainstream socialist vocabulary and, in contrast to the 
report from its 1982 congress, produced a critical, analytical text outlining its 
position and mapping out the socio-political state of affairs. The period before 
and after the congresses was characterised by a partial fulfillment of the long-
argued for change in the role of the youth organisation as a mere observer and 
passive participant in the system. Silvija Žugić-Rijavec, the only female 
President of the LSYY in the 1980s, signaled this change and the subsequent 
reactions on behalf of the state and Party organs in her speech at the 27th 
session of the Central Committee of the LCY in March 1986, when she accused 
certain forces within the League of Communists of acting in a ‘paternalistic’ 
manner not only towards the youth organisation, but also toward other socio-
political organisations:  
‘As long as the youth organisation dealt only with different actions and 
demonstrations, apart from criticisms addressed to the League of Socialist 
Youth, there were no other problems. Since the XI congress and 
especially during the preparations for the XII congress, we emphasised 
the demand for democratisation of the relations within the youth 
organisation, for its vertical independence […] But, certain problems and 
conflicts have already appeared [because of that].’447  
 
Although the official discourse still revolved around the paradigm of 
responsible self-management, the formal report of the 1986 federal congress 
addressed certain concerns in a straightforward manner: ‘The animosity which 
the young generation rightly feels towards the bureaucratised “all-political 
representatives” would soon be interpreted as a refusal of socialist self-
management’.448 The report abounds in calls to ‘de-bureaucratise’ the youth 
organisation and society and in attacks on the ‘bureaucratic-technocratic 
ideology’ and the ‘youth bureaucracy’. Interestingly, the report begins with a 
quote by Edvard Kardelj which reads as an attempt to relativise the superiority 
of socialism: ‘Socialism cannot preserve the aureole of historical 
                                                 
446
 Siniša Dimitrijević, ‘Socijalizam sinova ili socijalizam očeva’, Polet 347, 11.4.1986, p.4.   
447
 Ibid. 
448
 Predlog dokumenti dvanaestog kongresa, p.71.  
187 
 
progressiveness only because it is called socialism in name, but only if it 
increasingly expands the dimensions of his [the working man’s] freedom and 
democracy in society’.449 The federal level of the LSYY argued that new political 
forms were needed to keep the country up to date with contemporary 
technological developments: ‘to the challenges and demands [encountered] at 
the point of transition into the era of informatics, microeletronics, robotics, i.e. 
the third scientific-technological revolution, [the socio-political organisations] 
responded with weapons from the past’ and that ‘in a system where decisions 
about the most important questions of social development are mainly made in 
two ways – through the state and the party, there is no space for the 
development of the youth organisation as an independent political subject.’450 
The congress program also announced the incipient changes in the 
organisation and functioning of the LSYY, by targeting the ‘subjective forces 
[which] compile lists of societal changes without doing much to change 
themselves’ and expressing a commitment toward ‘radical change of the means 
of [our] struggle – the [youth] organisation itself’.451 This commitment began to 
materialise with a marked change in the vocabulary of some of the official youth 
representatives – such as the already quoted statement by its President from 
1987 that the inclusion of the new social movements is necessary, as well as 
the debate on the Youth Baton which culminated in its abolishment in early 
1988. The former was in line with the 1986 congress materials’ call for the 
‘creation of space’ within the youth organisation for the women’s, the peace, the 
ecological and other ‘progressive movements’. An attempt on the part of the 
federal leadership of the LSYY to somehow reconcile and acknowledge the 
different grievances and visions is visible not only in the congress documents, 
but also in the subsequent attempts to strike a balance between those who 
sought radical change and those who argued for minimal change or the 
preservation of the existing norms and practices.  
The different republican branches espoused ‘change’ within what was 
seen as a flexible institutional and political framework which had already 
undergone several constitutional changes and was susceptible to yet another 
reform. Yugoslav socialism had to be reformed, but not entirely abandoned. 
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However, the way change was embraced and articulated differed significantly 
between Slovenia, for instance, and Macedonia or Serbia. Although certain 
individuals among the new Macedonian youth leadership who were elected at 
the 1986 congress of the Macedonian LSY would become vocal opponents of 
the regime and the status quo after 1988 and would shift their rhetoric and 
demands to match their Slovenian counterparts, the 1986 congress materials 
bear witness to an organisation which had not significantly departed from its 
previous congress framework. Although the congress was hailed as a congress 
of ‘unity, action and change’ and voiced most of the already established 
complaints such as youth unemployment, careerism, insufficient inclusion of the 
young in the delegate system and calls for effective ‘de-bureacratisation’, the 
congress stage was adorned with the slogan ‘On Tito’s path – in Tito’s manner’ 
[На титовиот пат титовски].452 The Serbian LSY similarly organised its 
1986 congress under the banner of ‘change’ [Мењајмо да нас не промене]. 
Zoran Anđelković, the President of the Serbian LSY, concluded his speech by 
reiterating how indispensable change was: ‘This congress must be a congress 
of change […] Let’s change the relationships within our organisation – let’s 
make it more democratic, more open, more courageous […] Let’s change those 
who oppose change.’453 However, besides talking about the main problems 
facing the youth, he also referred to the ‘forced emigration of Serbs and 
Montenegrins from Kosovo’ as ‘the biggest political problem in the country’.454              
Thus, under the aegis of reform and change, 1986 saw the beginning of 
what would become an irreversible process of fragmentation of the LSYY. The 
Slovenian LSY launched more concrete demands which were articulated as 
slogans and printed on stickers on the occasion of its 1986 congress. 
Demanding the democratisation of political culture, a more genuine worker’s 
democracy and freedom of speech, it also hinted at the inherited, rigid forms 
from the past by outlining that ‘we are not primarily interested in the “internal 
and the external” enemy, but in the democratic self-managing decision-making 
which advances social development, because we want to live in the present that 
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we will co-create.’455 The concluding remarks of the speech of the President of 
the Slovenian LSY read as a generational manifesto: 
‘For us there is no way back. A way back is a way to a slow, but certain 
death. It is a departure towards historical oblivion. We want to be a 
generation which decides and not only obeys. We want to be a generation 
of knowledge, new technology, flexible and effective economy, we want to 
be a generation of open culture and social fantasy, a generation which is 
allowed to think with its own head and express those thoughts freely, a 
generation which is not and will not be satisfied with what had already 
been achieved; in brief, we want to be a generation of freedom and 
human dignity.’456 
      
Although the core of the 1986 congress program of the Slovenian LSY 
dealt with domestic issues, Zoran Thaler (born 1962), former activist in the 
LSYS and later a member of the Liberal Party, the Slovenian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and an MEP, underlined the importance of the international context and 
in particular the political developments in Eastern Europe: 
L: How did ZSMS conceive of the 1986 platform? 
 
I think one should consider the global context. Solidarity and the putsch 
on 13 December 1981 in Poland had a big impact upon me, my 
generation. I had just returned from the military and I remember well that 
during the first year at University I wore a Solidarity badge […] I organised 
an action of sending post cards to Jaruzelski […] We were also fascinated 
by the 1972 student movement. At that time the ‘Library of revolutionary 
theory’ [Knjižnica revolucionarne teorije - KRT] appeared […] There, a 
book was published on the student movement 1968-1972 and it was a 
revelation for us […] The main weapon was irony, sarcasm, cynicism […] 
[The congress in] Krško was a litmus for the new time. It was also a 
resistance against the militarisation which developed after the 1981 
Kosovo riots.  
  
Some of the new political stances articulated by some members of the 
Youth League in the late 1980s transcended the mainstream (conservative vs. 
reformist/liberal) discourse. After 1986, as it was becoming clear that the 
ideological status quo was no longer tenable, different voices began to invade 
the political realm. Parts of the youth sphere demonstrated a relatively high 
degree of openness, creativity and imagination, as ideas ranged from 
democratic multi-party federalism, liberal democracy or hybrid variations of 
democratic socialism, as shown in this 1988 statement by Miha Kovač:   
'We, in the circles around Mladina and the alternative movements, argue 
that you can have both economic and political democracy. We believe 
that self-management shoud remain as the institution of enterprise 
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democracy, only the political bureaucracy should be removed from power 
– which could be accomplished by changes in the electoral system and by 
the creation of free trade unions, etc... Our idea is to change this body 
(the Chamber of Socio-Political Organisations) into a democratic political 
assembly, without any leading role for the party. It would be elected 
directly, not on the basis of a classical multiparty system – which we think 
would be a regression – but on the basis of citizens organizing 
themselves in various political movements expressing various 
interests’.457 
 
In the same interview Kovač asserted that the position of the Slovenian 
LC of not being interested in propagating democratisation for all Yugoslavia - a 
position which might lead to a confederation or establishment of independent 
states - is ‘neither desired nor realistic’. This not only shows that the range of 
alternatives for filling the increasingly unstable and withering ideological space 
was immense, but also that this polyphony of political visions for the future of 
the institutional set-up could easily implode or turn into a cacophony. 
Against this background, the LSYY increasingly became involved in 
wider societal issues and in new debates over rights and citizens. It 
progressively abandoned the older rhetoric of socialist self-management from 
1988 onwards. In particular, certain branches became involved in rethinking the 
role of the citizen within socialism and drew on newly emerging political 
languages of human rights. One example was a decision of the LSYY from 
1988 to open up a public debate on the subject of ‘The liberties, rights and 
duties of the man and citizen in the socio-political system of the SFRY’. The 
project was meant to ‘bring to the surface a range of questions about the non-
conflictual character of Yugoslav society’, noting that the ‘sanctioning of the 
duties in our, as in many other societies, is far more developed than the respect 
and the advancement of human rights…’458 The numerous affairs, incidents, 
and instances of popular unrest which occurred during 1987 and 1988 and 
required intervention by the police acted as the impetus for the youth 
organisation to use the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights for initiating the debate. The numerous strikes, 
protest marches and the intervention of the police were said to have raised the 
awareness about citizens’ rights, about their violation and ‘the need for their 
development and advancement in our country, which implied a rupture with the 
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old way of thinking about the once-and-for-all given and guaranteed rights and 
the perfection of the existing system and state of affairs.’459 The Presidency of 
the LSYY commissioned two young legal scholars – Goran Svilanović460 (born 
1963) and Vojislav Stanimirović (born 1964) to write short summaries on the 
state of human rights and freedoms in Yugoslav constitutional and criminal law 
and offer recommendations. The shorts texts they produced, where ‘verbal 
crime’ article 133 and the freedom of thought and expression were pinpointed 
as needing urgent attention and amending, were to serve as initial basis for a 
wider debate.  
This particular example illustrates a crucial shift in the way the LSYY 
envisioned its social and political role, as well as in the very form and content of 
its politics and engagement both in the youth realm and in the wider public 
sphere. The shift away from the dominant vocabulary of self-
management/pluralism of self-managing interests and a shift towards an 
interest in human rights and freedoms were certainly not the result only of an 
internally generated debate. It should be observed within the contemporary 
context of the various citizens’ initiatives and groups which converged around 
different demands framed in the discourse of human rights.461 Yet, as a formal 
institution and part of the political system, the Youth League acknowledged the 
existence of serious human rights violations and by putting the burden of 
responsibility on the state organs and discarding ‘the old way of thinking’ which 
saw the existing system as perfect, it symbolically initiated the severing of ties 
with its long-time senior political sibling.  
 
4.2. 1988 – a point of no return 
 
The period 1987-1988 has been embedded in political histories, which 
tend to focus on elite stories around the ascent of Slobodan Milošević, the rise 
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of Serbian nationalism under the guise of what has been termed ‘ethno-
technocratic populism’462 and the internal splits within the Serbian LC. Mass 
workers’ protests which wrapped their discontent with the socio-economic 
situation in the classical symbols of Yugoslav socialism, additional austerity 
measures, protests of the Kosovo Serbs, the resignation of the Montenegrin 
leadership, the dismissal of the Kosovan-Albanian leadership, the ‘yoghurt 
revolution’ in Vojvodina, the ‘trial of the four’ in Ljubljana and the subsequent 
protests, were some of the events which posit 1988 in historical, but also in 
subjective, autobiographical terms as the turning point in recent Yugoslav 
history.463 This section addresses an unexplored question of how this impacted 
on activists and the local republican youth realms. It seeks to bring to light the 
diversity of experiences and offer a perspective on the 1988 events ‘from 
below’. Indeed, nearly all interviewees maintained that 1988 was the turning 
point and this was particularly prominent among those who happened to be 
based in Belgrade at the time. Moreover, the events of 1988 had real impact on 
the tone of debates within the youth sphere, as this moment shifted discourse, 
limited the scope of what was possible in terms of change and reform and 
forced the different republican LSYs to take new positions.   
The political crisis which began to throw Yugoslavia’s existence into 
question brought the Youth League and its media outlets into the debate. The 
events which were unfolding with an ever increasing speed initiated a process 
of fragmentation along republican lines, but also a convergence across national 
lines. The rifts became more visible as the ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ was 
gaining momentum and the debate on the constitutional changes which sought 
to restore the political and judicial powers of Serbia proper over its provinces 
was nearing its end. Different republican LSYs began to take divergent 
positions. The Serbian LSY openly sided with the Serbian Party when in 1988 it 
launched a propaganda campaign in support of the Serbian constitutional 
amendments, calling on the young to vote at the referendum and to express 
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support for the republic’s leaders.464 Furthermore, it progressively appropriated 
the official political discourse on Kosovo - among other things advocating a new 
‘population politics which will lead to the decrease in birthrates’.465 The decision 
of the Montenegrin youth officials to side with the protesters and join in their 
demands for the resignation of the old Montenegrin political leadership could be 
interpreted in a twofold manner: both in light of the previously upheld rhetoric on 
‘de-bureacratisation’, and as a pragmatic choice in advancing their career 
prospects.466 As a response to the act of aligning of the Serbian LSY with the 
politics of Slobodan Milošević and of the Serbian League of Communists, the 
LSY of Vojvodina launched its own set of materials, a document entitled ‘For 
Yugoslavia – my country’ [Za Jugoslaviju – moju domovinu]. The demands the 
material posed were more or less those which would later be upheld by the new 
liberal/reformist camp across the LSYY: abolishment of the national economies 
and introduction of a market economy, opening up of Yugoslavia for foreign 
investment and inclusion in the European integration perspectives, 
consolidation of a system of rule of law, accountability of all political bodies, 
direct elections for political positions and a new short, concise and efficient 
constitution fit for a modern polity.467 
These events could only aggravate the already fragile consensus which 
was built upon a loosely defined need for change. They also induced an 
atmosphere where it was difficult for individuals and the Youth Leagues to stay 
neutral. The polarisation at federal level between Serbia and Slovenia (primarily 
over Kosovo and the political restructuring of the federation) the following year 
further destabilised the political structure of which the Youth League was part. 
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The ‘particular system of conflict regulation and social integration through 
devolution’468 was called into question by Serbia’s demands for re-centralisation 
and revision of the autonomy of the provinces. The federal level of the Youth 
League could not stay immune to these and the accompanying debates. 
Moreover, an inherited consensus on curbing nationalist discourse - ‘Yugoslav 
communism’s strong antipathy to overt nationalist tactics’469 – began to unravel.   
This moment is mentioned as the central turning point in many 
biographies. It was often linked with changes in urban environment - especially 
in Belgrade. Risto Ivanov (born 1960) was delegated to the LSYY in Belgrade 
from Macedonia during 1986-1988. Ivanov reflected on one prominent division 
which ran along the lines of loyalty vs. competence and the consensus which 
existed among ‘the liberal camp’:  
What is interesting, however, and might be relevant for today is the fact 
that the more liberal camp was dominated by highly educated individuals 
who had some professional experience behind; on the other side, for 
example those who were advancing the politics in Serbia and 
Montenegro, did not have a university degree and entered politics as a 
token of loyalty, not competence. They were easier to control. So, even 
when there were arguments in the organisation, if it was for this other 
camp I call ‘advantage of competence, not loyalty’, it was possible to 
reach an agreement, there was a chance for agreement […] It became 
obvious that loyalty would trump competence and rationality. The seams 
began to break. At the end, everyone went where they came from. So, 
when you came back home [after your mandate], they could easily find 
fault [да те начекаат на нож] and that wasn’t pleasant at all. For 
example, people used to meet me on the street and say: ‘What is it, you 
are plotting something with the Slovenes? You’re trying to please them, 
eh?’ That wasn’t pleasant […] 
The idea at the time was to open up certain spaces and that competent 
individuals come to the fore. But, apparently, the working class paradigm 
was replaced with that of nationalism. One group was simply replaced by 
a different one where the same rules apply – loyalty, not competence. 
That’s when the seams began to break and everyone retreated to their 
own national group - no connecting thread was left. 
 
Rasim Kadić (born 1960) was delegated to the presidency of the LSYY in 
Belgrade in 1986 as a full-time professional employee in the department for 
education and student standards. Kadić became the focus of media attention 
because he publicly labelled Mirko Ostojić - member of the presidency of the 
SAWP as 'a political advocate of Slobodan Milošević in B&H'. He recalled the 
infamous 8th session of the Serbian LC's Central Committee which took place 
in September 1987:    
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            I remember very well when the 8th session of the Central Committee of 
the League of Communists of Serbia was taking place, there was a 
football match Yugoslavia-Italy. It was the first time that instead of 
watching the football game I watched the broadcast. Of course we were 
against Milošević, many of my friends in Serbia were also against that 
rigid form of nationalism backed by the YPA […] After Milošević won, I 
gathered everyone on the 22nd floor, bought them coffee and told them – 
‘Guys, this is my farewell coffee, I’m going back to Bosnia because this is 
no longer my country’ […] 
The moment Milošević won was that point for me. The moment he won I 
was 27. I can’t say I knew, but I could feel intuitively that it was the end. I 
could see it was simply something that can’t be saved […] I could have 
gone for a second mandate in Belgrade, but I left it, I left a girl behind, a 
good salary, privileges, friends […] I almost did not notice that Yugoslavia 
disappeared. Because for me Yugoslavia was not a grand, abstract notion 
[…] For me Yugoslavia was the friends, the people with whom I 
communicated and with whom I still communicate. So, in that sense, 
Yugoslavia did not disappear at all… 
 
Ivanov’s testimony echoes Kadić’s and those of the other youth 
functionaries who worked at the LSYY in Belgrade during the last years of the 
1980s: 
As far as the break-up of Yugoslavia is concerned, I can say that the period 
I spent in Belgrade was the beginning [of the end of Yugoslavia].  
 
L: So, one could sense it? 
 
Yes. It wasn’t anticipated, but the key moment was when Dragiša Pavlović 
was removed from the position of President of the City Committee of the 
Party in Belgrade and from then on one could feel that the whole 
atmosphere began to change […] After that, everything changed. Namely, 
before that, Belgrade was a city that left you fascinated. Whoever went 
there, they felt ‘European’, welcome, the way of life, the communication… 
It literally had the appeal of a world metropolis. Only few months later it 
became obvious that Belgrade is no longer hospitable to everyone. That 
was the key moment and it later reflected in the youth organisation and all 
other bodies.  
   
A sense of being taken by surprise by the radical change in public 
discourse and in what was considered to be a social and political consensus 
thus far was so prominent precisely because the public display of nationalism – 
in particular of the two ‘big nationalisms’, the Serbian and the Croat – was 
actively discouraged in post-WW2 Yugoslavia and perceived as politically 
incorrect. Dejan Jović located a feeling of ‘uneasiness’ during those years: ‘It’s 
the end of the 1980s - 1986-87-88, when it all began feeling uneasy. [National 
belonging] began to matter. It was shocking for me to hear “Slobo Srbine, Srbija 
je za tebe” [Slobo, you Serb, Serbia is behind you], that concept was completely 
unacceptable and frightening to me.’  
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A sense of ‘shock’ was echoed by interviewees with very different 
backgrounds. Simo Spaskovski told me about his own ‘shock’ when he first saw 
people adorned with ‘chetnik’ symbols on the streets of Belgrade when he 
visited the city on several occasions in 1988 and 1989 while attending lectures 
at the Command-staff academy of the YPA. Miha Kovač, who was doing his 
army service in Serbia in 1987, similarly underlined that he was ‘quite shocked’ 
by the shifts in the Serbian media discourse. His testimony echoes the 
significance of the socio-political consensus which sought to stigmatise and ban 
public manifestations of nationalism through his conviction that anyone who 
espoused such views in public would be dismissed: 
I strongly disliked Milošević, he was a disgusting person for me. I was 
serving the Yugoslav Army in 1987, when he was starting to rise. The 
army was boring for me. They knew that I am a dissident, they knew that I 
am coming from a good socialist family, so they didn’t know exactly what 
to do with me. So, they put me in a warehouse, where I had to take care 
of Party flags and I was basically sleeping there. I spent a lot of time 
reading [Belgrade daily] Politika. I was quite shocked, you know. In the 
letters by the readers appeared letters which were extremely chauvinist 
and nationalistic. When I saw them, after a few weeks I said [to myself] - 
‘They will remove the editor of Politika in a few months’ - because no 
decent Communist Party would allow something like that. But, then, the 
content of these letters started to move to the regular text in the paper. 
So, when I came back from the army I was much more aware than other 
Slovenians about what’s going on in Serbia. My theory was that it was a 
fascist movement […] But then, at a certain point I became very sceptical 
about people who were around [Slovenian journal] Nova revija, who 
claimed that we need national freedom first and democracy second […] If 
you ask common people in Slovenia, they will say – ‘Oh, our state, we 
were dreaming for a thousand years about this.’ But this is bullshit […] For 
a very long time Slovenians were dreaming not about independence, but 
about a more democratic Yugoslavia. The clue about the destruction of 
Yugoslavia is definitely in Belgrade. To put it very simply, Serbs made 
Yugoslavia and Serbs destroyed Yugoslavia. 
 
Indeed, media reports and editorial politics became increasingly 
divergent and irreconcilable.470 In a similar vein, Senad Avdić, the editor-in-chief 
of the federal youth magazine Mladost underlined the fragmentation of the 
media space. He recounted a trip to Kosovo during the Stari trg miner’s strike in 
early 1989. He followed Stipe Šuvar into the mine and had a chance to speak to 
the miners. Avdić recalled the existence of completely disparate media reports 
on the events, claiming that the Serbian one in no way corresponded to what he 
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had actually seen: ‘You’ve got millions of details like that, which are not details, 
but big things […] It told you that some sort of madness had prevailed.’ 
The realm of the youth press was not immune to the radical changes and 
realignments across the political scene. Although the various youth magazines 
naturally differed in their approach, editorial style and the level of boldness and 
critique, the majority of them shared an openly critical attitude towards the 
increasingly aggressive politics of the Serbian LC headed by Milošević. In an 
issue of Bosnian Naši dani, the editorial board of the magazine published a 
letter addressed to Stipe Šuvar, at the time chair of the Party Presidium, 
demanding from him, from the Presidency of the Party’s Central Committee and 
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia ‘a decisive settling of scores with the 
anarcho-nationalist processes threatening to shatter us all into ashes’ - alluding 
to the rise of Serbian nationalism and the mass rallies organised by the Serbian 
Party.471 
The youth media based on the territory of Serbia came under increasing 
pressure in 1988 when the Serbian LC began to purge Serbian media of those 
who were not willing to compromise and adjust their editorial line. Petar 
Janajtović’s testimony is illustrative of these context-specific developments and 
of the change in the manner of navigating the permitted boundaries of public 
critique after 1987: 
Even at the time when [Dragan] Kremer and I were working on the 
‘Rhythm of the heart’, we instated that mode of talking about politics 
through rock ‘n’ roll. We also had a show on the second program of Radio 
Belgrade that was called ‘This is only rock ‘n’ roll’. We started it in 1987. 
When the entire madness with Milošević began, the focus was on the first 
program of Radio Belgrade. The censors hardly ever listened to the 
second program. We were spitting on [Vojislav] Šešelj, on Sloba 
[Milošević], we were playing Rambo [Amadeus], [the song by Croatian 
band Film] ‘E moj druže beogradski’, until they figured it out and threw us 
out. As I said before, through writing and talking about rock ‘n’ roll one can 
talk about anything. Especially when the times are screwed.  
 
Print media were more visible and the youth press experienced 
increasing political pressure. The editorial board of the magazine of the 
students of Belgrade University Student was replaced472 and the Belgrade 
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public prosecutor initiated a case against the magazine of the Maribor students 
in front of the court in Belgrade for a regular supplement entitled ‘Beograjska 
priloga’ [Belgrade supplement]. This was without a precedent, since magazines 
were considered to be within the scope of the regional legislature. But, as the 
Maribor magazine was partially written in Serbo-Croatian and openly critical of 
the Serbian political elite, it was presented as a legitimate target.473 Eventually, 
it was the federal youth magazine Mladost474 which also came under pressures 
from the Serbian LC. The pressures were channeled through by youth 
functionaries who were simultaneously active in the federal Youth League and 
in the Serbian Party.  
In 1987 Mladost was voted ‘youth magazine of the year’ under the 
editorial leadership of Vlastimir Mijović (born 1956). Although officially the 
magazine of the LSYY, it pursued a rather independent editorial policy and did 
not hesitate to encourage critical writing. For instance, in 1986 it published a 
‘dossier’ on the initiatives for conscientious objection and the peace movement, 
while Mijović in his editorials openly targeted the LSYY and its leadership, 
arguing that ‘It is necessary, first of all, to say openly that the Yugoslav youth 
has an incompetent, sloppy, self-sufficient and in some cases unfair/foul 
leadership’.475 Mijović was not granted a second 2-year mandate and after the 
legally prescribed six-month period of ‘acting editor’ expired, the procedure for 
the appointment of a new editor was purposefully administratively delayed or 
hampered. ‘In whose interest is it to obstruct the federal youth magazine?’, 
asked the editorial staff of Mladost.476 They pointed to the secretary of the 
presidency of the LSYY – Zoran Anđelković, an active member of the Serbian 
LC: ‘In this case, it seems, what is decisive is pure political (ill) will of the organs 
of the LSYY who, by the way, are often manipulated by their most senior 
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political functionaries’.477 This was a clear allusion to the top echelons of the 
Serbian LC and its leader Slobodan Milošević. The editorial staff and other 
youth magazines also raised the question of why the Youth League through 
Anđelković (and some other functionaries such as Goran Milinović and Milan 
Janjić) sought an advisory opinion on the matter from the Serbian Committee 
for Information and not from the corresponding federal body.478 It was Avdić 
who succeeded Mijatović as editor. However, he also located the break-up of 
the common professional and socio-political space during that period: ‘I 
experienced [the break-up of Yugoslavia] two or three years before it actually 
happened. I experienced it in Belgrade […] As an editor of a federal magazine, I 
tried to reflect all type of interests - republican, provincial, so that no one had 
monopoly […]’ Thus, Mladost and Student were in a pool of media that came 
under pressures reflecting the new realignments on the volatile Yugoslav 
political scene, as Milošević ‘simultaneously extended personal influence over 
the most influential media and shifted their supervision from the City to the 
Central Committee […]’479  
The narrative that Belgrade was changing beyond recognition in those 
years might have been reinforced by the subsequent events and the role of 
Serbia in the Yugoslav wars. Yet, individuals from different parts of the country 
and with very different biographies tend to share a similar sense of a major 
rupture and change. Indeed, 1988 features as the crucial year in Yugoslav late 
socialism, the ‘point of no return’, where a sense of personal disempowerment 
and disappointment was enhanced by novel, often shocking developments and 
claims made on behalf of individuals, groups and nations. The events of 1988 
caused irreparable rifts at different levels within the LSYY, including the youth 
press. This paved the way for the final debate on the future of the institutional 
youth sphere.     
 
4.3. The demise of the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia 
 
By 1990, many different positions regarding the future of the LSYY were 
put forward. As political debates on the future of the Yugoslav federation were 
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intensifying, the Youth League was not only preoccupied with its own future, but 
also with the future of the entire Yugoslav institutional and political set-up. The 
‘constitutional crisis’480 of the late 1980s, as well as the first multi-party elections 
in 1990 led parts of the LSYY to transform into political parties and effectively 
put an end to the organisation which was founded in 1919 as the youth wing of 
the Yugoslav Communist Party. This section explores the debates concerning 
the future of the LSYY and Yugoslav federalism on the eve of the Yugoslav 
dissolution and seeks to shed light on the process of disintegration of the 
institutional youth sphere. This period saw both the growth not only of political 
and ethnic division within republican LSYs, but also a short-lived process of 
linking up across national lines – a development which was prematurely 
interrupted by the eruption of violence and the disintegration of the state.   
In July 1989, the LSYY took part in the international youth gathering in 
Paris organised as one of the events to commemorate the 200th anniversary of 
the French revolution. Each of the republican branches saw the international 
context of the event as an ideal space for promoting its program or its 
(unofficial) agenda. The Greek youth from the New Democracy party, for 
instance, noted an increasing turn towards nationalism among some Yugoslav 
branches of the Youth League, and found itself provoked by what they saw as 
‘aggressive Macedonian propaganda’ of some of the publications placed on 
display by the Macedonian LSY. However, a report by the Bosnian LSY noted 
that ‘The Yugoslav youth organisation […] was, after all, more united than it 
could be realistically expected, considering the actual and perhaps sometimes 
even dramatic differences which exist in the country.’481 Indeed, the report 
reflected a wider sentiment that the changing nature of Yugoslav socialism 
might require a fundamental rethinking of the ‘common umbrella’ of the LSYY. It 
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stated: ‘The concept, according to which the youth organisation of our country is 
once and for all ideologically determined, [seen] as a logical segment of a false 
conflict-free society, it seems that [such an organisation] definitely belongs to 
the past [...] a homogeneous society, compressed into one ideology in an 
unnatural way cannot be happier than an open and authentically pluralistic 
one.’482 This quote captures the state of the youth institutional realm on the eve 
of the disintegration of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia at its 14th 
extraordinary congress in January 1990483 and the first multi-party elections.  
Branko Greganović, delegate of the Slovenian LSY in Belgrade and the 
next-to-last president of the LSYY was seen as an embodiment of a loosely 
defined 'Yugoslav option': 
I think there was a certain urban environment, an urban circle of people 
who felt Yugoslav not in the national sense, but saw it as an urban idea – 
‘why would I identify as anything else?’ In my case my mixed origin is an 
additional reason, but I think no one saw the Yugoslav identification as 
problematic at the time […] After all, that is something we do not choose, 
you don’t choose your place of birth, the place where you grow up […]  
My Yugoslavism was not a political stance […] Those of us who felt 
Yugoslav in the urban, neutral sense, nationally neutral, although not in 
the sense of being nationally undeclared, but simply civically neutral, we 
did not realise that actually we are the instrument of a certain politics […] 
It was a genuine feeling, healthy vital feeling of belonging to a certain 
space. The rock ‘n’ roll and everything that was going on in the eighties is 
an expression of that […] 
My biggest support came from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, while 
Croatia and Serbia were much more critical towards me personally […] 
What I argued for did not necessarily include the survival of the [Yugoslav] 
state. That should be clear […] At the time, I was perceived as a 
Yugoslav, as a representative of the Yugoslav option, although de facto 
that was never my fundamental goal. The fundamental goal was peace 
[…] So, that perception was context-dependent, rather than a result of my 
own intimate goals and desires. In my own perceptions, I never argued 
that the state must survive, especially not if the price to pay for that 
survival is totalitarianism, war… So, in that sense, I was not ‘the Yugoslav 
option’. I was above all for democratic change and intimately for the 
preservation of peace. Objectively, in that context, it was what it was. One 
can’t run away from what it objectively was.  
 
The demise of the LCY, however, did not result in an immediate 
institutional break up. A reformist, pro-Yugoslav and pro-European political 
platform most ardently represented by federal Prime Minister Ante Marković, 
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was met with considerable approval in the youth realm, especially in the youth 
press. In December 1989, Polet organised a poll where it asked its readers to 
identify the most positive and negative events/individuals in Yugoslavia for 
1989. Slobodan Milošević was voted the most negative, while Ante Marković 
the most positive. The editorial board of the Macedonian youth magazine Mlad 
borec was also asked to cast its vote – it pointed to Slobodan Milošević as the 
most negative and to the program of Prime Minister Marković and his cabinet, 
the successes of the Yugoslav football and basketball national teams, the 
foundation of alternative political organisations, the opening of the first sex shop 
in Zagreb and the federal daily Borba as the most positive.484 Similarly, the 
Bosnian student magazine Valter also maintained that  
‘the promises given by the opposition fighting for power are not realistic 
and can hardly compare to [the Prime Minister’s] achievements so far, 
which have caused - in a completely a-national manner - a level of 
support unseen before. We should not have any doubts that this is a 
period where we’ll see a formal change of government, accompanied by 
strong disillusionment of manipulated voters. Because exclusive anti-
communism does not imply automatic creativity; on the contrary, the 
motives are quite banal and easily recognisable – taking power.’485  
 
This reflected a wider appeal of the reformist (pro-Yugoslav and pro-
European) option among the youth.486 The youth press voiced the widespread 
opinion that the political vacuum is being filled by a new exclusivist, ethno-
national doctrine. Even in Macedonia, where nationalism was rather tame, 
young journalists were warning of the impending dangers. In one of his 
editorials from 1990, the editor-in-chief of Mlad borec, Nikola Mladenov (1964-
2013) targeted the rise of nationalism, both at Yugoslav and local level: ‘As if it 
became a civic duty to propagate national tragedy and vulnerability. In place of 
one collectivity – the class, we are being offered another one – the nation, the 
easiest way of manipulation with the emotions of tomorrow’s voters. The 
propagating of one’s one history – always the most bloody and most difficult – 
hasn’t bypassed us either […]’487   
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The European future for Yugoslavia which was espoused by federal 
Prime Minister Ante Marković indeed struck a chord with the new youth 
leaderships at the end of the 1980s, although the Slovenian youth organisation 
was the most vocal on the matter. Zoran Thaler was responsible for the sector 
of foreign cooperation at the Slovenian LSY in 1989 and initiated the drafting of 
a ‘European declaration’: ‘In four points we determined what we are and what 
Europe means for us. Namely, that we are citizens of Europe and that we have 
had enough of the economic crisis and the inter-tribal conflicts and of the 
isolation of Yugoslavia from its natural historical surroundings and that we 
demand that Yugoslavia joins Europe’.488 The fact that Thaler declared a ‘liberal 
socialist’489 could be partially explained by the argument that in the late stages 
of European socialism, liberalism became synonomous with a political system 
responsive to pluralism, respect for human rights, equality before the law and 
rule of law, and ‘for the majority of the people in East-Central Europe it was 
closer to what in the West has come to be called social liberalism’.490 Azem 
Vllasi, who presided over the LSYY between 1974 and 1978, emphasised in his 
testimony that even in the second half of the 1970s,  
… We nurtured the seed of social democracy. At times we even ridiculed 
the rigid, communist idea and the way the generation of our parents or the 
members of the veterans’ organisation defended the League of 
Communists as something eternal […] One can say that the seed of the 
social-democratic idea almost everywhere in the former Yugoslavia was 
born within the youth organisation.           
 
The platform of the federal Prime Minister also overlapped with that of 
the anti-regime pro-Yugoslav intellectuals who gathered around UJDI (the 
League for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative).491 Sarajevo-based Valter, for 
instance, published lengthy interviews with almost all of the prominent members 
of UJDI: from Predrag Matvejević, Rudi Supek, and Branko Horvat, to Shkëlzen 
Maliqi and Zagorka Golubović.492 UJDI had a trans-generational appeal and 
activist core and its civic-based, pro-democratic and pro-Yugoslav platform 
struck a chord with numerous young activists, be it from the media or the 
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political realm. For instance, at the helm of the Kosovan branch of UJDI formed 
in December 1989 stood the twenty-eight year old journalist Veton Surroi (born 
1961).493 Considering the fact that the political space by 1990 had become 
considerably fragmented, even pan-Yugoslav initiatives such as UJDI had 
different local specificities which stemmed from the particular political context of 
the federal republics. Minutes from a meeting of the leadership of the Bosnian 
LSY, for instance, reveal that the meeting and cooperation with some of them 
was seen as problematic.494 Senad Pećanin recalled this period of forming new 
political alliances:  
Of course we cooperated with UJDI – with Puhovski, Horvat, Žarko Korač, 
Vesna Pešić, Grebo… Crazy [Zdravko] Grebo had posters printed with the 
inscription ‘People’s Liberation Movement – we will die together’ and him, 
Peđa and I were putting up these posters just before the war, at 2-3 am. 
HDZ and SDA had the slogan ‘We will live together’, so we went out that 
night and flooded the walls around the city with the posters – ‘PLM-we will 
die together’. 
 
Rasim Kadić credited the ‘tolerant’ and democratic character of UJDI’s 
politics and brought up the ‘non-partisan’ character of the organisation: 
UJDI was one noble idea of noble, highly educated, tolerant, 
democratically oriented people, but numerically totally insignificant […] 
Since we in the LSY had our own space and finances […] we served as a 
kind of logistical base for UJDI in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I remember 
meetings taking place on our premises, conferences […] We once even 
invited [Serbian nationalist politician] Vuk Drašković […] Why was UJDI 
important? Because it was a non-pretentious form [which allowed] for the 
hearing of a different opinion […] It was the answer of smart people to the 
situation in which we found ourselves […] We were somehow caught in 
between the non-partisan, non-political character of UJDI and our own 
ambitions to become a political party. That is why I could not really find my 
place, but I still think we were of some use for that idea […] Of course it 
was clear that Yugoslavia can’t exist without any of its parts. Let’s be 
frank, that was one wicked game of the Slovenians and Milošević, where 
Milošević was acting as if he was trying to keep Slovenia in […] while the 
Slovenes were playing the game eager to leave and pass the problems 
down south […] No matter how liberal they were, they were nationalist.495 
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In the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the LCY, 
reforming the Yugoslav institutional and political framework became an 
imperative. A view which saw the Socialist Alliance of Working People as the 
initial framework where political reform should commence was shared across 
the youth sphere.496 For instance, it was espoused by the Bosnian LSY, which 
maintained that a sudden shift from a mono-party to a multi-party system could 
be dangerous and even ruinous. Hence, it was argued that there should be a 
transitory period until the adoption of a new constitution: ‘Potential solutions 
should be sought after in the independence of the existing socio-political 
organisations, their autonomy, the systemic reform of the SAWP which must 
become a modern pluralist organisation in the framework of which all the 
political interests of its existing and new members and parts could be 
articulated’.497 Miha Kovač, as a member of UJDI, represented the moderate 
line which did not put Slovenian idependence from Yugoslavia over the priority 
of democratisation. Two decades later, he sees it as their attempt at the time to 
sideline the hard-liners: 
You must understand that what I thought in those days was that the best 
solution is parliamentary democracy. But, in the Yugoslav context, we 
were thinking how to make this move slow enough in order to crush the 
hard-liners, who were much stronger in Belgrade and in the Yugoslav 
Army than in Slovenia or in Zagreb. So, the idea was to use the Socialist 
Union [SAWP] as a kind of a democratising movement […]                                
On the other hand, I somehow liked Yugoslavia, because it was a crazy 
mess of very different cultures. And I actually felt very good when I was 
talking in Sarajevo or in Zagreb or in Belgrade with the people of my kind. 
And I saw Yugoslavia as a kind of a small picture of Europe […] So, I had 
this theory that if Yugoslavia is going to fail, then, at a certain point, 
Europe will fail too. So, I became close to some people in Zagreb and 
Belgrade [from UJDI] who thought about how to democratise and at the 
same time preserve Yugoslavia.  
 
The loosely defined framework of Europeanisation and democratisation 
for Yugoslavia appeared acceptable to the majority who were active in the Youth 
League and in the media at the end of the 1980s. Nowadays, however, in 
retrospective testimony one finds a high level of disapproval of Ante Marković’s 
politics, mainly in light of his indecisiveness via-à-vis Milošević and the hard-
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liners within the Army. Rasim Kadić’s opinion evokes a particular Bosniak 
perspective, reflective of a sense of disillusionment and betrayal:  
Ante Marković is a noble man, modern and very important in the history of 
Bosnia and he did what he did from the noblest and best of reasons. But, 
the consequences of what he did are catastrophic for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, terrible, immeasurably terrible […] We trusted him like small 
children […] That’s why Ante Marković is one of the biggest malefactors of 
Bosnia […] He totally neutralised us, pacified us, misled us, did nothing to 
help us […] and did not want to speak until they invited him at the 
[International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia in] Hague. So, he didn’t 
even want to speak against Milošević, after [the genocide in] Srebrenica 
[…] Regardless of the fact that he had noble, good intentions and ideas 
[…]  
 
Zoran Thaler shared a similar type of critique:   
As far as Marković is concerned, he formed the wrong alliance in the key 
moments. He had a chance to form an anti-Milošević coalition with the 
support from Washington and Brussels, and he didn’t […] Lončar and 
Marković were in the position to bring Yugoslavia into the EU in a very 
short time […] The old-fashioned ideological camp prevented them from 
undertaking radical reforms.  
 
By the end of 1989 there was a consensus among the majority of the 
republican branches of the LSYY that the organisation needed to undergo 
fundamental reforms, while the youth media did not shy away from portraying it 
as ‘a sinking ship’.498 Zoran Kostov, currently university professor of journalism 
and media, was editor-in-chief of the main student magazine in Macedonia and 
active member of the LSY. As he put it, 
The big difference between the federal youth organisation and the other 
federal bodies is that the former went through a controlled dissolution. It 
dissolved consensually […] ‘Dissolution’ perhaps is not even the right 
term. The federal Youth League went through a controlled process of 
transformation.  
 
The widespread recognition that the LSYY could not continue in its current 
framework was reflected in the fact that at the beginning of 1989 the federal 
level of the LSYY initiated a ‘public debate’ [javna rasprava] about the main 
principles of its Statute.499 That meant opening up a discussion which 
foreshadowed fundamental changes to the mission and the aims of the 
organisation. In June 1989, the LSYY published an edited volume consisting of 
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the summaries of the discussions and conclusions in the different branches of 
the League (for a more detailed overview, see Table 4). In addition to their 
views on the future of the organisation, the local Youth Leagues also outlined 
their visions of the future of the Yugoslav political system. Although nominally all 
of the republican branches of the LSYY referred to the democratisation of the 
organisation and that of the state as the sine qua non of any future statute or 
constitutional change and a new political agreement, the views were diverging. 
The debate unfolded, sandwiched between two extremes: that the organisation 
should be immediately abolished because it had ceased to function at a local 
level (in particular after the abolishment of the Youth Day relay), on the one 
hand,500 and that it should keep its socialist orientation, on the other. Whilst 
there was seemingly still a shared language around terms such as democracy, 
pluralism, rule of law, accountability, and free elections, the implication of these 
terms meant very different things to different groups and individuals. One of the 
major points of contention was the ‘generational’ character of the LSYY. Voices 
which questioned the generational principle of political organisation were most 
prominent in Slovenia, Croatia, as well as in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For instance, 
in 1989 Rasim Kadić was elected president of the Bosnian LSY with a program 
which proposed the creation of a completely new youth organisation, rather 
than its reform: ‘Do we need a political organisation on a generational principle 
at all? Political organisations of the generational type are very rare in the 
world’.501 The Bosnian, Croatian and the Macedonian LSYs argued for ‘an 
interest-based’ organisation with voluntary membership, proposing an 
abandoning of the hierarchical model in favour of a network-based one, 
independence and abolishment of the ‘paternalistic’ role of the League of 
Communists. Within this camp there was a consensus that the LSYY in its 
present conception (as a socio-political organisation and a mass, unitary and 
educational organisation) and form is obsolete. This view was not shared by the 
LSY in the YPA, the Serbian and the Montengrin LSYs. Although the Serbian 
LSY maintained that the new youth organisation should be liberated from 
‘programatic dogmas’, it also argued that the new Youth League should 
preserve its socialist orientation and should not be organised on 
national/republican basis. The latter stood in stark contrast with the demand of 
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the Slovenian LSY that the Youth League should not strive for ‘unity’, as it 
expressed its disapproval of the role of the ‘conference’ as an arbiter and a 
‘supranational body’. The views of the different LSYY branches on the future of 
Yugoslav socialist federalism similarly differed and could be said to reflect the 
views of the respective republican leaderships. For instance, the Serbian502 and 
the Montenegrin LSYs argued for ‘socialist political pluralism’ and the YPA’s 
Youth League for ‘pluralism of self-managing interests’. The Macedonian LSY 
did not entirely abandon the socialist framework and advanced a vision of ‘multi-
programmatic political pluralism’503, while the Slovenian LSY advocated 
‘complete affirmation of political pluralism’ and parliamentary democracy.504     
Indeed, the debates about the new statute and role of the LSYY became 
overshadowed by the more narrow republican debates on how to reorganise the 
Youth League, particularly as the republican congresses used to precede the 
federal one in the Yugoslav political calendar. A sense of new beginning and 
enthusiasm was prevalent as the republican branches of the LSYY embarked 
on the preparations for their last congresses in 1990. For example, the video 
clip for the last congress of the Macedonian Youth League had the slogan ‘Let’s 
make the world ours [Да го направиме светот наш] and featured an egg on 
a naked actress – as a symbol of a new beginning, according to Risto Ivanov. 
He explained that in the Macedonian tradition the egg is also put on ill, wounded 
spots of the body and the intention was to symbolically convey the message of 
detecting the existing anomalies and exposing the ‘naked’ truth. Moreover, the 
leadership of the Macedonian LSY repeatedly expressed sympathies and 
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support for ‘the Slovenian orientation’, whilst also insisting on the significance of 
a vaguely civic, as opposed to an ethno-national concept of political 
organisation. Olivera Trajkovska, now a well-known journalist, was then 
presiding over the city of Kumanovo LSY branch. In an interview from 1990, she 
summarised this attitude: ‘I still perceive Yugoslavia from Sežana to Gevgelija 
and I don’t understand the Slovenian orientation as an attack on Yugoslavism. It 
might be an attack on our understanding of Yugoslavism, but, nevertheless, that 
is an absolutely legitimate option […] The program of the RC LSYM is not 
burdened by the nation, it does not offer national salvation in any respect and 
reasons in a completely different way…’505  
In Croatia, related symbolism emerged as the Youth League chose a 
stork for its pre-congress marketing materials (see Annex 3) and promoted 
‘pluralism, tolerance, compromise and creativity’.506 The message reflected the 
‘liberal’ values it stood for, as Dejan Jović pointed out:  
If you look at the posters for the last congress, you’ll see a stork, which 
was the symbol of that congress […] He [Srećko Pantović] made versions 
[of the poster] with four messages – tolerance, freedom, justice, 
something like that. And when you look at them, they are generally 
speaking liberal values. That was the direction. After all, that was a 
pluralistic organisation which was not nationalist, wasn’t Yugoslav, wasn’t 
an organisation which aspired to state-building […] The organisation was 
really divided into two – the liberal camp and the ‘state’ one. Many people 
from that state apparatus camp later joined the national parties, the police, 
the intelligence services […]  
 
Some republican Youth Leagues used the congress to announce a more 
consolidated platform. At its congress in Portorož in 1989, the Slovenian LSY 
put forward the slogan which followed its original acronym: ZSMS - Za Svobodo 
Mislečega Sveta [For freedom of the thinking world/For freedom-minded world]. 
At his opening speech, Jožef Školč - the president of the organisation targeted 
‘the language of new Serbian communism’, and announced the transformation 
of the LSYS into a political party ‘as a responsible and clearly articulated 
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integral part of the Slovenian and Yugoslav political scene’.507 The change was 
reflected in the amended Statute which described the Slovenian Youth League 
as an ‘independent, open political and social organisation and part of the youth 
political movement’. In addition, the Congress program documents emphasised 
the demand for the end of ‘political monism’.508  
The new leadership of the Macedonian youth at the end of the 1980s 
also embraced a spectrum of liberal concepts and values. Like Rasim Kadić in 
Bosnia, Risto Ivanov, the last president of the Macedonian LSY from 1988 until 
1991, represented ‘a moderate liberal option’, according to Kostov’s testimony. 
He enjoyed considerable popularity for his support of change and what were 
considered at the time non-conventional values and political practices. 
Slobodan Najdovski (born 1961) worked at the LSYY in Belgrade from 1986 
until 1988 in the agro-industrial sector. He later joined the successor-party of 
the LSYM, which later became the Liberal Party. He located the germination of 
the processes of democratisation within the political elite of the Youth League 
and in particular with the leadership of Ivanov. It is telling that, yet again, the 
‘Slovenian’ demands became established as the model against which 
progressive politics was measured. For instance, the Macedonian Youth 
League also adopted a new acronym for the title of the organisation similar to 
the above-named Slovenian one: ‘LSYM: Freedom for creation, thought and 
change’ [ССММ – Слобода за создавање, мислење и менување]:    
Risto brought in new freshness and the Slovenian wave significantly 
impacted on the [Macedonian] youth organisation […] Risto gathered 
many professionals and he was more popular than [politician] Vasil 
Tupurkovski […] I think that the conception of democracy in Macedonia 
unfolded within that core of the youth organisation which demanded 
societal changes. 
 
The Slovenian LSY was renamed the ‘ZSMS-Liberal Party’ and at the 
first multi-party elections in 1990 it won 12 mandates in the new Slovenian 
Parliament, but remained in opposition against the Government led by the 
DEMOS coalition. While in 1989 the idea of Yugoslavia still figured prominently 
in the Congress documents, at the 14th congress of the ZSMS-LP in 1990, it 
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was Slovenia which was the focus and the principal frame of reference. 
Yugoslavia at that point was perceived and portrayed as a problem that requires 
a solution, albeit in a constructive manner: ‘We believe that it is possible to 
solve the inter-ethnic problems in the Balkans through negotiation; because it is 
in our core interest that those problems are solved, as Slovenia can’t exist 
peacefully with a civil war on its borders, we will cooperate with all those 
political forces in Yugoslavia which would advocate dialogue, tolerance and 
compromise, irrespective of their political orientations’.509 Zoran Thaler 
reiterated the mission of the Slovenian youth organisation intially as one of 
democratisation, where the ‘national question’ did not figure prominently, to one 
of ‘exit from socialism’ as things began to deteriorate at federal level after 1989: 
The national question initially was none of our concern, us – students and 
youth, that was the story of DEMOS and Nova revija 57. What we were 
interested in was democratisation, civil rights, the question of the verbal 
crime, civil service, new social movements, the greens, gay, lesbians, 
death penalty […] When I came back from Belgrade in 1988, the 
atmosphere, the tension was much worse compared to 1986 […] When 
we simplified our program (from 1990) it boiled down to – we no longer 
need the reform of socialism – Gorbachev was popular at the time, 
perestroika and glasnost - we need an exit from socialism.   
 
A somewhat different type of path of institutional transformation was pursued by 
the Macedonian LSY. It eventually had three legal successors: the ‘Young 
democratic progressive party’ [Млада демократска прогресивна странка], 
the Macedonian Youth Council [Младински совет на Македонија] and the 
Student Union [Сојуз на студенти]. After the Slovenian Youth Council 
[Mladinski svet] joined the Council of European National Youth Committees 
(later ‘European youth forum’) in 1991, it was assisting the Macedonian Youth 
Council until it was admitted in 1993. The political successor of the LSYM, 
which later merged with the Liberal Party, went to the first multi-party elections 
as part of Ante Marković’s Alliance of Reform Forces [Savez reformskih 
snaga/Сојуз на реформските сили]. They won five MPs, in addition to the 
nine from the Alliance of Reform Forces, which eventually obtained fourteen 
seats. Ivanov pointed to the importance of the economic platform of the federal 
Prime Minister’s electoral agenda:   
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L: Why did you decide to go with Marković? 
 
Because everything here boiled down to political frustrations. From the 
very beginning of my political engagement my only goal was the 
improvement of the condition of the individual in Macedonia. It could only 
improve through economic measures, not politics. Marković was the one 
who focused the most on that problem […] Secondly, I feared the 
severing of all ties and communication with the rest of the Yugoslav 
space, because in that case it was clear who would dominate here.       
 
New political platforms which echoed the broad demands for 
democratisation and Europeanisation of Yugoslavia similarly marked the 
formation of the Liberal Party (later Liberal-Democratic Party) of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Stemming from the Bosnian LSY, it was originally established in 
1989 as a party under the name SSO-DS (Socialist Youth League – Democratic 
League). During the electoral campaign for the first multi-party elections, they 
went ahead with the slogan ‘liberty, democracy, harmony’.510 In the highly 
fragmented political space in 1990, this platform did not find great support 
among the electorate. Nevertheless, they were aware of the fact that a platform 
based on the sovereignty of the citizen (as opposed to the nation), would not 
attract much support when they rebranded themselves as liberals in 1991. 
Kadić argued that the ‘salvation’ of Bosnia-Herzegovina lies in ‘the beginning of 
the demise of the nation-based political parties.’511 Martin Raguž (born 1958) 
was also one of the leaders of the young Bosnian liberals. He reiterated the 
generational, the trans-national and the civic dimension of their liberal platform:  
‘This attitude of ours has a biological-generational aspect, the fact that we 
were born and brought up without, with very little or at least with an 
insufficient amount of communist indoctrination; also taking into account 
the communication aspect – CNN and MTV. Today we don't want to 
compare ourselves only with what is happenning in this country, but also 
with developments at global level, in any sphere – music, culture, politics, 
sports [...] Of course, we know that our Liberal Party won't become a 
major power in society, as is the case everywhere in the world [...] But, we 
hope that it will be an influential political option [...] which would attract 
those who don't perceive their national belonging as their profession. ’512  
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As late as September 1990, certain individuals and circles within what 
used to be the LSYY still worked on the creation of a new youth body for the 
envisioned democratic, multi-party Yugoslav (con)federation, even after the 
LSYY self-abolished itself at its last federal congress in Ljubljana in 1990.513 
Namely, the Coordination Committee for the establishment of the Yugoslav New 
Forum [Jugoslovenski Novi Forum – JNF], on an old letterhead bearing the logo 
of the LSYY invited all newly established organisations and parties – 
successors of the old Youth League to attend the meeting of the Committee and 
deliver an opinion on the ‘draft codex’.514 The letter also included an invitation 
for a round-table discussion entitled ‘The Yugoslav Community (working title)’ 
[Jugoslovenska zajednica (radni naslov)]. The Yugoslav New Forum was 
envisioned to act as an umbrella organisation, i.e. a ‘programmatic coalition of 
political parties stemming from the former League of Socialist Youth 
organisations’. Among other things, it stated ‘a reaffirmation of the civic status of 
the individual in politics’, ‘preservation of the Yugoslav state as a parliamentary 
republic’; ‘for a realistic and tolerant debate about a confederal arrangement as 
a legitimate proposal during the constituent process’; and ‘a state founded upon 
the sovereignty of the citizen’.515  The majority of the platforms articulated within 
the broad network of the LSYY on the eve of its demise overlapped with the 
ideas and visions put forward by the intellectual and political front of the 
Association for Yugoslav Democratic Alternative (UJDI) and the above-
mentioned party led by federal Prime Minister Ante Marković. This polyphonic 
reformist, pro-democratisation, liberal, pro-European camp envisioned 
Yugoslavia as a democratic (con)federation, part of the European Community.  
Nevertheless, the question remains as to why this generation’s new 
sense of layered citizenship failed to materialise into a viable, pan-Yugoslav 
political alternative at the end of the decade. Indeed, why their political, cultural 
and media activism did not translate into a more coherent and politically 
articulated ‘Yugoslav option’ with the advent of multi-partism at the end of the 
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1980s? The answer is threefold. The first aspect relates to the general context 
and the role of the older generation in the events of the late 1980s, while the 
other two relate more specifically to the generation under scrutiny here. Firstly, 
the answer to the question about the reasons for the Yugoslav Sonderweg516 
could be partially found in the argument about the multi-level crisis. To 
paraphrase the question about why Germany - unlike comparable countries in 
the West and North - turned to fascist and totalitarian perversion: ‘why did 
Yugoslavia - unlike comparable countries such as Czechoslovakia - turn to 
violent conflict and nationalist perversion?’ The thesis that ‘three basic 
developmental problems of modern societies came to the fore at about the 
same time’ and ‘the temporal overlap of and interaction among these three 
crises [formation of a nation-state, constitutional decision on parliamentarisation 
and the social question]’ which led to their incomplete resolution and National 
Socialism, seems equally plausible if transposed to the Yugoslav context. The 
fact that an international and a domestic economic crisis coincided with a 
political/constitutional one at home and a major post-Cold War reconfiguration 
in international relations meant that several critical developments had to be 
handled at the same time by elites belonging to different biological and political 
generations which held very different views on the future. Moreover, the 
individuals who held the real positions and bastions of power and in the second 
half of the 1980s fought hard to bring the ‘republicanisation of Yugoslav 
politics’517 to a definite conclusion, generally belonged to the older, what was 
described as the second dominant Yugoslav generation – the ‘post-war 
generation’, which ‘to a large extent managed to build its own egoism/self-
interest into the social and political system’.518 Andrew Wachtel similarly argued 
that the conflicts and wars throughout the 1990s 'were led, not by the 
generation that grew up on ‘soft’ Yugoslavism from the mid-1950s to the 1970s, 
but by a group who had come of age during or just after the ethnic slaughter 
that had riven the country during World War II’.519 Zoran Thaler echoed this 
view in his testimony by blaming the older generation for the tragic outcome: 
‘Yugoslavia was destroyed by the generation which was 50 at the time, or 
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rather, between 40 and 60 […] None of us was in a position of power so that 
one could seriously do or prevent something.’ 
Secondly, the layered sense of citizenship where the ethno-national and 
the Yugoslav dimensions coexisted harmoniously and complemented each 
other was contingent upon the inherited political consensus and the existing 
social context, where this sense of layered Yugoslavism was encouraged and 
provided with the space to develop and exist as such. Towards the end of the 
1980s, as the prominence of the ethno-national grew in every sphere, the 
tension between these different identities grew as well to the point that the 
multilayered citizenship began to fracture. As I have argued elsewhere, the 
notion of ‘fractured citizenship’ relates to a ‘segmented political life and 
cemented ethno-national identities’, where the fractures could be either healed, 
so to say, or they could deepen and produce a ‘fragmented citizenship with 
more neatly delineated and segregated identities, institutions and forms of 
political and cultural belonging’.520 As it has been shown in this chapter, with the 
pronounced polarisations in the public sphere in the second half of the decade, 
and as the existing Yugoslav political/ideological consensus was being 
destabilised, individuals were compelled to make political choices in a political 
space which was being predominantly realigned along ethno-national lines. 
Moreover, with the disappearance of the League of Communists and the 
abolishement of the League of Socialist Youth at the end of the decade, the 
common political institutional platforms which provided the space for supra-
ethnic convergence and pan-Yugoslav debate, were irretrievably lost.       
Finally, the role the young Slovenes had played throughout the decade in 
pioneering new models of cultural, media and political youth activism proved to 
be critical at the end of the decade as well. As has been underlined on several 
occasions, activists in the other Yugoslav republics took inspiration from and 
often modelled their own activism upon what was unfolding in the Slovenian 
youth realm. However, as it was shown above with regard to the congress 
materials of the Slovenian youth league in 1989-1990, there was a dramatic 
shift in priorities and frames of reference, to the extent that there was an evident 
sense of distancing from the rest of the Yugoslav space. Hence, the 
consolidation of a ‘Yugoslav’ political option at the end of the decade failed 
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mainly because at the critical juncture of 1988-90 it was not pursued by those 
who had been at the forefront of this generation’s political organisation. Instead, 
subsumed by the developments on the Slovenian political scene and the 
growing internal divisions in the youth realm among leftist/liberals and 
conservative nationalists, they shifted their focus on Slovenia and abandoned 
any attempts at forging a pan-Yugoslav alternative. This explains the sense of 
betrayal and disappointment present among the interviewees from Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Rasim Kadić’s testimony is particularly illustrative of a common 
narrative which faults the Slovenian elites for abandoning the project of 
democratisation for the whole of Yugoslavia, for embracing nationalism and 
choosing to step out of the federation without carefully considering all the 
consequences it would entail:    
ZSMS for me were genuine democrats who spoke in a completely new 
manner. I was supporter of that […] Few years later, when Yugoslavia 
really began to disintegrate, I actually realised that all of them generally 
acted primarily as Slovenes and only secondly as liberals, social 
democrats, conservatives [...] At the beginning maybe they were for 
democratisation of Yugoslavia, but since that was impossible with 
Milošević, they quickly transformed their demands into demands for 
independence […] They are my friends, democrats, but nevertheless they 
were nationalist […] Now, Branko Mamula was saying this about them 
from day one. Who was right? (laughs) But, you can’t halt the flow of 
history with force. I was the only politician from Bosnia who, when the 
conflict in Slovenia started, wrote a letter that the Slovenian journey to 
independence can’t be stopped forcefully, that the YPA lost its credibility 
because it acts as a Serb and not as a Yugoslav army and that I 
absolutely oppose the use of force for political aims.  
 
The period from 1986 until 1990 saw a radical change in the way the 
League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia articulated its politics and defined its 
role. From a relatively strong consensus on the need for change and reform 
within the framework of socialist self-management in 1986, after 1987 it was 
caught in the prevailing political debates which worked to polarise Yugoslav 
public opinion. The fragmentation along republican lines simultaneously 
engendered internal de-homogenisation, as the political upheavals in 1988 
forced everyone to take a stand. When the wide anti-regime, anti-bureaucratic 
frame which initially united overlapping demands from industrial workers, 
students and ordinary citizens shrank to the point of accommodating demands 
which were perceived as particular to Serbia and the Kosovan Serbs, the youth 
infrastructure and the shared programmatic goals of the LSYY began to lose 
their cohesiveness. A sense of shock in front of the drastic change in the 
217 
 
publicly acceptable discourse, imagery and the forging of a new ethnocentric 
consensus was present in the majority of the personal memories of those who 
happened to be in Belgrade and Serbia during the last years of the decade. The 
proposed statute changes which came out of the public debate organised by the 
LSSY in 1989 reflected both the gap between the Slovenian, on the one hand, 
and the Serbian, the Montengrin and the YPA youth organisation, on the other, 
but also shed light on a spectrum of shared visions and values which existed 
among the other branches. The particular blend of Serbian nationalism, 
socialism and Yugoslavism espoused by Slobodan Milošević dealt a decisive 
blow to any viable socialist vision. By the end of the decade the ‘pluralism of 
self-managing interests’ was almost entirely replaced by a new discourse which 
experimented with a range of social democratic and liberal concepts and values 
and which foresaw ‘an exit from socialism’, without necessarily envisioning an 
outright exit from Yugoslavia. Democratic, pro-European Yugoslavism remained 
a credible and desirable political framework for most of the activist youth in the 
LSYY and in the youth media who chose not to side with the politics of the new 
ethno-nationally defined parties.            
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Table 4     
League of Socialist Youth of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
• Interest and project-based youth 
organisation 
• Independence and abolishment 
of the 'paternalistic' role of the 
League of Communists 
• Individual accountability and 
responsibility 
• Rule of law and democracy/direct 
elections 
League of Socialist Youth of 
Montenegro 
• For democratic 
socialism/socialist political 
pluralism 
• Against the inter-dependence 
among socio-political 
organistions and the youth 
organisation as a transmission 
belt with regard to the Party 
• The Socialist Alliance of Working 
People as the main platform for 
political pluralism 
League of Socialist Youth of 
Croatia  
• Interest-based organisation 
/abolishment of the classical 
political forms of organisation 
and of the LSY as a socio-
political organisation 
• Decentralisation of the decision-
making process, instead of 
consensual/collective decision-
making 
League of Socialist Youth of 
Macedonia 
• For a socialist legal (not party) 
state/against political 
monopoly/'multiprogramatic 
political pluralism' 
• The Socialist Alliance of Working 
People as the main platform, 
'political parliament'  
• An interest-based youth 
organisation, instead of 
exclusively territory-based 
• Abandoning of the hierarchical 
model in favour of a network-
based one 
• Voluntary membership 
• The definition of the LSY as 
mass, unitary and educational 
organisation is no longer tenable 
League of Socialist Youth of 
Slovenia 
• The League of Communists 
should become one of many 
political parties/parliamentary 
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democracy 
• 'Complete affirmation of political 
pluralism' 
• Nationalism as a consequence of 
the inadequate political system 
• Depolitisation of all state 
organs/decentralisation of federal 
institutions 
• Optional political convergence at 
federal level 
• European accession  
• The youth organisation should 
not strive for 'unity' and its 
'conference' should give up on 
the role of ultimate arbiter and a 
'supranational body' 
League of Socialist Youth of 
Vojvodina 
• The LSY lacks legitimacy 
• For democratic socialism/rule of 
law/federative union of equals 
citizens 
• The new Youth League as an 
independent political 
organisation 
League of Socialist Youth of 
Serbia  
• The LSY as a pale copy of the 
other socio-political organisations 
• The new youth organisation 
should be liberated from 
'programatic dogmas' 
• For 'socialist political 
pluralism'/one citizen-one vote 
• The new Youth League should 
preserve its 'socialist' 
orientation/abolish the 'congress' 
• It should not allow convergence 
on national basis 
• Socialist, federative, non-aligned 
Yugoslavia 
League of Socialist Youth in the 
YPA 
• The main principles outlined in 
the Statute should not be 
changed, only supplemented 
• 'Pluralism of self-managing 
interests' 
• The Youth League should remain 
a unitary organisation, 'open and 
democratic' 
• Differences and divisions should 
not be 'glorified or absolutised' 
  
*Adapted from Igor Lavš (ed.), Prilozi iz javne rasprave o opštim načelima Statuta SSOJ 
(Belgrade: Predsedništvo Konferencije SSOJ, 1989). 
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Conclusion: Rethinking youth politics and culture in late 
socialist Yugoslavia: the lens of the last Yugoslav generation 
 
Moja prva i najveća želja bi bila da se probudim  
i da ustanovim da je 1990 godina i da kažem  
‘Uh, al’ sam nešto ružno sanjao…’521  
 
Milan Mladenović, EKV 
 
 
 
The thesis reflected on a generational challenge to Yugoslav socialism, 
in which socialist self-management was not necessarily rejected, but rather 
seen as capable of reform within the existing Yugoslav federal framework. It 
showed how an urban trans-republican network developed that expressed novel 
ideas in politics and culture and engendered issue-oriented activism, in addition 
to a new ‘sense of citizenship’, where the Yugoslav and the ethno-national line 
of identification were seen as complementary and not mutually exclusive. 
Although significantly conditioned by the republican contexts, debates, 
exchanges and interactions took place across republican borders. This realm of 
youth politics and culture which had the wide decentralised network of the 
League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia as its institutional umbrella broke down 
only very late in the decade once the physical dissolution of the country began 
to materialise. The thesis addressed the publicly prominent/active youth of the 
1980s against the background of Yugoslav late socialist research that dealt with 
‘the crisis generation’. It also addressed the ways in which the actors 
themselves mobilised the rhetoric of youth/generation to challenge the 
mainstream, establishing new political languages through cultural acts, 
journalistic writing or issue-oriented activism. 
The thesis focused on the reinvention of the institutional youth sphere 
and the new concepts of freedom members of this generation put forward 
through the youth media and through their various ‘acts of citizenship’. The first 
chapter elaborated on the notion of space - both in physical terms and as a form 
of public platform where the boundaries of permitted critique and ‘tolerated 
freedom’ could be challenged and tested. In addition, it addressed the subtle 
border between negotiation and dissent in the rapport these youngsters had 
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with their youth organisation and with the state. The LSYY was perceived as 
capable of reforming and acting as a conduit for new forms of politics and 
culture, whether derived from internal sources or taken from new developments, 
particularly in Western European countries. In this sense, representatives of this 
generation - for the most part - still believed in a ‘Yugoslav way’. A more daring 
style of journalistic writing, new forms of music and art and new forms of 
political expression and activism found shelter within the institutional youth 
sphere. As a state ‘socio-political’ institution that was nevertheless 
decentralised in form, relatively distanced from the realm of high politics, and 
full of ‘experimental’ peripheral spaces, the LSYY was perfectly positioned to 
channel and support new ideas and forms of cultural and political activism with 
its considerable material resources and infrastructure. At the same time, it had 
to maintain a balance between ‘the new’ and ‘the old’. In addition, the federal 
level of the Youth League often faced the challenge of reconciling the disparate 
attitudes and views coming from its diverse ‘base’ all over the country. 
Moreover, being part of the political system, it had to frame the new demands 
and aspirations in the politically acceptable vocabulary, although internal 
debates about ‘the democratisation’ of the LSYY began soon after the death of 
Josip Broz Tito in 1980. Hence, a closer look at the internal dynamics, internal 
debates and changes over time within socialist institutions provides a venue for 
studying socialist societies beyond the often taken for granted paradigm of 
‘binary socialism’.  
The concept of ‘freedom’ was central to this generation’s cause: it was 
primarily associated with freedom of thought, speech and expression, which 
became particularly prominent during the bannings of particular issues of youth 
magazines, the contestations of article 133 and the elusive definition of the 
crime of ‘enemy propaganda’, as well as during the rise of the new issue-
oriented campaigns around peace, environmentalism and sexual freedom. 
However, freedom for many of these activists did not mean the end of 
Yugoslavia and socialist self-management, at least until the very late 1980s: for 
most, Yugoslav socialism was still capable of reforming itself and 
accommodating these demands. The second chapter reflected on the debates 
concerning the future of the inherited socialist framework of values and 
commemorative practices and the ways Tito’s legacy was going to be carried 
forward following his death. Although frequently reproached for an alleged 
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appropriation of far right ideologies, the different cultural acts (punk music, the 
controversial Youth Baton poster) essentially challenged the norms and 
discourse of an older generation and sought to re-think the performative 
dimension through which the various levels of the Yugoslav post-war consensus 
were manifested. 
Until the late 1980s, the young activists involved in the different issue-
oriented campaigns that used the institutional youth realm as a platform to gain 
visibility in the public space, still operated within the discourse of socialist self-
management, social justice and solidarity, seeking to put under scrutiny the 
malfunctions of the system and the corrupt elites. As it was demonstrated in 
Chapter 3, new areas for political expression opened up around issues of 
peace, anti-militarism, environmentalism/nuclear disarmament and sexuality 
and it was the League of Socialist Youth that brought these issues to public 
attention. What was unique to this generation’s understanding of the socio-
political context was an acceptance of the Yugoslav institutional framework and 
an identification with Yugoslavia in a political, or civic sense, as they essentially 
sought to correct, criticise or ridicule the regime, thus drawing a rather clear line 
between their anti-regime activism and the overt anti-Yugoslavism which began 
to dominate in the late 1980s, in particular among the intellectual circles in 
Serbia and Slovenia.522 The way they framed their ‘acts of citizenship’ and 
articulated their demands conflated their particular identity as stemming from 
the Yugoslav context, possessing Yugoslav-specific contestations of the socio-
political framework with challenges resulting from developments at international 
level, as the latter served both as a personal inspiration and a platform for 
meaningful exchange and interaction. 
One of the prevalent debates both within the political realm and the 
sphere of institutional youth culture up until 1987 was how to maintain but 
rethink and reform Yugoslav socialist federalism. After 1987 the clashes 
intensified, the envisioned responses to the crisis further diversified and the 
ideological gaps widened to the extent that one could observe more conflicting 
approaches rather than constructive debate. This was particularly visible during 
the debates for the amendment of the Serbian republican constitution in 1988 
and the emerging anti-Albanian discourse which would eventually lead to 
Kosovo being stripped of its constitutional autonomy in 1989. In Chapter 4, the 
                                                 
522
 See: Jasna Dragović-Soso, ‘Saviours of the Nation’. 
223 
 
thesis provided new perspectives on this moment from the point of view of the 
young generation and the youth sphere. The period from 1986 until 1990 saw a 
radical change in the way the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia 
articulated its politics and defined its role. In the late 1980s, the political debates 
and their framing in hostile and exclusivist terms started to migrate to the youth 
political and cultural realm, engendering conflicts, statements or observations 
which did away with the previously established codes of public debate and 
political communication. At the same time, however, an intra-republican 
diversification among the young political and media elite occurred, accompanied 
by a convergence on individual or group basis across national lines and mainly 
around reformist and liberal values.    
Like the majority of the anti-nationalist liberal and leftist intellectuals in 
the second half of the 1980s, some of the vocal representatives of this 
generation advanced a vision of Yugoslavism/Yugoslav citizenship that could 
stand apart from dogmatic socialism and ethnic nationalism. Born and raised in 
socialist Yugoslavia to parents who were also educated and socialised in the 
post-1945 Yugoslav context, these youngsters had internalised to a certain 
extent the proclaimed notions of freedom and peace, equality and solidarity and 
thus openly campaigned through the youth media against public hypocrisy 
when it came to the proclaimed values and their actual implementation.523 
However, a prominent caesura detected by the absolute majority of my 
respondents was indeed the rise of Slobodan Milošević and Serbian nationalism 
after 1987. Hence, during the last three years of the decade there was an 
apparent discursive shift within the youth realm as hopes for amelioration of the 
system of socialist self-management and the federation in its current form were 
abandoned, debates which openly questioned accepted history were initiated 
and although generally speaking the youth press and the youth political elite 
preserved an anti-nationalist/reformist line, they embraced the ‘liberal turn’ and 
a moderate discourse of national emancipation, eventually relegating Yugoslav 
socialist federalism to the past. Moreover, with the disappearance of the League 
of Communists in January 1990 and the abolishement of the League of Socialist 
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Youth of Yugoslavia the same year, the common political institutional platforms 
which provided the space for supra-ethnic convergence and pan-Yugoslav 
debate were lost and the formation of the new supra-national democratic 
institutions never took place. The multilayered sense of citizenship this 
generation was the embodiment of, where the ethno-national and the Yugoslav 
dimensions complemented each other, could only exist under the specific 
political consensus and the post-war social context. At the end of the 1980s, as 
the ethno-national became an omnipresent identity-marker and frame of 
reference, the tension between these different identities insreased to the point 
that this multilayered citizenship began to fragment irretrievably. Last but not 
least, the Slovene activists - those who stood at the helm of this generation’s 
political, media and cultural activism, at the end of the decade decided to 
retreat, shift their focus away from the rest of the Yugoslav space and 
abandoned any attempts at forging a pan-Yugoslav alternative – which might 
explain why a viable Yugoslav political option failed to consolidate within the 
Yugoslav youth realm.          
This thesis opens up new questions and hopes to suggest new ways of 
studying late socialism – from a critical rethinking of the concept of dissent, 
processes of domestication of Western social movements in a socialist context, 
to approaching the youth sphere more seriously and providing a history of 
alternatives. Moreover, since the thesis only analysed a limited group of 
individuals who have classified as an elite both in late socialism and today, 
other units of this generation remain unaccounted for in historical research, as 
well as many other groups who were ascribed similar importance and status 
within Yugoslav society – workers, miners, children/young pioneers, army 
officers, war veterans.   
The last Yugoslav generation has been generally remembered through 
its achievements in culture and sport in the 1980s.524 It has been often 
represented as a generation which epitomises urbanity, cosmopolitanism, non-
conformism and late Yugoslav culture. In reality, individuals who were actively 
involved in late socialist youth politics, media or culture followed diverse 
trajectories – some pursued their ‘non-conformist’ engagements in the realms of 
media and culture, some remained wholly or partially faithful to their 
liberal/progressive youthful ideals, while some chose to abandon/erase their 
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socialist past and redefine their politics. Indeed, individual professional 
trajectories and the different post-Yugoslav trajectories of the federation’s 
successor states prove to be determining of the ways individuals reflect on their 
generational experience, on the 1980s and on the Yugoslav past. Narratives of 
loss of ‘geo-political dignity’ and disillusionment with the post-Yugoslav reality 
and post-socialist politics were intertwined among my interviewees with wider 
reflections on the Yugoslav past, as well as with evocations of a sense of 
cosmopolitanism, a different way of engaging with both the Eastern and the 
Western world and a somewhat generational obsession with freedom.  
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Annex 1: Interviewees 
 
Culture: 
1. Zemira Alajbegović (Slovenia). 19 March 2012, Ljubljana.  
2. Aleš Debeljak (Slovenia). 15 March 2012, Ljubljana.  
3. Toše Filipovski (Macedonia). 12 October 2011, Skopje.  
4. Srđan Gojković-Gile (Serbia). 30 October 2011, Belgrade.  
5. Bojan Hadžihalilović (Bosnia-Herzegovina). 9 March 2012, Sarajevo.  
6. Nikolai Jeffs (Slovenia). 16 March 2012, Ljubljana.  
7. Neven Korda (Slovenia). 4 May 2012, Ljubljana.  
8. Milčo Mančevski (Macedonia). 6 September 2012, Skopje.  
9. Zoran Predin (Slovenia). 16 November 2011, Ljubljana.  
10. Vlatko Stefanovski (Macedonia). 19 December 2011, Skopje.  
11. Goran Tanevski (Macedonia). 24 August 2012, Skopje.   
12. Gregor Tomc (Slovenia). 17 November 2011, Ljubljana.  
13. Igor Vidmar (Slovenia). 13 November 2011, Ljubljana.  
Media: 
14. Senad Avdić (Bosnia-Herzegovina). 24 February 2012, Sarajevo. 
15. Velimir Ćurguz-Kazimir (Serbia). 10 April 2012, Belgrade.  
16. Petar Janjatović (Serbia). 27 October 2011, Belgrade.  
17. Ljupčo Jolevski (Macedonia). 6 October 2011, Skopje.  
18. Predrag Kojović (Bosnia-Herzegovina). 2 March 2012, Sarajevo.  
19. Boro Kontić (Bosnia-Herzegovina). 7 March 2012, Sarajevo.  
20. Miha Kovač (Slovenia). 4 May 2012, Ljubljana.  
21. Milomir Kovačević-Strašni (Bosnia-Herzegovina). 20 June 2012, Paris.  
22. Zoran Kostov (Macedonia). 30 April 2012, Skopje.  
23. Dragan Kremer (Serbia). 1 November 2011, Belgrade.  
24. Sašo Ordanovski (Macedonia). 7 October 2011, Skopje.  
25. Senad Pećanin (Bosnia-Herzegovina). 7 March 2012, Sarajevo.  
New social movements: 
26. Danica Fink Hafner (Slovenia). 15 March 2012, Ljubljana.  
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27. Marko Hren (Slovenia). 19 March 2012, Ljubljana.  
28. Nataša Sukič (Slovenia). 16 March 2012, Ljubljana.  
Politics: 
29. Branko Greganović (Slovenia). 26 September 2012, via Skype.  
30. Risto Ivanov (Macedonia). 30 April 2012, Skopje.  
31. Dejan Jović (Croatia). 11 June 2012, Zagreb.  
32. Rasim Kadić (Bosnia-Herzegovina). 22/24 February 2012, Sarajevo.  
33. Slobodan Najdovski (Macedonia). 26 April 2012, Skopje.  
34. Martin Raguž (Bosnia-Herzegovina).  01 March 2012, Sarajevo. 
35. Hasib Salkić (Bosnia-Herzegovina). 29 February 2012, Sarajevo. 
36. Zoran Thaler (Slovenia). 18 March 2012, Ljubljana.  
37. Azem Vllasi (Kosovo). 4 September 2012, Prishtina.  
Military: 
38. Milan Lišanin (Serbia). 25 August 2012, via Skype.  
39. Vladimir Rajtar (Croatia). 13 June 2012, Zagreb.   
40. Simo Spaskovski (Macedonia). 22 November 2011, Skopje.  
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Annex 2: Generations 
 
 
The Partisan generation 
 
The first socialist/post-war generation 
 
The older cohort  
 
    The older cohort 
Josip Broz Tito (b.1892) 
Vladimir Bakarić (b.1912) 
Stevan Doronjski (b.1919) 
Dušan Dragosavac (b.1919) 
Fadil Hohxa (b.1910) 
Jovo Kapičić (b. 1919) 
Edvard Kardelj (b.1910) 
Lazar Koliševski (b.1914) 
Sergej Kraigher (b.1914) 
Nikola Ljubičić (b.1916) 
Cvijetin Mijatović (b.1913) 
Miloš Minić (b.1914)  
Petar Stambolić (b.1912) 
Mika Špiljak (b. 1916) 
 
 
Mahmut Bakalli (b.1936) 
Stipe Mesić (b. 1934) 
Nebojša Popov (b. 1939) 
Ivan Stambolić (b. 1936) 
Stipe Šuvar (b. 1936) 
Aleksandar Vasiljević (b. 1938) 
 
The younger cohort 
 
    The younger cohort 
Angel Čemerski (b.1923) 
Raif Dizdarević (b. 1926) 
Veselin Đuranović (b.1925) 
Stane Dolanc (b.1925) 
Ivan Dolničar (b.1921) 
Aleksandar Grličkov (b.1923) 
Veljko Kadijević (b. 1925) 
Budimir Lončar (b.1924) 
Branko Mamula (b.1921) 
Ante Marković (b. 1924) 
Branko Mikulić (b.1928) 
Lazar Mojsov (b.1920) 
Milka Planinc (b.1924) 
Franc Popit (b.1921) 
Hamdija Pozderac (b.1923) 
Franjo Tuđman (b. 1922) 
Vidoje Žarković (b.1927) 
 
Radovan Karađić (b. 1945) 
Milan Kučan (b. 1941) 
Slobodan Milošević (b. 1941) 
Ratko Mladić (b. 1942) 
Rahman Morina (b. 1943) 
Dragiša Pavlović (b. 1943) 
Ivica Račan (b. 1944) 
Azem Vllasi (b. 1948) 
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Annex 3: Visual material 
 
          
  Mladost, Belgrade                                             Stav, Vojvodina 
 
           
  Valter, Bosnia-Herzegovina                             Naši dani, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
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  NON, Serbia                                               Student, Serbia 
 
                      
  Mlad borec, Macedonia                                   Studentski zbor, Macedonia 
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   Mladina, Slovenia                                            Tribuna, Slovenia 
        
  Polet, Croatia                                                   Studentski list, Croatia 
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The controversial Youth Day poster, 1987 (State Archive of Slovenia) 
 
The Youth Day poster that replaced the previous one, 1987 (State Archive of Slovenia) 
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Poster for the 12th congress of the League of Socialist Youth of Croatia  
(National Library of Croatia)   
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